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Special Operations News – October 2, 2023

SOF News — Mon, 02 Oct 2023 05:00:00 +0000

Curated news, analysis, and commentary about special operations, national security, and conflicts around the world.

Photo / Image: A CV-22 Osprey flies over Fort Walton Beach, Florida. (USAF photo by Senior Airman Christopher Callaway, April 24, 2015).

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SOF News

Drug Testing by NSW. The Navy will begin randomly testing its special operations forces for steroids and other performance-enhancing drugs beginning in November, taking a groundbreaking step that military leaders have long resisted. Rear Adm. Keith Davids, commander of Naval Special Warfare Command, announced the new program Friday in a message to his force, calling it necessary to protect their health and military readiness. The Navy will be the first to begin random testing, but Army Special Operations Command said it will soon follow suit, although no start date has been set. “The Navy will start randomly testing SEALs and special warfare troops for steroids”, CBS News, September 29, 2023.

AFSOC Summit. Air Force Special Operations Command hosted the annual Technology, Acquisition, Sustainment Review summit at Cannon Air Force Base, N.M., Sept. 27-28, 2023. TASRs are Air Force-directed annual tri-chair summits designed to ensure AFMC is meeting warfighters’ needs. During the two-day summit, Cannon Air Commandos showcased AFSOC’s pathfinding legacy through operational capability demonstrations. TASR attendees saw how AFSOC techniques and equipment, like forward arming and refueling point teams and the Compact Loading Adapter and Wench System, are key to building a resilient and ready Air Commando force. “Air Force Special Operations Command hosts annual Technology, Acquisition, Sustainment Review summit”, Cannon Air Force Base, September 29, 2023.

Birth of Modern ARSOF. The road to the establishment of a two- and three-star command for ARSOF was long. Three individuals played key roles in the formation of USASOC and SF Command. “You Have Arrived”: 1st Special Operations Command and the Birth of Modern ARSOF”, U.S. Army, October 1, 2023.

Cutting Army SOF Strength. Congress is concerned about proposed cuts to Army Special Operations Forces and is asking questions on the 3,000 or more personnel who will be trimmed from the United States Army Special Operations Command (USASOC) structure. “Lawmakers, Army headed for a fight over cuts to special operations forces”, Defense One, September 28, 2023.

Best Books on SEALs. Dive into the culture and history of the Navy’s SEAL teams through the written word. “The 5 best books about Navy SEALs – according to Navy SEALs”, Task & Purpose, September 26, 2023.

Australia’s Tactical Response Team. Topics covered include history, mission, roles, selection and training, equipment, weapons, vehicles, and operations. “The Tactical Response Team: One of Australia’s Best Kept Secrets”, by Milo Ritchie, Grey Dynamics, September 30, 2023.

SOF History

SOAC. On October 1, 2012, the Army Special Operations Aviation Command (USASOAC) was activated at Fort Bragg.

75th Ranger Regiment. On October 1, 1974, the 2nd Battalion, 75th Ranger Regiment was established. On October 3, 1984, the 75th Ranger Regiment and 3/75th was established.

Merrill’s Marauders. On October 3, 1943, the 5307 Composite Group – Merrill’s Marauders was established. It would fight in the Pacific theater during World War II.

Gothic Serpent. On October 3, 1993 – Operation Gothic Serpent, Battle of Mogadishu took place. It would end on October 4. https://sof.news/history/operation-gothic-serpent/ At the end of the battle a U.S. helicopter pilot was missing which would prompt a days-long search for until he was released by Somali insurgents. https://sof.news/conflicts/gothic-serpent-super-64/

Ambush in Niger. On October 4, 2017. Four soldiers of 3rd SFGA died in an ambush in Niger.

Ukraine Conflict

Counteroffensive. The Ukrainian military continues its offensive operations. The advances are small and incremental. Successful interdiction of Russia’s logistical network continues with the use of long-range artillery and rockets.

Updates on Ukraine. An analysis of the war in Ukraine with a discussion of whether there is a stalemate or not. Weekend Update, by Phillips O’Brien, October 1, 2023. The Institute for the Study of War has published its Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment dated September 30, 2023.

Help Special Operations Forces (SOF) personnel with spine injuries receive the healthcare options, education, and care they need.

Asia

CRS Report – China Primer: The People’s Liberation Army (PLA). The Congressional Research Service has updated a report on China’s military. Topics include PLA organization, strategy and goals, modernization, key capabilities, and defense expenditures. CRS IF11719, PDF, 3 pages, September 26, 2023. https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF11719

CRS Report – China Primer: Uyghurs. The Congressional Research Service has updated a publication about the Muslim ethnic minority group living in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR) in the far northwest of the People’s Republic of China (PRC). The document covers topics related to history, force labor, forced assimilation, mass internment, U.S. responses, and the East Turkestan Islamic Movement. PDF, 3 pages, updated September 22, 2023. https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF10281

Montagnards – SF Warrior Brothers. Terry Lloyd writes about how American Special Forces sought out the help of the Indigenous Montagnard peoples of the Central Highlands of Vietnam and their traditional homelands in Laos and Cambodia. Coming from a deep warrior culture, the Montagnard soon accepted the Green Berets as ‘warrior brothers’. “How the Montagnards of Vietnam became the Special Forces’ warrior brothers”, We Are the Mighty, September 25, 2023.

Europe

Armenia. The small Armenian Chrisitan enclave of Nagorno-Karabakh has long been a part of historical Armenia. However, since December 2022, this region of 120,000 people has been under siege by Azerbaijan. It has recently endured a long blockade of food and medicine and shortages of electricity, fuel, and internet access. Now the occupants face an authoritarian rule, religious persecution, or worse by Azerbaijan or fleeing to Armenia. “Tragic Dispatches From Nagorno-Karabakh: Armenian Christians Flee Another Genocide”, by Lela Gilbert, Religion Unplugged, September 26, 2023.

Exodus From Nagorno-Karabakh. Most of the ethnic Armenians in the breakaway region have fled Azerbaijan. Cars, buses, trucks, and tractors are carrying refugees out along a ‘humanitarian corridor’ after a lightening military operation to by Azerbaijan to occupy the region. The region had been under blockade by Azeri forces for over nine months – causing food and fuel shortages. The World Health Organization says that over 100,000 residents have fled the region. “Three quarters of Karabakh population already out in swift exodus”, Reuters, September 29, 2023.

For an understanding of the legal implications of the conflict read “The Evolving Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict – An International Law Perspective”, by Michael Schmitt and Kevin Coble, Articles of War, Lieber Institute at West Point, September 29, 2023.

Tension in Northern Kosovo. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization has increased its presence in northern Kosovo due to rising tensions between Serbia and Kosovo (Google Maps). Some news reports same an additional 600 troops have been deployed to the area. The UK is reported to have sent in 200 troops. The United States has criticized the buildup of Serbian forces along the border with Kosovo. “NATO bolsters forces in Kosovo as US urges Serbia to withdraw from border”, Politico, September 30, 2023.

Afghanistan

Kabul NEO and JPME. Gary Anderson, a retired Marine Corps officer with a lot of Afghanistan experience, laments the deplorable state of our military professional education system. He points to the chaotic Afghan withdrawal of the summer of 2021 as well as the chaotic non-combatant evacuation operation at Hamid Karzai International Airport (HKIA) as an example. He questions why our top generals didn’t push the Department of State to stage the NEO out of Bagram Air Field instead of HKIA. Read more in “Why Our Generals Can’t Think”, Military.com, September 2023.

Family Reunification. The U.S. Department of State has updated its “Family Reunification for Afghans” webpage. The page describes the different immigration options for Afghan family reunification based on citizenship, immigration status, and how the Afghan entered the United States. Updated Sep 2023.
https://www.state.gov/afghanistan-family-reunification/

Monthly Update. News about Afghanistan, relocation, immigration, resettlement, humanitarian crisis, commentary, Kabul NEO hearings, National Resistance Front (NRF), NGOs and biometrics, ‘gender apartheid’, #AfghanEvac caseworker guide, and more. Read it all here at Afghan Report, September 30, 2023.

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Books, Podcasts, Videos, and Movies

Sentinel. The October 2023 issue is now online. Topics include book reviews, intelligence failures during the 1972 Easter Offensive, SOAR convention in Las Vegas, dental CAPs in Thailand, and more. https://www.specialforces78.com/chapter-78-newsletter-for-october-2023/

Armor. The summer 2023 issue is now online. Several articles of interest for the tank community in the professional bulletin of the Armor Branch. PDF, 44 pages. https://www.dvidshub.net/publication/issues/67587

Upcoming Events

October 3, 2023
2023 Virtual MOG Mile
Three Rangers Foundation

October 16-20, 2023
SOAR XLVII
Special Operations Association

November 29-30, 2023
SOF & Irregular Warfare Symposium
Defense Strategies Institute

December 8, 2023
Winter Cruise
Combat Diver Association

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Digital Trenches: Influence Operations and Asymmetry of Values

Guest — Wed, 12 Jul 2023 05:00:00 +0000

By Riccardo Catalano.

In the rapidly evolving information environment of the 21st century, a new battlefield has emerged, one where influence operations have taken center stage. Transversal to the “Cognitive Dimension” of warfare, and the six domains, the Information Environment is a battleground that knows no geographic boundaries, and is accessible from any point around the globe through a few taps on a smartphone or keystrokes on a computer.

According to NATO’s doctrine, “the information environment is an aggregation of individuals, organizations, and systems that collect, process, disseminate, or act on information”.

While western democracies champion the virtues of a free and open Internet, certain adversarial nations are exploiting this openness to their advantage. China, Russia, and Iran have weaponized social media and press freedom in a sophisticated and strategic influence campaign, while maintaining a tightly controlled media environment within their own borders.

The openness of Western societies provides fertile ground for disinformation campaigns. Adversaries can easily disseminate false or misleading narratives through social media platforms and digital news outlets, exploiting freedom of speech to sow discord and confusion.

In contrast, the highly controlled media landscape in countries such as China, Russia, and Iran, effectively shields them from reciprocal influence operations.

One primary example is Russia’s activities during the conflict in Ukraine and more broadly across western democratic elections. With state-sponsored troll farms and the use of artificial intelligence bots, the Russian government has systematically spread disinformation to create societal divisions and challenge democratic values.

Similarly, China’s influence operations are not only aimed at promoting a positive image of China globally, but also at creating divisions within western societies. China’s combination of strict domestic censorship, such as the “Great Firewall,” and its prolific use of platforms like TikTok and WeChat for influence operations presents a particularly asymmetrical threat.

Iran, while technologically behind China and Russia, has also engaged in digital influence operations. Their efforts have focused on inciting discord among western allies and spreading anti-western propaganda.

Confronting this asymmetry requires a multi-pronged approach. The western alliance must prioritize the protection of their own information environment while developing capabilities to penetrate the adversaries’ information barriers. This includes investing in technologies to detect and counteract disinformation, and educating the public on how to recognize and respond to foreign influence efforts.

Civilian professionals with experience in digital marketing, social media, and information security can play a crucial role in this battle. Their expertise can be used to create compelling narratives that support democratic values, while their understanding of information flow and audience analysis can help identify and neutralize adversarial influence operations.

In an era where ‘the pen is mightier than the sword‘, we are in an arms race for narrative control. The challenge for western democracies is to strike a balance between protecting our information environment from adversarial influence operations while upholding the principles of freedom of speech and open information access that define us.

In this tug-of-war, the key is not to choose between one over the other, but rather to find a way to uphold both commitments simultaneously. This requires a nuanced and multi-faceted approach. A purely defensive posture, focused solely on identifying and countering disinformation, is not enough.

Democracies must go on the offensive, leveraging the skills and resources of both the government and private sectors to effectively communicate democratic values, reinforce societal resilience against disinformation, and promote critical thinking. Initiatives like digital literacy programs, fact-checking services (truly independent ones), and public awareness campaigns can go a long way towards equipping citizens with the tools to discern reliable from unreliable information.

***********

Author: Riccardo Catalano is a former SGT in the Italian Air Force. He is now a copywriter and editor. His writings can be found on his blog at https://www.narrazionistrategiche.net/.

Ukraine Conflict Update – June 6, 2023

SOF News — Tue, 06 Jun 2023 05:00:00 +0000

Curated news, analysis, and commentary about the Russian invasion of Ukraine, tactical situation on the ground, in the air, and on the seas. Additional topics include NATO, aid to Ukraine, refugees, internally displaced personnel, humanitarian efforts, cyber, and information operations.

Image / Photo: Staff Sgt. Dave Servida, 436th Aerial Port Squadron ramp supervisor, directs weapons cargo bound for Ukraine onto a C-17 Globemaster III during a security assistance mission at Dover Air Force Base, Delaware, Aug. 19, 2022. (U.S. Air Force photo by Senior Airman Cydney Lee)

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Big Picture of the Conflict

Failed Winter Offensive (Russia) and Future Counteroffensive (Ukraine). The results of fighting over the winter was costly for both sides of the conflict. Now all eyes are watching the Ukrainian military for its expected spring offensive. Some analysts believe it will be a major attack at one focal point with the intent to thrust deep into the Russian rear area reaching the Sea of Azov. But others think it will be a series of shorter offensives spread across the front line. Currently, Ukraine is attacking Russian logistical depots and command and control centers behind enemy lines with artillery and missiles. Ukrainian officials are being quiet on when the counteroffensive will take place and have mounted a campaign against public disclosure of details – “Words are very unnecessary. They can only do harm”. (Twitter, June 4, 2023)

Has It Begun? There is speculation that the Ukrainian counteroffensive has already begun. U.S. officials say there are signs that a counteroffensive is now underway. Fighting is raging at several points on the front line. Most military analysts believe the attack will be concentrated on southern Ukraine in an attempt to sever the land bridge between western Russia and occupied Crimea.

News Reports on Counteroffensive:

“This is Ukraine’s D-Day”, by Jamie Dettmer, Politico Europe, June 6, 2023.
“Ukraine Intensifies Attacks on Russian Frontline Positions”, The New York Times, June 5, 2023. (subscription)
“Is Ukraine’s Counteroffensive Here?”, The New York Times, June 5, 2023. (subscription)
“Ukraine war: Kyiv says troops advance on eastern front”, BBC News, June 6, 2023.

NATO-Trained Units and the Coming Offensive. Ukrainian units have had personnel trained by European nations for months. Some of these units have been made from scratch – like the brand-new 47th Separate Mechanized Brigade that received its training at a NATO base in Germany. The 47th brigade and other assault units have been armed with Western weapons, including Bradley infantry fighting vehicles and Leopard tanks, that will allow it to cross minefields and trenches into the deep Russian rear area of operations. “NATO-trained units will serve as tip of spear in Ukraine’s counteroffensive”, The Washington Post, June 4, 2023. (subscription)

Battle for Bakhmut. The fight for the small industrial city on the frontlines in eastern Ukraine is in a temporary operational lull. The Russians appear to have reached their culminating point (no more capacity to conduct offensive operations) and are relying on the use of artillery and mortars to continue the fight around the city. The Russians announced that they achieved their objective of capturing the city. The Russian paramilitary organization, the Wagner Group, is pulling its forces to the rear for rest and refit; while the ground held is being turned over to regular and airborne Russian military troops. A Ukrainian defense spokesman said that at the end of May Ukrainian forces maintained control over the southwestern outskirts and entrance to Bakhmut City.

Increased Global Support for Ukraine. The Biden administration has given the green light for other nations to provide F-16s to Ukraine. This is one of many ‘signals’ that global support for Ukraine has increased and that nations are more willing to provide more lethal offensive weapons to that nation; weapons that can strike deep behind enemy lines and threaten Russian positions in Crimea. Ukraine is enjoying strong support throughout most of the world – even as the conflict rages on. Some think the conflict is at a turning point. “Did Ukraine just win the war?”, The Strategist, Australian Strategic Policy Institute, May 30, 2023.

Microsoft Report – Russian Cyber Operations. A Microsoft Threat Intelligence report has been published that analyzed Russian tactics over the twelve-month period since Russia invaded Ukraine in February 2022. The 18-page PDF examines what the investigative team has learned about Russian state tactics so far and what may be on the horizon. “A year of Russian hybrid warfare in Ukraine”, Microsoft, March 15, 2023. The United States is reported to have provided $37 million in cybersecurity assistance to Ukraine. (The Kyiv Independent, June 5, 2023).

Ground Situation

Tank Numbers. When the Russians invaded Ukraine in February 2022 they had a significant advantage in tanks and armored vehicles. However, the tank numbers are now about equal due to Russian losses and tanks provided to Ukraine by European nations. “Ukraine now probably has as many tanks as Russia”, Euromaiden Press, June 1, 2023.

Minefields and Fortifications. The Russians have been digging in for months in anticipation of an expected Ukrianian offensive to recapture territory taken by the Russians since February 2022. One expected axis of approach for the Ukrainian offensive is Zaporizhzhia region and the city of Melitopol. However, it is unknown if Ukraine has the necessary quantity of mine clearing and fortification breaching equipment to rapidly push through the Russian lines. “To liberate territory, Ukraine must smash fortified Russian defenses”, The Washington Post, June 2, 2023. (subscription)

SOF – Preparing the Battlefield. Expectations are high for a widely anticipated Ukrainian counteroffensive; perhaps too high. However, Kyiv is already making the first moves of the campaign with its special operations forces. “Ukrainian Special Forces – Preparing the Battlefield”, Center for European Policy Analysis (CEPA), May 22, 2023.

Chechen Leader Criticizes Wagner Group. Ramzan Kadyrov has come out vocally against the leader of the Wagner Group – Yevgeny Prigozhin. He says that the leader of the Russian paramilitary group should not criticize the Russian military and should provide more vocal support for Putin. Chechen “Akhmat” forces have been active on the frontlines supporting the Russian occupation of Ukraine. Prigozhin has accused the Kremlin of fabricating a rift between him and Kadyrov.

The Other Russian Mercenaries. While the Wagner Group gets most of the headlines there are numerous private military groups in Russia . . . some fighting in Ukraine. “Everyone is talking about Wagner. But who are Russia’s other mercenairies?”, Euronews, May 16, 2023.

Sabotage Cells in Russia. Ukraine has cultivated sabotage agents inside Russia and is giving them drones to stage attacks. The drones have been launched from inside Russia; some targeting the Kremlin. (CNN Politics, June 5, 2023).

Situation Maps. War in Ukraine by Scribble Maps. The Institute for the Study of War presents a map that depicts the assessed control of terrain in Ukraine as of March 6, 2023, 3:00 PM ET. View more Ukraine SITMAPs that provide updates on the disposition of Russian forces.

News Updates. A detailed daily update of the war – a daily review – is provided by Euromaidan Press. And, of course, there is the always comprehensive daily report by the Institute for the Study of War.

Fight for the Skies

Air Attacks Continue. Despite reports over the past several months that Russia has been expending its supply of missiles the pace of the air attacks is continuing. A combination of drone and cruise missiles have targeted command and control nodes and logisitical facilities over the past four weeks – many times in the nations capital of Kyiv. In the past month over 400 Iranian Shahed drones and 114 cruise missiles (Politico) have struck Ukraine.

F-16s for Ukraine. There is a lot of support for NATO nations to provide F-16s to Ukraine. After months of public lobbying by Ukraine there appears that some may be going to Ukraine. In May, President Joe Biden said that the U.S. will support training Ukrainian pilots to fly the aircraft and has said he supports the providing of F-16s to Ukraine by Poland and other European nations. While the public may have high expectations for the F-16 there are many factors that will need to be taken into account. “What F-16s Will (and Won’t) Do For Ukraine”, The RAND Blog, May 31, 2023. See also “Ukraine’s Quest for Air Superiority: The Implications of F-16 Fighter Jets in the Conflict”, SOFREP, May 20, 2023.

Drones – Cost Effective. One defense expert has conducted research on the cheapest and most effective means of destroying infantry or armored units. He has found that, in many instances, the use of small drones comes out on top. “Study shows drones the cheapest, most effective in battle against Russian invasion”, Euromaiden Press, May 28, 2023.

Maritime Activities

Ukrainian Naval SOF Unit. A quiet but intense battle is raging near Kherson, which Ukraine recaptured from Russia last year. The fight is happening along the Dnipro River, which divides Ukrainian and Russian-held territory. The 73rd Naval Center of Special Operations appears to be leading the effort for Ukraine. “A secretive SEAL-like unit is leading Ukraine’s shadowy battle against Russia in a vital corner of the country”, Business Insider, May 28, 2023.

Importance of the Black Sea. Mara Karlin, assistant secretary of defense for strategy, plans, and capabilities spoke at the Black Sea and Balkans Security Forum in Bucharest, Romania in mid-May 2023. In her comments she stated that the Black Sea is a crucial crossroads for the world and is an area of critical geostrategic importance. “U.S. Official Looks to Deter Russia in Black Sea Region”, DoD News, May 19, 2023.

General Information

Report – Middle East and North Africa: Implications of the Russia-Ukraine War. Congressional Research Service (CRS), updated June 2, 2023, PDF, 30 pages.
https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R47160

Documentary on Mariupol. A film named “20 Days in Mariupol” made its premiere in Ukraine on June 3, 2023, when it was seen by the first time by some of the Ukrainian medics and first responders who were chronicled in the documentary. The film is a joint project between The Associated Press and PBS Frontline and footage was taken from three Ukrainian journalists who were in Mariupol during the seige and capture by the Russians. “Award-winning Mariupol documentary screened for 1st time in Ukraine”, AP News, June 4, 2023.

Ukraine and Military Observers. History shows us that sending military officers to observe foreign wars yields benefits. We should send some to Ukraine to prepare our forces for the future. “U.S. Military Observers and Why They Are Needed in Ukraine”, War on the Rocks, May 12, 2023.

Additional U.S. Assistance. On May 31, 2023, the U.S. Department of Defense announced that President Biden has authorized the 39th drawdown of U.S. arms and equipment for Ukraine. This will provide an additional $300 million worth of equipment. The security package includes significant air defense capabilities, ammunition for HIMARS and artillery, and other field equipment. Some of the air defense equipment includes additional munitions for Patriot air defense systems, Avenger air defense systems, Stinger antiaircraft systems, and AIM-7 missiles for air defense. A Fact Sheet on U.S. Security Assistance to Ukraine (dated May 31, 2023) details the security assistance provided to Ukraine since February 2022.

Body of U.S. Green Beret Recovered. Nick Maimer, a former U.S. Special Forces soldier, was killed in the embattled city of Bakhmut in mid-May 2023. He was performing humanitarian work and training defense forces when he was killed. The Russian paramilitary organization, Wagner Group, turned the body after efforts by Perry Blackburn, another former Green Beret associated with the non-profit organization AFGfree, interceded into the affair. “Body of US Special Forces Veteran Turned Over by Russian Mercenary Group”, Military.com, May 26, 2023. Watch a video about the death of Maimer in “CNN pieces together clues about American killed in Bakhmut”, CNN World, May 26, 2023.

Commentary

What Ukraine Must Do to Win. Two retired U.S. Special Forces officers, Erik Kramer and Paul Schneider, provide their perspective on what the Ukrainian military needs to do to be victorious in the conflict with Russia. They are co-founders of the Ukraine Defense Support Group headquartered in Kyiv, Ukraine. They observed a series of common trends: lack of mission command, effective training, and combined arms operations. The logistic and maintenance systems are ad hoc. The use of special operations forces needs to be fine-tuned. One specific aspect of training that is needed is the implementation of a 30-day train-the-trainer program that focuses on mission command of combined arms from the brigade level down. “What the Ukrainian Armed Forces need to Do to Win”, War on the Rocks, June 2, 2023.

What is Russia’s Strategy? Putin may have already attained his goals in Ukraine. He has occupied the entire western coastline of the Sea of Azov, captured vital Ukrainian ports on the Sea of Azov, established a land corridor between Russia and Crimea, and occupied swaths of agricultural and industrial regions of eastern Ukraine. His military will outlast Ukraine’s in a war of attrition, the vital support of western nations may ebb over time, and Ukraine’s economic future is in peril. Read more in “What Is Russia’s Strategy in Ukraine?”, Modern War Institute at West Point, June 5, 2023.

Resources about the Ukraine Conflict

Maps of Ukraine
https://www.national-security.info/ukraine/maps.html

Weapons of the Ukraine War.
https://www.national-security.info/ukraine/weapons.html

Ukraine Conflict Info. The Ukrainians have launched a new website that will provide information about the war. It is entitled Russia Invaded Ukraine and can be found at https://war.ukraine.ua/.

Ukrainian Think Tanks – Brussels. Consolidated information on how to help Ukraine from abroad and stay up to date on events.

UNCN. The Ukraine NGO Coordination Network is an organization that ties together U.S.-based 501c3 organizations and non-profit humanitarian organizations that are working to evacuate and support those in need affected by the Ukraine crisis. https://uncn.one

Paper – Evolution of Russian Information Warfare

Charles Davis — Fri, 05 May 2023 05:00:00 +0000

By CW4 Charles Davis.

Information technology has significantly enhanced human interaction around the globe and elevated the importance of information as an instrument of power wielded by individuals and societies in politics, economics, and warfare. Advances in information technology have significantly changed the generation of, transmission of, reception of, and reaction to information. – Joint Concept for Operations in the Information Environment July 2018

The Russian concept of Information Warfare (IW) began to develop in the post WWII Soviet Union. However military theory on the concept gained traction with the USSR’s Military Research Institute (MRI), through the writings of Dr. Vladimir Lefebvre. [1] Lefebvre is credited with developing Reflexive Control (RC) Theory in the 1960s, while working for the MRI. His book, “The Algebra of Consciousness”, was the foundation for classifying the theory and establishing a Soviet research institute to assess its applications. [2]

Reflexive Control Theory requires a foundational understanding of the psychology of the target. Developing a targeted operation requires deep cultural understanding and occurs through modeling

Diagram: Lefebvres Reflexive Control Technique.

Lefebvre’s philosophy was reaffirmed in a 1976 paper by V Druzhinin and D Kontorov, titled “Problems with Military systems Engineering”. The work firmly asserts; control of the target’s decision process derives from a profound knowledge of the state of his forces, military doctrine, objectives, and personal qualities of his executive personnel. Additionally, an adversary’s politics, ideology, emotional state, and mutual relations can also be leveraged to influence decision-making. (Chotikul, 1986) [4] Putin’s approach to conducting Information Warfare through RC is firmly intrenched in these concepts, with global implications.

Russia does not distinguish Information Operations (IO) as a peacetime or conflict tool and there are no restrictions between leveraging RC against military or civilian targets. Therefore, adversaries such as the United States can expect IW to be a constant in competition, crisis, and conflict. As such, IW is conducted globally and indiscriminately. Putin affirmed this position in his 2006 address to the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation. “We must take into account the plans and directions of development of the armed forces of other countries…. Our responses must be based on intellectual superiority, they will be asymmetric, and less expensive.” [5]

An early example of Soviet forces applying Lefebver’s Reflexive Control is evident in interviews with Vladimir Ryzhkov (Russian State Duma Deputy 1993-2007). Ryzhkov recalls conversations with KGB propaganda officers regarding their efforts in Afghanistan in the 1980s and several points can be taken. The Afghan population had to be convinced the government was acting in their interests and the enemy provoked the crisis. Operations also focused on fabricating incidents of persecution of Russian speaking populations, using just enough truth to draw social attention and outrage. Using these incidents, IOs focused on demonizing the adversary and masking Soviet aggression as humanitarian aid to those persecuted. Controlling the narrative was most important and crackdowns on all accessible media outlets secured their ability to direct the message. [6]

Later examples provided by Ryzhkov present RC in a new light. For example, in 1999 Russia used reports of Chechen attacks into Dagestan as a mechanism for driving public opinion in support of a second military incursion into Chechnya. None of the jihadist groups ever took responsibility for the August and September apartment bombings and there is broad speculation that Moscow conducted false flag reporting to justify a military presence.

Additionally, Russian press suggested as many as 100 foreign instructors participated in training Chechen terrorists. Other Russian press reporting indicated Usama Bin Laden was sending mercenaries from Afghanistan and Yemen. [7] Narrative control here provided popular support for elevated military operations in the region. Media influence during the second Chechen war was highlighted in a Newsline piece by Paul Goble: “Indeed, the Russian government’s own newspaper ‘Izvestiya’ noted rather critically that “the introduction of centralized military censorship regarding the war in the North Caucasus is the only new idea in the much-vaunted national security doctrine.” [8] These examples along with press observations suggesting a shift in tactic, reinforce the presence of RC as a recognized component of Russian political and military strategy.

Also in the 1990s, the Russian government started to see the value in state-sponsored think tanks. While Russia leveraged academia for research and analysis, it did not apply the concept of state sponsored institutes, like RAND in the United States. The Russian Institute for Strategic Studies (RISI) is one such organization, which was established by presidential decree in February of 1992. Atlantic Council Research indicates; by 2007 there were roughly seventy researchers, working on international security, the near abroad, military-strategic questions, international economic security, and market economic issues. [9]

RISI provides a unique view of how Lefebvre’s concepts for RC are studied and applied. A 2019 product by Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center provides an in-depth study of several think tanks in today’s Russia. According to Barbashin and Graef, in April of 2009 RISI was identified as a Federal Scientific Institution. Categorizing it in this manner solidified funding through the Presidential Administration. The increased funding allowed RISI to broaden its scope and add new departments. Putin also installed Lieutenant General (ret) Leonid Reshetnikov, formerly the Director of Foreign Intelligence Services, as administrator. [10]

Between 2011 and 2014 Reshetnikov was able to expand RISI research and analysis capabilities. In 2011, RISI established a Center for Regional and Ethno-Religious Studies. Then in March 2014 Reshetnikov hired representatives from Helsinki, Belgrade, and Warsaw to support his newly established Information Center in Tiraspol Transnistria. At the opening ceremony, he spoke of the importance of the Crimean vote for reunification with Russia. [11] RISI remained supportive of the creation of Novorossiya (New Russia) and endorsed escalation of military operations in eastern Ukraine. [12]

RISI remained vocally supportive of Russian operations in Ukraine throughout 2014 and drafted a report in October framing the events as a western plot. In the October 2014 report, titled “The Ukrainian Crisis: Instrument of Geopolitics of the West”, RISI analysts asserted the United States was waging an information, economic, and political operation against Russia. Russia was portrayed as foiling US plots to establish a new world order of US “business and political elites”. [13] The October report also alluded to US intentions for American military bases on the Black Sea. The report and narratives to insight fear of the US and incompetence in Ukrainian governance all align with the primary concepts of RC.

Also in 2011, Russian Chief of General Staff Nikolai Makarov began to voice his reservations that Russia’s military had not successfully adopted to the requirements of modern warfare. Specifically, he did not believe the military would be successful in non-contact warfare such as Information Operations. Makarov’s concerns fueled General Valery Gerasimov’s efforts to address the question of how to describe/define modern war and frame operational concepts for Russian success in 2013. One key distinction in Gerasimov’s framing of Information Warfare (IW), and that of western generals is that Russia does not distinguish cyber warfare from other types of IO: it’s simply another tool in the box. [14]

Graphic from Gerasimov article in Voyenno-Promyshlennyy Kurier, 26 February 2013 [15]

By 2014 there were two primary templates for IO. The first, “Red Web”, written by former KGB officers Andrei Soldatov and Irina Borogan centered on media control. But an article in the Journal of the Academy of Military Science, written by several Belarusian nationals approached the concept in much broader terms. The concept focused on 13 goals and more closely aligns with Reflexive Control Theory. They are described in an article by MITRE as:

Changing the citizen’s moral values
Creating a lack of spirituality
Destroying traditions and cultivating a negative attitude toward cultural legacy
Manipulating the social consciousness
Disorganizing systems and creating obstacles
Destabilizing political relations
Exacerbating political struggles and provoking repression
Reducing information support
Misinforming, undermining, and discrediting administrative organs
Provoking social, political, national, and religious conflicts
Mobilizing protests and strikes
Undermining authority
Damaging interests of a state [16]

Where Soldatov and Borogan focused on a single platform, the Belarusian theorists addressed measurable objectives. Their approach has garnered more attention, and practical application of their concepts has appeared more recently in Russian IW efforts.

In 2014, Vladislav Surkov left his position of Deputy Prime Minister of the Russian Federation for an appointment as Presidential Aide to Putin. Surkov assumed responsibilities for the Presidential Directorate for Social and Economic Cooperation with the CIS Member Countries. In this capacity, Surkov assumed the responsibility for developing policy towards Ukraine and began to receive daily updates focused on social, economic, and political issues in specific regions of the country. The data allowed Russia to frame a narrative and develop supporting disinformation that would manipulate Ukrainian public sentiment and political decision-making.

Graphic image from hacked Surkov emails, Euromaiden Press, March 26, 2020.

Hacked emails, associated with Surkov’s position during the annexation of Crimea, also provide supporting evidence Surkov relied on several Russian think tanks to assist with developing RC concepts to use in IW against Ukraine and NATO countries. This data provides a connection back to Reshetnikov and the Russian Institute for Strategic Studies, supporting direct involvement in privately funded efforts to recruit and finance the separatist insurgency in eastern Ukraine. [17]

In 2019, The Royal United Service Institute was able to establish a chronology of Surkov- led activities during the Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014. The final paper was a direct result of hacked emails from Vladislav Surkov during this period. [18] Authors, Alya Shandra and Robert Seely, assert Russia accomplished the seizure of Crimea through overt and covert activities, along with local ideologs and paid collaborators.

At the covert level, Russia interfered in Ukrainian elections, organized and funded a pan-Ukrainian campaign for a ‘soft federalization’ of the country, attempted to change Ukraine’s constitution and establish an alternative center of power, and created an illusion of widespread support for these activities…. The Kremlin conducted painstaking research into the intricacies of Ukrainian daily life to understand the Ukrainian world view and identify vulnerabilities that could be exploited. Then, using media, front groups, provocateurs, and paid rallies, it created a virtual reality designed to compel Ukraine into making decisions serving Russian objectives. [19]

Stark similarities can be drawn between Russian actions in the second Chechen war and that of the annexation of Ukraine. Pro-Russian proxies in the Donbas were inundated with fake news targeting Ukrainian government and military atrocities; while the Russian population was provided similar media coverage focused on stimulating their emotional support of the ethnic Russian people trapped in Ukraine. In the international community, Russia continued to distract, and deceive, creating information overload paralysis and indecision among the NATO partners.

The May 2nd, 2014, street fighting and fire in Odesa is an excellent example of Russian IO. Russian President Vladimir Putin claimed “Ukrainian nationalists drove defenseless people into the Trade Union building and burned them alive.” Reporting goes on to reassert the pro-Nazi position of the western backed Ukrainian government. [20] The Russian Federation continues to use the incident for propaganda purposes, through heavily financed exhibitions and select witness testimony in European countries.

Learning from IW activities in numerous other countries, Putin enhanced and refined Russia’s IO capabilities and turned his sights on the United States. Russia’s primary platforms to manipulate social consciousness, destabilize political relations; exacerbate political struggles; provoke repression; reduce information support and; misinform, undermined and discredit administrative organs were Facebook and Twitter. The weapons he intended to use were Russian Troll Farms.

In Late 2014, Russia experienced a great deal of internal social unrest. Citizen protests regarding corruption and abuse of power seemed to appear without warning, fueled by social media. To manage domestic social unrest, he turned to the Internet Research Agency (IRA), financed and developed by Yevgeny Prigozhin in 2013. [21] Christian Science Monitor correspondent Fred Weir states:

The IRA is a well-funded “internet marketing” operation that may perform commercial functions but has become notorious for its political activities. These include loading Russian social media with pro-Kremlin commentary, blogs, postings, and graphic content. Experts believe there are several such operations around Russia, some aimed at regional audiences. [22]

Russian expatriate and investigative reporter, Lyudmila Savchuk, describes IRA troll operations as mental bullying, explaining how lies are mixed with the truth to discredit and repress dissenting political opinions in Russia. In her Oslo Freedom Forum interview, Savchuk discusses her infiltration of IRA and the operational effectiveness of the Troll Farms, fake accounts, and fictitious activist groups. [23] Other interviews indicate she had daily quotas of 5 political posts, 10 non-political and 150-200 troll comments. [24]

Applying this very successful media exploitation weapon against the 2016 US presidential elections, Russia’s IRA was able to establish 3,184 Twitter accounts responsible for posting 175,993 election related tweets. [25] Additionally, Facebook assesses 126 million Americans received posts from roughly 470 IRA accounts and 3,000 IRA adds. [26] Investigations, by both the Justice and Treasury Departments, determined:

“The Internet Research Agency LLC (IRA) tampered with, altered, or caused a misappropriation of information with the purpose or effect of interfering with or undermining election processes and institutions. Specifically, the IRA tampered with or altered information in order to interfere with the 2016 U.S. election. The IRA created and managed a vast number of fake online personas that posed as legitimate U.S. persons to include grassroots organizations, interest groups, and a state political party on social media. Through this activity, the IRA posted thousands of ads that reached millions of people online. The IRA also organized and coordinated political rallies during the run-up to the 2016 election, all while hiding its Russian identity. Further, the IRA unlawfully utilized personally identifiable information from U.S. persons to open financial accounts to help fund IRA operations.” [27]

Image: Department of Justice, Affidavit Press Release, September 28, 2018, page 23.

Additional details from federal investigations into the IRA operation known as “Project Lakhta” indicate a multimillion-dollar budget, financed by Prigozhin, and supervised by GRU officers assigned to Russia’s Unit 26165 and 74455. [28] In total four entities, seven individuals, three aircraft and a yacht were determined to be directly involved; resulting in asset seizures and sanctions. The Internet Research Agency was designated for directly or indirectly engaging in, sponsoring, concealing, or otherwise being complicit in foreign interference in a U.S. election. [29]

However, Russia’s attempts to apply RC measures against the American population continued, leading up to the 2020 elections. According to researchers from MIT Technology Review “Facebook’s most popular pages for Christian and Black American content were being run by Eastern European troll farms.” [30] Furthermore, content from troll farms was viewable to 140 million US accounts each month and these farms boasted the largest Christian American page, largest African American page, second largest Native American page and the fifth largest women’s’ page. Lastly, as of October 2019 roughly 15,000 Facebook Pages were being operated from Kosovo and Macedonia. [31]

In March 2021, the Director of National Intelligence released assessments of malign Russian activities targeting the 2020 US elections. In this report, the Intelligence Community assessed Putin authorized influence operations to denigrate the Biden candidacy and the Democratic Party, through proxies. The intent was to disseminate influence narratives and misleading allegations to media and government officials as well as influential private citizens. Some activities intended to undermine public confidence, sow division, and exacerbate social tension were directly linked to Iran.

More recently, a June 2022 Chatham House report indicates Russia’s IO efforts are targeting South Africa, India, Brazil, and Mexico; attempting to garner support and sympathy for Russia’s position on Ukraine. [32] Chatham House concerns, along with July 2022 reporting from the Center for Strategic and International Studies, paint a stark picture for US relations with the Latin American Countries. Russian IW in Venezuela, Nicaragua, Cuba, Mexico, Brazil and Argentina, will require significant counter-efforts from the US Department of State and with malign leadership in a number of these countries, it is likely to be a hard-fought war on perception. [33]

As stated in the Department of State report, Pillars of Russia’s disinformation and Propaganda Ecosystem: “The perpetual conflict that Russia sees in the information environment also means that officials and state media may take one side of an issue, while outlets with a measure of independence will adopt their own variations on similar overarching false narratives. The ecosystem approach is fitting for this dynamic because it does not require harmonization among the different pillars. By simultaneously furthering multiple versions of a given story, these actors muddy the waters of the information environment in order to confuse those trying to discern the truth.” [34]

[1] https://sofrep.com/news/russian-reflexive-control-is-subverting-the-american-political-landscape/

[2] ibid

[3] ibid

[4] https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA170613.pdf

[5] http://www.en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/23577

[6] http://www.themoscowtimes.com/opinion/article/thekremlins-war-propaganda/496779.html

[7] https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monograph_reports/MR1289/RAND_MR1289.pdf

[8] http://www.hri.org/news/balkans/rferl/1999/99-10-12.rferl.html#28

[9] https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/report/thinking-foreign-policy-in-russia-think-tanks-and-grand-narratives/

[10] ibid

[11] https://mid.gospmr.org/en/DPj

[12] https://lithuaniatribune.com/russian-think-tank-that-pushed-for-invasion-of-ukraine-wants-moscow-to-overthrow-belarus-lukashenko

[13] https://riss.ru/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/AO_2014_ves-tekst.pdf

[14] https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/AD1019062.pdf

[15] https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Portals/7/military-review/Archives/English/MilitaryReview_20160228_art009.pdf

[16] https://www.mitre.org/sites/default/files/2021-11/prs-19-1004-russian-military-thought-concepts-elements.pdf

[17] https://www.bellingcat.com/news/uk-and-europe/2017/03/04/kremlins-balkan-gambit-part/

[18] https://euromaidanpress.com/2020/03/26/a-guide-to-russian-propaganda-part-5-reflexive-control/

[19] https://static.rusi.org/201907_op_surkov_leaks_web_final.pdf

[20] https://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2014/05/03/ukra-m03.html

[21] https://edition.cnn.com/2023/02/14/europe/russia-yevgeny-prigozhin-internet-research-agency-intl/index.html

[22] https://www.csmonitor.com/World/Europe/2018/0221/Before-Russia-s-troll-farm-turned-to-US-it-had-a-more-domestic-focus

[23] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Z4OAQfoMyC8

[24] https://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/07/magazine/the-agency.html

[25] https://www.usatoday.com/story/tech/news/2018/01/19/twitter-there-were-more-russian-trolls-than-we-thought/1050091001/

[26] https://www.usatoday.com/story/tech/news/2017/11/01/russians-used-facebook-way-other-advertisers-do-tapping-into-its-data-mining-machine/817826001/

[27] https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sm0312

[28] https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sm577

[29] https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sm787

[30] https://www.technologyreview.com/2021/09/16/1035851/facebook-troll-farms-report-us-2020-election/

[31] ibid

[32] https://www.chathamhouse.org/2022/06/disinformation-fight-goes-beyond-ukraine-and-its-allies

[33] https://www.csis.org/analysis/russia-western-hemisphere-assessing-putins-malign-influence-latin-america-and-caribbean

[34] https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2020/08/Pillars-of-Russia%E2%80%99s-Disinformation-and-Propaganda-Ecosystem_08-04-20.pdf

**********

Author’s Note: Thoughts and assessments in this work are those of the author and are not meant to reflect organizational opinions of the Warrant Officer Career College or the Army.

Ukraine Conflict Update – April 19, 2023

SOF News — Wed, 19 Apr 2023 05:00:00 +0000

Image / Photo: Destroyed Russian tanks in the Sumy region, Ukraine. Photo by Irina Rybakova, press service of the Ukrainian Ground Forces, March 7, 2022.

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Big Picture of the Conflict

Leaked Documents. The top secret documents leaked by an Air National Guardsman have revealed a lot of the behind the scenes happenings with the Ukraine conflict. One aspect of the conflict is the likelihood of a prolonged conflict that appears to be a stalemate; but one that favors Russia over the long-term. Since Russia is a larger country with more resources, industrial capacity, and a large population base, it can afford a long war of attrition. “Leaked documents could both help and hurt Ukraine”, The Hill Defense, April 16, 2023. The U.S. Department of Defense says that the leaked documents will not hinder cooperation with NATO partners in the support for Ukraine. “Partnered Commitment to Ukraine Unlikely to be Deterred by Recent Intel Leaks”, DoD News, April 17, 2023.

Russian Recruitment. Enlistment offices across Russia are attempting to bring recruits into the military. A new campaign is underway canvassing high schools and colleges. A mobilization in September 2022 of 300,000 reservists was the spark to led to tens of thousands of military age men to flee Russia for other countries. Russia is avoiding another large-scale call up as it resulted in wide spread opposition. “New Russian campaign tries to entice men to fight Ukraine”, AP News, March 26, 2023.

Ground Situation

Fight for Bakhmut and Stalingrad. Gaelan Hanlon provides an analysis of the Battle of Bakhmut. He used the historical example of the Battle for Stalingrad during World War II as a comparison model. His analysis concludes that the time has come for the Ukrainians to cede control of this small industrial city in eastern Ukraine to the Russians. The defenders should withdraw and live to fight another day. “How Long Should Ukrainian Forces Defend Bakhmut? Lessons from Stalingrad”, Modern War Institute, April 18, 2023.

“A Wall of Armor”. The Russian invasion and occupation of Ukraine has galvanized NATO countries into action. Eastern European countries are learning from the conflict in Ukraine that main battle tanks still have a role in a ground war. Part of the response to Russian aggression is sending tanks to Ukraine. This then requires the acquisition of new tanks. Many nations are looking to acquire the M1 Abrams, a U.S. made main battle tank. “The M1 Abrams is becoming the Benchmark Main Battle Tank for Eastern Europe”, Real Clear Defense, April 18, 2023.

‘Gun Trucks’ for Ukraine. In an effort to counter the wide-spread use of drones by the Russians the U.S. will soon be providing an inexpensive counter-air solution to Ukraine. 30mm guns that can be mounted on the back of trucks will be sent to the country in the coming months. Kind of like the technicals found in smaller countries – big guns on pickup trucks; but better. “US providing Ukraine with 30mm gun trucks to blast Iranian drones out of the sky”, Task & Purpose, April 5, 2023.

Fight for the Skies

More Airpower Needed. Douglas Birkey of the Mitchell Institute for Aerospace Studies argues that Kyiv needs more jets – and points to the recently leaked U.S. intelligence documents to buttress his argument. Ukraine’s stockpile of surface-to-air missiles are running low and Russia could be on the verge of gaining air superiority later this spring. This would be a disaster for Ukraine’s planned counteroffensive that may kick off in a matter of weeks. “Don’t want to lose Ukraine? Empower Kyiv with airpower”, Breaking Defense, April 17, 2023.

Finland’s Airspace. The skies of Finland are now open for NATO surveillance and intelligence missions. This will allow NATO to monitor Russian activities more closely in the region. The first surveillance flight was conducted on March 23, 2023. Both manned and unmanned aircraft will be performing these future intelligence gathering missions. Both Sweden and Finland joined NATO’s Alliance Persistent Surveillance from Space (APSS) program in February 2023. Finland, currently a ‘NATO partner’, has applied to join NATO in response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and other aggressive activities in the region. “Finland opens airspace for NATO surveillance and intelligence flights”, Defence Today, March 23, 2023.

Maritime Activities

Blockade of Crimea? Ukraine seems determined, if you listen to the rhetoric, to recapture Crimea from Russia. The peninsula was annexed in 2014 at the beginning of the Russian Ukraine War. Most military analysts believe that Ukraine does not have the military capability to retake Crimea. However, some suggest a Ukrainian blockade is feasible. The peninsular is susceptible to a blockade. It’s two main supply routes are over the Crimea Bridge that spans the Kerch Strait or on the land route from the Russian border, along the west coast of the Sea of Azov (close to the front lines), and across the narrow band of land that connects Crimea to Ukraine. Read more in “Why Blockading Rather Than Retaking Crimea Might Be Kyiv’s Best Option”, The Rand Blog, April 10, 2023.

General Information

Changes in NATO Military Strategy. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization is becoming the fighting alliance it once was during the Cold War. NATO is moving from a strategy of deterrence by retaliation to deterrence by denial. For the Baltic States, this new strategy is one they can embrace. “Russian Invasion of Ukraine Revolutionizes NATO Military Strategy”, by Steven Erlanger, The New York Times, April 17, 2023.

Guardsmen to Train with Ukrainian Troops. Members of the Arkansas National Guard are heading to Germany for a year-long mission. They will assume command of the Joint Multinational Training Group – Ukraine (JMTG-U) at Grafenwoehr where they will mentor and advise Ukrainians. “39th Infantry Brigade Combat Team to Work With Ukrainian Forces”, National Guard, April 6, 2023.

TS Docs on Social Media. It appears that Top Secret Pentagon documents with details about the war in Ukraine have been published on some social media sites (Telegram and Twitter). The Pentagon is reviewing the matter but has not provided many details. The Department of Justice has opened an investigation into the leaks. The documents include maps of Ukraine, where troops are concentrated, and the kinds of weapons available to the Ukrainian forces. Defense analysts are picking apart the posted documents determining what is real and what is fiction. “Top-secret Pentagon documents on Ukraine war appear on social media”, NPR, April 7, 2023. See also “Pentagon probing leaked docs purporting to preview Ukraine offensive”, New York Post, April 7, 2023. And this article as well . . . “Russians Accused of Doctoring Leaked Western Documents on Ukraine War”, Voice of America, April 7, 2023.

UK SOF in Ukraine? According to some leaked U.S. intelligence documents the United Kingdom has UK special forces operating in Ukraine. One document indicates that as many as 50 UK SOF personnel had been deployed to Ukraine alongside SOF from other nations. The UK Ministry of Defence is pushing back on the claims saying:

“The widely reported leak of alleged classified US information has demonstrated a serious level of accuracy. Readers should be cautious about taking a face value allegations that have the potential to spread disinformation.”Spokesman for UK MoD, April 11, 2023, MOD @DefenceHQ Twitter

U.S. SOF In Ukraine. The CIA and U.S. Army Special Forces have some personnel based in Ukraine serving in an advisory capacity. Read more in “The Unknown Mission of American Special Ops Troops Fighting in Ukraine”, SOFREP, April 16, 2023. (subscription) See also “Ukraine Situation Report: US Troops for Embassy Support Only Pentagon Says”, The Drive, April 17, 2023.

New Ukrainian Head of SOF. Yevhenii Khmara has been appointed by President Zelenskyy as the head of the Alpha Group of the Security Service of Ukraine and head of the Special Operations Centre. Yahoo! News, April 14, 2023.

Egypt’s About Face. Apparently, according to leaked intelligence reports, Egypt was prepared to provide rockets to Russia for its use in the Ukraine conflict. But it seems that U.S. intervention has swayed the country to instead provide 152mm and 155mm artillery ammunition to Ukraine instead. Initial plans had Egypt providing up to 40,000 122mm Sakr-45 rockets to Russia. “Egypt nearly supplied rockets to Russia, agreed to arm Ukraine instead, leak shows”, The Washington Post, April 17, 2023. (subscription)

Commentary and Papers

Russia’s Frozen Billions. The economic cost of the war has been catastrophic for Ukraine. One-third of its population has been displaced and one-third of its GDP has been lost. Cities, towns, and villages have been destroyed. The civilian infrastructure will take years to rebuild. However, there is a source of funding that could assist Ukraine with the economic pain it is experiencing. Approximately $300 billion in Russian central bank assets that were frozen by Western governments could be used to counter the costs of Moscow’s destruction of Ukraine. “The moral and legal case for sending Russia’s frozen $300 billion to Ukraine”, The Washington Post, March 20, 2023. (subscription)

Moldova – In the Crosshairs? Russian aggression in Ukraine has captured the attention of this east European country. Sharing a border with Ukraine (Google Maps) and having its own bit of troubles with Russian agitators, Moldova is weathering a storm of uncertainty and unrest. Russia’s attempts to destabilize the country through disinformation, propaganda, and agitation are a very real threat. “War as a Neighbor”, Foreign Policy Research Institute, April 14, 2023.

Paper – The Russian General Staff. A host of authors provide an understanding of the Russian military’s decision making role in a ‘besieged fortress’. This document details the formal authorities and responsibilities of the Russian General Staff and the General Staff’s capacity to influence Russia’s national security decision making process. RAND Corporation, March 2023, PDF, 132 pages. https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RRA1233-7.html

Resources about the Ukraine Conflict

Maps of Ukraine
https://www.national-security.info/ukraine/maps.html

Weapons of the Ukraine War.
https://www.national-security.info/ukraine/weapons.html

Ukraine Conflict Info. The Ukrainians have launched a new website that will provide information about the war. It is entitled Russia Invaded Ukraine and can be found at https://war.ukraine.ua/.

Ukrainian Think Tanks – Brussels. Consolidated information on how to help Ukraine from abroad and stay up to date on events.

Ukraine Conflict Update – March 23, 2023

SOF News — Thu, 23 Mar 2023 05:00:00 +0000

Image / Photo: U.S. Airmen push a pallet holding munitions going to Ukraine into a C-17 Globemaster III at Travis Air Force Base, California, April 28, 2022. (U.S. Air Force photo by Chustine Minoda)

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Big Picture of the Conflict

Battle of Bakhmut. The fight for a small industrial city in Donetsk province continues (Google map). The struggle has gone on for many months. The Russians have been making some incremental advances on the city with huge personnel and equipment losses. The city is surrounded on the north, east, and south with one main road to the West (T0504) for the Ukrainians to evacuate dead and wounded and receive resupplies and replacement units and personnel. Read (and listen) more below:

The Battle of Bakhmut, Urban Warfare Project Podcast, Modern War Institute at West Point, featuring John Spencer, March 17, 2023, 36 minutes. https://mwi.usma.edu/the-battle-of-bakhmut/
The Wagner Group, a Russian paramilitary organization, has been unable to fully capture Bakhmut. It has lost many personnel in almost ‘human wave’ attacks against Ukrainian defensive positions. Its incremental gains have not succeeded in cutting the T0504 highway – a critical line of communication for Ukraine. However, the mercenary group has not ceased in its efforts to take the city.

Ground Situation

Limited Russian Gains. Over the past few months Russia has gained very little territory along the front lines. The incremental gains on the ground have come at a high cost of equipment and personnel. Many observers believe that the Russian offensive in the east of Ukraine has ‘culminated’.

A War of Attrition. The longer the war lasts the more likely the Russians will prevail in holding the land corridor from the Russian border to Crimea and the entire coastline of the Sea of Azov. This is one of the most important objectives of the conflict for Russia. It has the advantage in a bigger population, more resources, and greater industrial capacity.

Ukrainian Counteroffensive. It is likely that the Ukrainians will mount an offensive in the spring – likely in late April or early May. Several factors play into this scenario.

The Ukrainians have lost a lot of personnel in the battle for Bakhmut. Many of these soldiers were veterans of the war.
The main battle tanks promised by the United States and European nations are slowly being introduced; but many will be unavailable for a spring offensive.
Ukrainian troops need to be trained up in the new equipment being fielded by western nations. Some of this equipment will be fielded to newly formed units that need to have a train-up before being committed to the battlefield.
The Russians have been busy fortifying their positions and will mount a strong defense.
Weather and terrain are important factors. The ground has to be firm (no mud) for wheeled and tracked vehicles to travel across the countryside and on unimproved roads.

Tanks and More Tanks. A lot of press coverage is being given to the provision of modern Western tanks to Ukraine. Some national security observers say it is a ‘game changer’. Others question whether the limited quantities, long timeline to deployment, and other factors will result in limited effects this spring and summer.

U.S. Abrams. One of the nations providing tanks is the United States. The Abrams tank, is many months away from deployment – and there are not a lot scheduled to be sent to Ukraine. “M1 Abrams Tank: A Game Changer for Ukraine or Just a Waste of Time”, by Kris Osborn, 1945, March 16, 2023. The DoD announced that it will be sending M1A1 Abrams instead of the M1A2 Abrams. This will accelerate the delivery of 31 main battle tanks. “Abrams Tanks to Arrive in Ukraine by Fall”, SOF News, March 22, 2023.
Polish Tanks. Ukrainian crews have completed their training on Leopard 2 tanks in Poland. Warsaw has delivered 14 of the tanks to Ukraine. The crews and tanks will form the nucleus of a full tank battalion when combined with 8 tanks from Canada, 8 from Norway, and 6 from Spain. Poland had previously sent almost 250 T-72 tanks to Ukraine. “Poland already sent 14 Leopard 2 tanks to Ukraine as Ukrainian crews finished training on them”, Euromaiden Press, March 9, 2023.
Russian Tanks. As the number of modern Russian tanks are depleted in Ukraine the country has been reaching back into its stock of older tanks. New reports say that T-54s and T-55s are now being taken out of storage for deployment in Ukraine. Apparently these older tanks are being ‘modernized’. The tanks date back from the Stalin era.
Russia’s Armata Tank. When the T-14 Armata tank was revealed in a 2015 May Victory Day parade it embarrassingly broke down. Seven years later the tank can be declared dead. Read about the demise of the Russia’s latest prototype tank. “Armata – the story is over”, by Sergio Miller, Wavall Room, February 10, 2023.

Fight for the Skies

MQ-9 Drone Incident. The Russian downing of an MQ-9 Reaper has resulted in some national defense observers examining the role of UAVs and the US involvement in the Ukraine Conflict. Liam Collins, PhD, a retired Special Forces colonel, provides his views of the incident. “Reaper Down: Three Takeaways from Russia’s Intercept of a US Unmanned Aerial Vehicle”, Modern War Institute at West Point, March 17, 2023.

Ukrainian Drones. Dodging incoming Russian mortars to spot where Russia is firing from is just a day in the life of a Ukrainian drone operator. Read an informative article by Howard Altman on the training drone operators receive and how the drone teams are employed. “Ukrainian Drone Pilot’s Frontline Account of Fighting Via Eyes in the Sky”, The War Zone, March 21, 2023.

New Russian Tactic. The Russians have been using emergency marine radio buoys to conduct more accurate strikes by aircraft or attack UAVs. The ACR RLB-37 GlobalFix buoys are dropped by UAVs. The transmission device provides a very accurate location signal for aerial attacks; it transmits coordinates of its location by using satellite communication. Russia is receiving drones from Iran and China.

F-16s and ‘Private Pilots’. One of the objections to providing Ukraine with the F-16 fighter is the extensive train-up needed for Ukrainian pilots. One retired U.S. F-16 pilot has a fix for that. “Deadliest F-16 pilot offers solution to Ukraine’s jet problem”, Euromaiden Press, March 18, 2023. It has been estimated that it would take six months to train Ukrainian pilots on the F-16. (Euromaiden Press, March 20, 2023).

Maritime Activities

Sabotage of Nordstream Pipelines. In September 2022 an unknown entity (Moscow perhaps?) attacked gas pipelines just outside Swedish and Danish territorial waters. This attack has awaken Europe to the vulnerability of the underwater maritime infrastructure. Read more in “Maritime Sabotage: Protecting Europe’s Soft Underbelly”, by Walker D. Mills, Irregular Warfare Initiative, March 19, 2023.

Black Sea. The latest reports from the Pentagon state that the Russians are keeping three Kalibr cruise missile-capable ships off the coast of Ukraine in the Black Sea. The Russians are reported to still be searching for the MQ-9 Reaper downed by Russian aircraft in the Black Sea. It is unknown if they will be successful in their recovery efforts.

Grain Exports. The Russians have agreed to extend the grain initiative agreement for four more months. Turkey was instrumental in negotiating this deal. This allows shipping vessels to transport grain from Ukrainian ports through the Black Sea to other countries around the world. Read more about Ukraine’s grain in “Saving Ukraine’s economy: the grain giant fighting for survival”, Financial Times, March 22, 2023.

World Response

ICC and Putin War Crimes. According to the International Criminal Court (ICC), Russian President Putin is responsible for the illegal deportation of hundreds of Ukrainian children to Russia. The arrest warrant will obligate the court’s 123 member states to arrest Putin and transfer him to The Hague for trial if he sets foot on their territory. “ICC judges issue arrest warrant for Putin over war crimes in Ukraine”, Reuters, March 17, 2023.

Russia and International Law. The Congressional Research Service has published a 6-page PDF entitled The Role of International Tribunals in the Response to the Invasion of Ukraine, March 22, 2023.
https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/LSB/LSB10704

China. President Xi Jinping met with President Vladimir Putin during a visit to Russia in late March. Likely topics of discussion probably included sanction evasion schemes, the supply of equipment to Russia, and Chinese involvement in a negotiated settlement of the war in Ukraine. It is believed that some of Putin’s goals for the summit were not met.

US Army – Permanent Presence in Poland? In an effort to improve command and control capabilities and manage forward operating sites, the Army has established the U.S. Army Garrison Poland in March 2023. The Army now has 11 locations where its troops are stationed in Poland. “Army establishes permanent garrison in Poland”, U.S. Army, March 21, 2023.

Ex-Navy SEAL (Korea) Arrested. A former Korean Navy special forces officer who went to Ukraine a year ago to help that country defend itself against Russia has been arrested upon his return to Korea. “Ex-Navy SEAL admits violating passport law”, The Korea Herald, March 20, 2023.

U.S. Airlines – Hurting Due to War. Shortly after western nations prohibited Russian airlines from flying over Europe and the United States President Putin did the same. He restricted U.S. airlines from transiting Russian airspace. This has benefited other international carriers from countries like UAE, India, and China. “Banned From Russian Airspace, US Airlines Look to Restrict Competitors”, The New York Times, March 17, 2023. (subscription)

Commentary

Defeating Russia. Hans Petter Midttun, a Norwegian naval officer, provides his perspective on what needs to be done for Ukraine to defeat Russia. The Russian winter offensive seems to be failing and Russian ground attacks have decreased significantly. However, the conditions that allow a successful counteroffensive by Ukraine have not yet been set. “What Ukraine needs to defeat Russia in 2023”, Euromaiden Press, March 22, 2023.

Appeasing Russia. Critics from the far right and far left are of the same view that Ukraine is not a conflict America should be involved in. The country is far away, it has never been an ally of the U.S., and Russia has some legitimate claims on part of the country. But there are some that fear what happens is the ‘appeasers’ win out. Read why giving in to Russia is a bigger mistake than Munich (1938). “The New Appeasement”, The Critic, January 2022.

Defense Strategy. Jim Mitre, a defense researcher at the RAND Corporation, sees the Ukraine conflict bringing about momentum for widespread change in the Defense Department. “How the Ukraine War Accelerates the Defense Strategy”, War on the Rocks, March 21, 2023.

Video – Historical Guide to Ukraine Conflict. The invasion of Ukraine is shattering the illusion that aggression is a relic of the past and a reminder that warmongering must be deterred by forceful resistance. “The Historical Guide to Dealing with Putin’s Invasion of Ukraine”, PolicyEd, YouTube, March 14, 2023, 3 minutes. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dPL-pY2Q8sc

Resources about the Ukraine Conflict

Maps of Ukraine
https://www.national-security.info/ukraine/maps.html

Weapons of the Ukraine War.
https://www.national-security.info/ukraine/weapons.html

Ukraine Conflict Info. The Ukrainians have launched a new website that will provide information about the war. It is entitled Russia Invaded Ukraine and can be found at https://war.ukraine.ua/.

Ukrainian Think Tanks – Brussels. Consolidated information on how to help Ukraine from abroad and stay up to date on events.

Ukraine Conflict Update – March 16, 2023

SOF News — Thu, 16 Mar 2023 05:00:00 +0000

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Big Picture of the Conflict

Fight for Bakhmut. The Russians have still not yet captured all of Bakhmut, a small industrial city in eastern Ukraine. They do control the eastern portion of the city and approaches to the city from the north and south. However the Ukrainian forces have continued to defend the western portion of the city as well as a landroute to the west from which they receive supplies, ammunition, and personnel replacements. The city sits along key roads and railways in the Donbas region; however, control of the city is unlikely to tip the war’s outcome.

“Ukraine forces Russian troops to impale themselves on Bakhmut and then reload”, Washington Examiner, March 10, 2023. (subscription) Months of fighting have been costly for both sides; however, the Russians have expended a lot of equipment, material, and personnel in its quest to capture Bakhmut. The Urkrainians have made it very difficult for the Russians. The head of the Wagner Group, a paramilitary mercenary firm spearheading the Russian attack on Bakhmut, says the Ukrainian forces are putting up “colossal resistance” but insisted the Russian offensive would succeed.
“Bakhmut: The Battle That Decides the Ukraine War?”, 1945, March 16, 2023. As spring approaches many observers will be looking for signs of where the much-awaited Ukrainian offensive will take place. Will it be in the north, the south, or central region? Perhaps a clearing of Russians from Bakhmut is planned. The offensive will likely take place in early May when the ground is firm, Ukrainian troops finish their NATO training, and western armored vehicles and tanks are fully integrated into the Ukrainian military force structure.
“Defending Ukraine’s ‘highway of life’ – the last road out of Bakhmut”, The Washington Post, March 12, 2023. (subscription) A two-lane hardball road that connects Bakhmut to the rest of Ukraine is held by various units of the Ukrainian military. The Russians want to capture the road to prevent the medical evacuation of Ukrainian wounded and the transport of supplies and reinforcements to the Ukrainian fighters of Bakhmut. Who controls the road is key to the battle of Bakhmut.
“The Wagner Group is losing so many fighters in Bakhmut that it’s launching a recruitment drive”, Task & Purpose, March 11, 2023. No longer able to recruit from Russia’s prisons, the mercenary group is seeking volunteers from high schools across Russia.

Inexperienced Troops. Both Ukraine and Russia have lost thousands and thousands of their veteran, professional soldiers. Both nations are filling their ranks with inexperienced conscripts with little battle experience. In a war of attrition, this favors Russia – a nation with a much larger population pool to draw upon. The morale of the Ukrainian troops has shifted over the last few months; with fewer talking about victory and with complaints of ammunition shortages.

Ground Situation

Situation Maps. War in Ukraine by Scribble Maps. The Institute for the Study of War presents a map that depicts the assessed control of terrain in Ukraine. View more Ukraine SITMAPs that provide updates on the disposition of Russian forces as well as varioius other topics.

Tanks. “The Tactical and Strategic Value of Tanks”, Strategika, Hoover Institution, March 10, 2023. A lot of discussion has taken place on the value of tanks over the past year – a topic that has come to the forefront as a result of the conflict in Ukraine. Some say the ‘tank is dead’ – yet much is made of the huge impact the provision of western tanks like the Abrams, Challenger, and Leopard 2 will make when deployed to Ukraine. Sweden has announced that it will transfer 10 Leopard 2 tanks to Ukraine. Other nations have also contributed or have stated their intention to contribute tanks to the fight.

Poland has already sent 14 Leopard 2 tanks to Ukraine. (Euromaiden Press, Mar 9, 2023).
Refurbished Leopard 1 tanks will arrive in Ukraine this spring. (The Warzone, Mar 11, 2023).
The Russian Army is running out of T-72 tanks quickly. (Forbes, Mar 12, 2023).
“Western Tanks vs Russian Armor: Who’s Winning”, SOFREP, March 8, 2023.

Artillery Comparison. Both nations are lobbing less artillery shells across the lines than last summer. The Russians are firing some 10,000 shells a day while the Ukrainians are firing about 3,000 a day. A combination of heavy daily use and limited stockpiles are the cause.

Fight for the Skies

U.S. Drone Downed by Russian Aircraft. A Su-27 jet fighter struck a U.S. Air Force ISR MQ-9 Reaper unmanned aerial vehicle’s propeller causing U.S. forces to bring it down into the international waters of the Black Sea. The bump in the sky happened after two Russian fighter jets dumped fuel on it. The incident took place on Tuesday morning, March 14, 2023. U.S. drones routinely fly a circular type route over the Black Sea monitoring the situation over Ukraine. “Russian Fighter Strikes U.S. Unmanned Aircraft”, U.S. Department of Defense, March 14, 2023. Watch a video of the incident, “US video shows moment Russian fighter jet collides with US drone”, Fox News, March 16, 2023.

Poland’s MiG-29s. Warsaw may be sending some fighter jets to Kyiv in a couple of months. This may happen if a broader coalition of nations join in the effort. “Poland my give Ukraine MiG-29 jets in next 4-6 weeks”, Reuters, March 14, 2023.

F-16s – a Mistake? The effectiveness of airpower on the battlefield in the Ukraine Conflict has been limited. Surface to Air missile systems like the Starstreak MANPAD have been so effective that pilots rarely attack enemy positions – the odds of success and survival are low. The F-16s are a fourth-generation fighter that would have to survive a fifth-generation SAM threat (systems like the S-400). Supplying F-16s to Ukraine would be a costly mistake. A better strategy would be to provide air-defense systems like the Patriot to kill Russian air power – and to continue to provide weapons like artillery and tanks to win on the ground. “Why Sending F-16s to Ukraine Would be a Mistake”, Real Clear Defense, March 16, 2023.

Russia’s Grom Standoff Weapons. Recent images of wreckage found on the battlefield indicate that air-launched standoff weapons are being employed by Russia. This is the first confirmed use of the Grom missile in over a year. This missile is believed to have been introduced in 2010. It has a warhead of about 700 pounds with a range of 62 miles. The weapon may offer a precision-guided fire-and-forget capability that can be used to strike static targets from a notable distance. “Evidence of Russia Using Grom Standoff Weapons in Ukraine Emerges”, by Emma Helfrich, The War Zone, March 15, 2023.

Maritime Activities

Black Sea Region. One of the most strategically important areas of the globe is the Black Sea. It can influence the course of events in the Ukraine Conflict. “The Black Sea Strategic Triangle in 2023 and Beyond”, Hoover Institution, March 7, 2023.

Black Sea Grain Deal. The deal to allow Ukrainian exports of grain to transit from Ukrainian ports on the Black Sea through the Russian naval blockade to destinations around the world is set to expire on March 18. “Moscow open to extending Black Sea grain deal”, The Washington Post, March 13, 2023. (subscription)

World Response

Tracking Weapons. Since the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the U.S. has sent over $27 billion in security aid to Ukraine. These weapons are state-of-art; MANPADS, HIMARS, ATGM, MLRS, and more. Tracking these sophisticated weapons systems, without monitors on the ground observing, is challenging. One way of doing this is using OSINT to track the weapons systems. “Digitizing the Battlefield: Using Social Media to Track U.S. Weapons in Ukraine”, by Laura Courchesne, Lawfare Blog, March 14, 2023.

Ukraine and the Budget. U.S. Defense officials left Ukraine aid out of the Pentagon’s new budget request. DoD plans to continue to seek emergency funding from Congress. DoD is concerned that Republican opposition to the Ukraine aid could derail Congressional negotiations over the defense budget. “Pentagon keeps Ukraine aid out of budget, punting to divided Congress”, Defense News, March 13, 2023.

CIA Director Visit. William Burns, the head of the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, met with Polish President Andrzej Duda in Warsaw on March 15 to discuss the current security situation in eastern Europe.

India – Russia Relations. The south Asian nation of India has long been a strategic partner of Russia in the diplomatic and international relations community. It also depends heavily on Russian weapons exports for its military. However, the Ukraine Conflict has caused India to re-evaluate its foreign policy towards Russia. “Continental Drift? India-Russia Ties After One Year of War in Ukraine”, Stimson, March 9, 2023.

Commentary

A Grinding War of Attrition. There are some national security observers who believe that the present rate of western aid and support to Ukraine will only result in a years long battle of attrition between Ukraine and Russia. Some advocate for a stepping up of the assistance and perhaps a revision of the ‘no boots on the ground’ stance. Hans Petter Midttun, a Norwegian military officer with lots of time in Ukraine, provides the details and his perspective. “The new strategy NATO needs to avoid a protracted war in Ukraine”, Euromaiden Press, March 13, 2023.

Putin, Ukraine, and History. Learn a little bit of history about Russian and Ukraine . . . Kyivan Rus. A great read if you have the time. “Imposing the Past: Putin’s War for History”, by Jade McGlynn, War on the Rocks, March 15, 2023.

Certain Victory for Ukraine? What about Casualties? A central theme has emerged in most western media outlets that Ukraine is beating Russia on the battlefield. Much is made of Russia’s personnel, equipment, tank, and aircraft losses. Less is known and reported on the personnel losses of the Ukrainian military. However, what is known is that Ukraine has suffered significant losses. It has been a brutal battle of attrition; one that Russia – with its much larger population base, would likely win. “The danger of downplaying the Ukrainian battlefield toll”, Responsible Statecraft, March 15, 2023.

Long Wars and Ukraine. George Friedman, a strategist on international affairs, writes about how quick victories by an attacker will sometimes end up being a protrated conflict. “Ukraine and the Long War”, Geopolitical Futures, March 15, 2023.

Resources about the Ukraine Conflict

Maps of Ukraine
https://www.national-security.info/ukraine/maps.html

Weapons of the Ukraine War.
https://www.national-security.info/ukraine/weapons.html

Ukraine Conflict Info. The Ukrainians have launched a new website that will provide information about the war. It is entitled Russia Invaded Ukraine and can be found at https://war.ukraine.ua/.

Ukrainian Think Tanks – Brussels. Consolidated information on how to help Ukraine from abroad and stay up to date on events.

Ukraine Conflict Update – March 7, 2023

SOF News — Tue, 07 Mar 2023 06:00:00 +0000

Image / Photo: Soldiers of 1 A Squadron, Queens Royal Lancers (QRL) patrolling outside Basra, Iraq onboard a Challenger 2 Main Battle Tank during Operation Telic 4. Photo by UK MoD.

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Big Picture of the Conflict

Fight for Bakhmut. The small city in eastern Ukraine is surrounded on three sides by the Russians. The Ukrainians will likely make the difficult decision to retreat from the industrial city before it is entirely surrounded. The Wagner Group, fighting alongside the Russian military, has been in the forefront in the fight for the city using waves upon waves of mercenaries and released prisoners to attack positions of the defenders. If the defenders retreat, it will be just a few kilometers to the rear to long-planned defensive positions. The city, with a prewar population of 70,000 is largely uninhabited – most of the people have fled – about 6,000 remain. Many of the buildings in the town have been completely destroyed or damaged. The fight for this city has gone on for over nine months. It is reported by NATO that the troop losses in the battle have been five Russians for every one Ukrainian. “Ukrainian forces cling to Bakhmut as Russia attacks from three sides”, The Washington Post, March 5, 2023. (subscription)

Bakhmut – Withdrawal Soon? Ukraine may soon decide that the costs of keeping the Russians out of a the city is too high. For many months the Russians have struggled to take the city – at great material and human cost. But a dogged defense by the Ukrainians along with poor tactics by the Russians have resulted in a long slog for the Russians. The cost of holding the city by the Ukrainians may soon outweigh the benefits. Taking the town of Bakhmut would be a symbolic victory for Moscow; although it is not operationally significant. It is very likely that Ukraine will conduct a time-phased, methodical withdrawal from the city to well-prepared positions just to the west of Bakhmut. However, there are news reports that Ukrainian generals are asking President Zelensky to keep troops in Bakhmut. (The Kyiv Independent, Mar 6, 2023). The request may have been successful – there are reports that more Ukrainian reinforcements are heading to Bakhmut.

“Ukraine may ‘strategically pull back’ from embattled Bakhmut”, The Hill, March 1, 2023.
See also “Fortress Bakhmut” by Seth Cropsey, Real Clear Defense, March 6, 2023.
And there is a comprehensive study of the fight in “The End of the Battle of Bakhmut?” by Phillips OBrien, Phillips Newsletter, March 5, 2023.
“Bakhmut defenders double down – Zelensky”, BBC News, March 6, 2023.
“Ukrainian civilians grapple with heart-wrenching decisions as Russin forces surround Bakhmut”, CBS News, March 6, 2023.

Ground Situation

Situation Maps. War in Ukraine by Scribble Maps. View more Ukraine SITMAPs that provide updates on the disposition of Russian forces. The Institute for the Study of War presents a map that depicts the assessed control of terrain in Ukraine as of March 6, 2023, 3:00 PM ET. They also provide an interactive time-lapse map of the war.

Stalemate on Front Lines. There has not been a lot of movement on the ground across the frontlines in Ukraine over the past few months. The long-awaited Russian offensive either hasn’t happened or was much less than expected. The Ukrainians are still waiting on the arrival of armored personnel carriers and main battle tanks from Western European nations. That, and the weather and terrain conditions are not yet condusive for large-scale maneuver operations. Once the snow has melted, the spring thaw passes, and the ground is firm then offenses by either side may very well take place. Some experts following the year believe that, although Ukraine cannot dislodge the Russians from the coast of the Sea of Azov, the Russians are not going to make much headway either. One of the biggest reasons is the Russians are not learning from their past mistakes over the last year. (Slate, Mar 6, 2023).

Tanks and Russia. A year ago it seemed as though Russia’s numerical superiority in tanks would assure the country a quick victory. Apparently the only thing all those tanks did was provide Ukrainians with a target-rich environment for their inexpensive shoulder-fired weapons and improvised explosive-laden drones. Watch a video that explores the real reasons Russian tanks keep failing in Ukraine. (Sandboxx, Feb 24, 2023, 20 mins).

Tanks and Ukraine. Western tanks will be able to outperform Russian tanks and will make a difference on the battlefield. However; that depends on how many, when they will arrive, and if the proper logisitical and maintenance programs and training are in place. “How Western Tanks Will Make a Difference in Ukraine”, CEPA, January 26, 2023. The struggle to deliver Leopard 2 tanks for use against Russian forces has exposed just how unprepared European militaries are. “Scrounging for Tanks for Ukraine, Europe’s Armies Come up Short”, The New York Times, February 28, 2023. (subscription). However, some of the modern battle tanks are making their way to Ukraine; like the Leapard 2 tanks provided by Poland. (Breaking Defense, Feb 24, 2023).

UKR Bn Completes CA Training. Ukrainian soldiers have graduated from the first battalion comined arms training course at the U.S. Army’s Grafenwoehr training area in Germany. The training was focused on the M2 Bradley fighting vehicle. About 635 Ukrainians completed the five-week long course. “Ukrainian battalion completes first combined-arms training in Germany”, Army Times, February 17, 2023.

Fight for the Skies

Ukraine SOF and Drones. An informative article describes the role of drones in Ukrainian special forces operations, how Ukrainian SF are leveraging drones for surveillance and intelligence gathering, and how the drones are enhancing the capabilities of Ukraine’s SOF. “The Role of Drones in Ukrainian Special Forces Operations”, TS2.space, March 2023.

Starlink and Drones. Portable sat-comm gear feeds drone video to Ukrainian artillery batteries and provide battlefield situational awareness to commanders. Read about the men and women of Ukraine’s 93rd Brigade “Seneca” drone unit; a unit using commercial ‘off-the-shelf’ drones, Starlink, and Google Meet in the effort to defeat the Russians. “How Elon Musk’s Starlink is Still Helping Ukraine’s Defenders”, Defense One, March 1, 2023.

F-16s for Ukraine? Retired Colonel Jeffrey Fischer lays out a plan for how Ukraine can get advanced jet fighters to fight the Russians. “Retired Air Force Colonel Lays Out ‘Affordable’ Plan to Get Ukraine F-16s”, Newsweek, February 22, 2023.

Maritime Operations

Nothing Significant to Report (NSTR) on this front. It is expected that naval warfare is poised to play a smaller role in year 2 of the Ukraine War. (Breaking Defense, Feb 24, 2023). Turkey is working behind the scenes to arrange for more grain shipments from Ukrainian ports on the Black Sea.

U.S. and Ukraine

SAG-Ukraine . . . Officer Reassignment. Brig. Gen. Ronald R. Ragin, deputy commander for support, Security Assistance Group-Ukraine, Germany, will be posted to be commanding general, 21st Theater Sustainment Command, U.S. Army Europe-Africa, Germany.

More U.S. Aid to Ukraine. On March 3, 2023, the Department of Defense announced it was transferring up to $400 million in military equipment to Ukraine. The security assistance package features ammunition and support equipment. The package includes ammo for HIMARS and artillery pieces, armored vehicle-launched bridges, demolitions munitions for obstacle clearing, and more. Read a list of the equipment to be provided.

CRS Report – Aid to Ukraine. The Congressional Reseach Service has updated its U.S. Security Assistance to Ukraine “In Focus” report. This one is dated February 27, 2023 and is a 3-page long PDF. Topics include an overview of programs since 2014, the provision of defense equipment, recent legislation, and the prospect of future assistance. https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF12040

More U.S. Funding? Not a Sure Thing. The Republicans in the House of Representatives could very well make future funding bills for Ukraine problematic. Supplemental appropriations may not pass as smoothly as it has in the past. The Biden administration will have to be more creative in its approach to Congress on this issue. There are six potential options that can be used to solve this potential problem. Read about them in “U.S. Security Assistance to Ukraine is Going to Get Complicated”, War on the Rocks, March 3, 2023. For more on this topic monitor a virtual event by the Hudson Institute entitled Support for Ukraine’s Defense in the 118th Congress to take place on Friday, March 10, 2023. Luke Coffey and Representative Seth Moulton (D-MA) are the featured speakers.

Accountability of U.S. Aid. Thus far, as the end of February, the United States had provided over $31 billion in support to Ukraine since Russia launched its invasion one year ago. Allies and partners have provided over $19 billion during that timeframe. With so much material and equipment flowing into a combat zone it is only natural that some ‘stuff’ will be diverted. U.S. officials have been up front with their Ukrainian counterparts regarding the importance of accountability and transparency. Read more in “U.S. Ensures Accountability of Systems Supplied to Ukraine”, DoD News, February 28, 2023.

DOS and Justice in Ukraine. The U.S. Department of State explains how it is holding individuals accountable for war crimes and other atrocities in the Ukraine conflict. Read more in “Supporting Justice and Accountability in Ukraine”, DoS, February 18, 2023.

US SOF Learn Lessons From Ukraine. Russia’s struggles in Ukraine are showing US special operators that they’ll need to fight without their ‘tethers’ to win future wars. The war shows that a robust logistical network is needed to sustain frontline forces; however – for US special operators a network won’t always be available. Business Insider, February 28, 2023.

UKR SOF – “Test Your Gear”. At a special operations conference held in Florida Ukrainian SOF said that U.S. defense manufacturers should bring their gear to Ukraine to try it out againsta an enemy. “Come Test Year Gear Against Russian Forces, Ukrainians Urge US Defense Firms”, Defense One, March 3, 2023.

World Response

NATO and Undersea Infrastructure. The sabotage of the Nord Stream energy pipeline in September 2022 has the North Atlantic Treaty Organization forming up the Critical Undersea Infrastructure Protection Cell. The organization will enable better coordination between key military and civilian stakeholders and with industry. “NATO stands up undersea infrastructure coordination cell”, NATO, February 15, 2023.

Luxembourg – Providing Outsized Aid. The tiny country in western Europe has a small army of 1,000, one cargo plane, two helicopters, and fewer than 200 trucks. But it has some money to spend so it is buying weapons and military equipment on the open market and sending to Ukraine. “How a Tiny NATO Nation Tackled a Big Problem: Arming Ukraine”, The New York Times, February 17, 2023. (subscription).

UN – Demands Russian Withdrawal. The United Nations General Assembly has called for ending the war in Ukraine and demanded Russia’s immediate withdrawal from the country. The world body adopted the resolution during an emergency special session. There were 141 Member States in favor and seven against. The seven against included North Korea, Eritrea, Mali, Nicaragua, Russia, and Syria. China, India, and Pakistan were among the 32 abstentions. “UN General Assembly calls for immediate end to war in Ukraine”, UN News, February 23, 2023.

Report – China and Russia Relations. In the wake of Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine, Russia’s reliance on China’s economic and political support has grown. A CRS report identifies key features of the relationship, PRC and Russian perspectives of the relationship, and areas of cooperation between the countries on matters of defense, energy, economics, and the global order. China-Russia Relations, Congressional Research Service (CRS), February 24, 2023, PDF, 3 pages.
https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF12100

Wagner Group

Wagner Group and Bakhmut. Regular Russian troop formations and units of a Russian paramilitary group are engaged in the fighting against the Ukrainian defenders in Bakhmut for many months. However, it appears that there may be a ‘rift’ between the two ‘allied’ forces. “Russia’s Wagner boss suggests ‘betrayal’ in Bakhmut battle”, BBC.com, March 6, 2023. The number of fighters with the Wagner Group in eastern Ukraine is apparently around 50,000 strong. Sean McFate briefs us on three ancient strategems to win against mercenaries drawn from history that could turn the tide of the war for Ukraine. “How to Defeat Russia’s Mercenaries”, Newsweek, March 6, 2023.

Mercenaries – at the End of the Ukraine Conflict. When the conflict ends in eastern Europe the thousands of mercenaries (those that manage to live through the war) will likely end up in hot spots in Africa. The Wagner Group and other international paramilitary organizations will have a huge recruit pool to hire from. “Mercenary Shocks: What the War in Ukraine Will Eventually Mean for Africa”, by Raphael Parens, War on the Rocks, February 17, 2023.

Report – Putin’s Stealth Mobilization. Candace Rondeaux and Ben Dalton provide a detailed and informative account of Russian irregulars and the Wagner Group’s Shadow Command Structure. New America, February 22, 2023.

Commentary

Report – Avoiding a Long War. Samuel Charap and Miranda Priebe argue that the Ukraine war is not going to end soon. In this publication they discuss U.S. policy and the trajectory of the Russia-Ukraine conflict. RAND Corporation, PDF, 32 pages, January 2023. The paper is a topic of discussion in a podcast posted by War on the Rocks, February 16, 2023, one hour, entitled One Year of War in Ukraine.

Understanding Putin. There is a lot of speculation of what Putin will do if he is ‘victorious’ in Ukraine – does he go further into eastern Europe in future years? At the same time national security observers worry on what he will do if he starts to lose in a big way – does he use tactical nukes? Most people are guessing and don’t really know. “The Guessing Game about What Putin Will Do If He Begins to Lose Even More Badly in Ukraine”, McFaul’s World, March 3, 2023. Also by McFaul is “Why Vladimir Putin’s Luck Ran Out”, Journal of Democracy, February 2023.

Podcast – European Land Warfare. Kyle Atwell hosts Dr. Benedetta Berti and Lieutenant Colonel Jordan Becker in a podcast entitled The Politics of Coalition Warfare. It focuses on the lessons learned in Ukraine and the strategic and political dynamics of the NATO alliance. Modern War Institute at West Point, March 6, 2023, 48 minutes.

Resources about the Ukraine Conflict

Maps of Ukraine
https://www.national-security.info/ukraine/maps.html

Ukraine Conflict Info. The Ukrainians have launched a new website that will provide information about the war. It is entitled Russia Invaded Ukraine and can be found at https://war.ukraine.ua/.

Ukrainian Think Tanks – Brussels. Consolidated information on how to help Ukraine from abroad and stay up to date on events.

Weapons of the Ukraine War.
https://www.national-security.info/ukraine/weapons.html

Ukraine Conflict Update – Feb 7, 2023

SOF News — Tue, 07 Feb 2023 06:00:00 +0000

Image / Photo: A German Army Leopard 2 tank, assigned to 104th Panzer Battalion, moves through the Joint Multinational Readiness Center during Saber Junction 2012 in Hohenfels, Germany, Oct. 25, 2012. Photo by Specialist Markus Rauchenberger, U.S. Army.

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Ground Situation

Current operations by the Russians are concentrated in the country’s east. There are reports in the media that these operations are lacking proper coordination and that there is a lack of interaction between the Wagner Group and the Russian military units. Tens of thousands of recently mobilized Russian soldiers have arrived at the front; negating to an extent the qualitative advantage the Ukrainians have had thus far in the conflict. Many reports indicate that the Russians have at least 300,000 soldiers in Ukraine.

A Russian Offensive in February? Ukrainian officials are expecting a large general offensive by the Russians in mid-February or around February 24th – the anniversary of last years invasion. The timing of the Russian offensive is critical; it has to take place after a sufficient number of reinforcements have arrived in the area of the conflict – most likely eastern Ukraine. The stock of fuel, ammunition, and other supplies must be replenished to support a general offensive. The operation has to take place before the muddy spring season and prior to the arrival of Western armored fighting vehicles and tanks. Read more in “Ukraine braced for renewed Russian offensive later in February”, BBC News, February 6, 2023.

Degrading Russian Forces. For their part, the Ukrainians are degrading the supply and logistic network of Russia, causing many Russian casualities, and limiting any advances by the Russians to small parcels of hard-fought territory. The Russian logistical depots have been pulled back from the front due to the ability of HIMARS to range beyond the front lines. The introduction of the GLSDB HIMARS munitions will mean that the Ukrainians will be able to strike even deeper into Russian rear areas. The Ground Launched Small Diameter Bombs provide the HIMARS with an increase of range from 80km to 150km. This will cause the Russians to pull their logistical nodes even further back from the front and will allow the disruption of critical bridge crossings that supply convoys must pass over.

Tanks for Ukraine. The news that Western nations will soon supply Ukraine with modern main battle tanks like the Abrams, Leopard 2, and Challenger is still on the front pages of the media. Unfortunately, the decision to send tanks is belated; it would have been better if the decision was made earlier in the year. Since the decision was made so late it won’t be until late 2023 that Abrams tanks will arrive in Ukraine; too late to stop a spring offensive by the Russians or for the Ukrainians to conduct their own push to the east. The Leopards and Challengers should arrive sooner. Once the tanks arrive they will add an offensive punch; especially when combined with the numerous armored fighting vehicles like the newly deployed Bradleys. However welcome the news is about the soon-to-be deployed tanks to Ukraine, one must remember that the total number of tanks to be sent is small and are unlikely to have a significant impact on the outcome of the war.

Here are some articles on the topic of tanks from the last few weeks:

“Tanking Up: Understanding the material – and moral – implications of the new armor heading to Ukraine”, by Frank Hoffman, Modern War Institute at West Point, February 3, 2023.
“The Weight of NATO Tanks May Pose a Problem in Ukraine”, Newsweek, February 5, 2023.
“Germany adds older Leopard 1s to the list of tanks for Ukraine”, The New York Times, February 3, 2023.
“Tanks a Lot (Well, Actually Not That Many for Ukraine)”, by Robert E. Hamilton, Foreign Policy Research Institute, February 2, 2023.
“Tanks and what they mean for the Ukraine War’s endgame”, by John A. Nagl, Pennsylvania Capital-Star, February 3, 2023.

Battle For Bakhmut. For months the Russians have been trying to take the eastern city from the Ukrainians – and with tremendous losses. The offensive for Bakhmut may likely continue and Ukraine will face the agonizing choice over whether to withdraw or face having units surrounded. The city is becoming increasingly isolated. The key to the battle is keeping the Bakhmut-Kostyantynivka highway open – a critical supply route for the Ukrainian army and evacuation artery for civilians. There are over 5,000 civilians still in Bakhmut. Thus far, the fight for this city has been the longest battle of the war. Taking the Bakhmut city and surrounding area is important to controlling the whole of the Donbas region. “Battle of Bakhmut nears tipping point as Russia intensifies offensive”, by Christopher Miller, Finanicial Times, February 2, 2023.

Phases of Russia’s Invasion. Serge Havrylets, a Kyiv-based journalist, explains how Russia has been changing its tactics in the war against Russia. He describes the invasion as one of four phases. Read more in “Evolution of Russian Tactics in Ukraine: From failed blitzkrieg to assault infantry”, Euromaidan Press, January 31, 2023.

Phase I: Blitzkrieg – a large-scale rapid operation from the air, land, and water.
Phase 2: Tank Breakthrough – taking place in April and May, use of tanks with massive artillery fires; followed by use of battalion task groups to establish a bridgehead.
Phase 3: Probing the Defense – smaller units engaged in local fighting, seeking weak spots in the defense; then followed with a large-scale assault.
Phase 4: Assault Infantry with artillery support. This is described as a creeping occupation. Most of the units are former convicts and mercenaries of the Wagner Group. These units are then followed into battle by the recently mobilized soldiers.

Fight for the Skies

Drone Factory. U.S. officials believe that Iran will assist Russia in the building of a facility that will produce about 6,000 drones to be used in Ukraine. The Russians are employing a number of drones that the Iranians have sent to Russia. There are reports that the Iranians will help Russia develop a Shahed-136 model that will have a new engine for a faster and farther flight. The senior leadership of an Iranian firm, Paravar Pars, has been sanctioned by the United States because the shipment of UAVs to Russia. Iran-produced UAVs are attacking civilians and civilian infrastructure in Ukraine. See “U.S. Sanctions Leadership of Iranian UAV Manufacturer”, U.S. Department of State, February 3, 2023.

Air Defense Equipment: From U.S. to Ukraine. The Department of Defense announced that it will be providing another security assistance package to Ukraine. This will include a long-range fires capability as well as various types of equipment to defend against Russian missile attacks. “Air Defense Systems, Long-Range Fires Capability to be Sent to Ukraine”, DoD News, February 3, 2023.

Maps

Situation Maps. War in Ukraine by Scribble Maps. Interactive map by Institute for the Study of War. View more Ukraine SITMAPs that provide updates on the disposition of Russian forces.

Maps of Ukraine
https://www.national-security.info/ukraine/maps.html

General Information and Commentary

Negotiations. There was a recent prisoner exchange. Ukraine received more than one hundred ‘defenders’ in exchange for POWs sent to Russia. No sign of possible negotiations between the two countries in the near future.

Refugees, IDPs, and Humanitarian Crisis. View the UNHCR Operational Data Portal – Ukraine Refugee Situation (Updated daily), https://data2.unhcr.org/en/situations/ukraine. As of January 31, 2023, the number of refugees from Ukraine registered for temporary protection in Europe is over 4.8 million; according to UNHCR.

Wagner Group. The Russian paramilitary corporation has suffered heavy casualties in Ukraine. It has been recruiting prisoners, foreign recruits, and some Russians to fill its ranks in the units fighting in Ukraine. The Wagner Group units have featured prominently in the ground action in eastern Ukraine; especially in the Bakhmut region. The company has grown from 5,000 seasoned veterans to a force of 50,000. But the paramilitary group is not just busy in Ukraine; it has increased its presence in some of the more volatile countries in Africa.

“Wagner Group Redefined: Threats and Responses”, by Raphael Parens, Foreign Policy Research Institute, January 30, 2023.
“Countering the Wagner Group and Degrading Russia’s War Efforts in Ukraine”, by Antony Blinken, Secretary of State, U.S. Department of State Press Statement, January 26, 2023.
“Actions to Counter Wagner and Degrade Russia’s War Efforts in Ukraine”, U.S. Department of State Fact Sheet, January 26, 2023.

China Aid to Russia. Russian government-owned defense companies are receiving navigation equipment, jamming technology, and jet fighter parts from China. In addition, thousands of dual-use goods, that have both commercial and military applications, are being provided to Russia. Many critical components (like semiconductors, commercial drones, etc.) needed for Russia’s war machine are on a sanctions list; however, nations like Turkey, China, and the UAE are key in avoiding these sanctions. “China Aids Russia’s War in Ukraine, Trade Data Shows”, The Wall Street Journal, February 4, 2023.

Australian Trainers in UK. Some Ukrainian recruits have been receiving military training in the United Kingdom. Over seventy Australian personnel arrived in the UK in late January to join a U.K.-led multinational mission named Operation Interflex to train the Ukrainians.

Key Leadership Changes. A new head for Ukraine’s defense may soon be appointed. It seems that the current defense minister is going to resign (or be told to resign) and be moved to the Ministry of Strategic Industries. The dismissal may be tied to allegations of corruption in the defense ministry. The Chief of Military Intelligence is rumored to become the next defense minister. President Zelensky has nominated a new head of the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU). Vasyl Maliuk has been the acting head of the security agency since July 2022. The also “Ukraine expects leadership shake-up, with defense minister replaced by military intel chief”, The Washington Post, February 5, 2023. (subscription)

Change in European Politics and Leadership. Since the Russian invasion of Ukraine the Nordic and eastern European countries have taken a stronger role in European politics. They are now seen as driving some of the policy issues of the European Union (EU) and NATO. One example is the sending of modern main battle tanks to Ukraine; they pressed Washington and Berlin hard for this to happen. Perhaps these smaller nations are, because of their proximity to Russia, more aware of the threat posed by their big neighbor to the east.

Banning Russian Diesel. A 27-nation bloc will prohibit imports of Russian gasoline, diesel, and other products used throughout Europe. “Europe bans Russian oil products, the latest strike on the Kremlin war chest”, National Public Radio, February 5, 2023.

Russian Classics. Some folks that study Russian literature are giving it another look and coming away with differing opinions. Read how to reckon with the ideology of “Anna Karenina,” “Eugene Oneign,” and other ‘beloved’ books. “Rereading Russian Classics in the Shadow of the Ukraine War”, The New Yorker, January 30, 2023.

Resources about the Ukraine Conflict

Ukraine Conflict Info. The Ukrainians have launched a new website that will provide information about the war. It is entitled Russia Invaded Ukraine and can be found at https://war.ukraine.ua/.

Ukrainian Think Tanks – Brussels. Consolidated information on how to help Ukraine from abroad and stay up to date on events.

Weapons of the Ukraine War.
https://www.national-security.info/ukraine/weapons.html

V Corps’ Special Airborne Soldiers Turned Rangers: Cold War History

DVIDS — Fri, 03 Feb 2023 06:00:00 +0000

By Devin Klecan, DVIDS.

“The eyes and ears of V Corps move on little cat feet. The Long Range Reconnaissance Company could set themselves up on your front lawn, stay all day, and you’d never know they were there, all the time they’d be radioing your every action, including your dinner menu, back to their base camp,” wrote Richard Cole in 1961, a reporter for The Guardian.

On July 15, 1961, the U.S. Army Long Range Reconnaissance Patrol Company 3779 was activated in Wildflecken, Germany, by the Seventh U.S. Army to specifically serve as a special company under V Corps. At first, the company was assigned to the 14th Armored Cavalry Regiment for administration and court-martial jurisdiction. During that time, the company wore the Seventh Army shoulder patch complimented with a blue and white airborne tab, and was the only unit near the East German border actively on jump status.

V Corps needed Soldiers that were ready to fight and win during an era of uncertainty, now known as the Cold War. The Corps deployed across the West German states of Hessen and Bayern (Bavaria), providing protection and support for four of the six hotspots said to be the most likely Soviet penetration corridors into West Germany.

The company conducted extensive exercises such as rehearsals for deep penetration missions in tactically significant areas, troop training for special missions that involved team placements of T-4 Atomic Demolition Munitions, and locating enemy battlefield targets for Army Nuclear Delivery Systems.

In Jan. 1963, the company relocated to Edwards Kaserne (near Frankfurt, Germany), and upon the completion of a successful change of command ceremony shortly after, replaced their Seventh Army patches with the well-known white and blue V Corps patches placed below their airborne tab.

V Corps Soldiers stayed at Edwards Kaserne temporarily. The company moved again on May 9, 1963, to Gibbs Kaserne in Frankfurt to support the corps’ intelligence section, with the Soldiers classified as “V Corps Special Troops.”

At the time, the company was often assigned to honor guard duties in garrison. Later, the company was chosen to provide honor guards to represent the U.S. Army Airborne at the 20th anniversary of the corps’ D-Day landing of 1944 on June 6, 1964. The ceremony consisted of 122 enlisted men and four officers in attendance.

The company name was officially changed to Company D, LRRP,17th Infantry on May 15, 1965, due to the end of the company’s provisional status under V and VII Corps. The company did not change, containing the same personnel, mission, and barracks.

Overlooked by motivated leadership, V Corps’ LRRP’s “developed and perfected aspects of Long Range Patrol Operations that resulted in the issue of the first LRRP TO&E (Table of Organization & Equipment) 7-157E, and the publication of the first Long Range Reconnaissance Company Field Manual, FM 31-16,” wrote Bob Murphy, a Soldier that served in the company from 1964-1967.

The company also formalized the trends for Ranger status, with a requirement to have pre-set designated positions to ensure success in the field. Bearing the title “Ranger” was a requirement, with all 208 Soldiers in the company being Airborne qualified.

The men conducted constant training in cycles, focusing on field training exercises that emphasized the importance of camouflage, radio operator training and combating tactics used by the Soviet Union.

In 1968, the U.S. Army began a large pullout of troops from Europe, code named “OPERATION REFORGER.” The company found itself at Fort Benning, Georgia, in July that same year. At Fort Benning, the company was the only active duty Airborne unit on post. The Soldiers of the company, still bearing the V Corps patch, used their training to act as enemy forces at Ranger training sites. Even more so, about half of the ranks that filled the company saw combat in Vietnam, with most of them having been with the 101st Airborne Division and the 173rd Airborne Brigade in theater.

Yet again, on Feb. 1st, 1969, Company D, underwent a name change to A/75th Infantry (Rangers) with a new commanding officer. Upon the name change, the unit adopted the 197th Infantry Brigade’s shoulder patch and kept the Airborne tab.

The company spent time training other Soldiers heading to Vietnam in the states, but never formally deployed to Vietnam themselves due to V Corps’ objective supporting NATO allies and partners in multiple REFORGER (Return of Forces to Germany) exercises. REFORGER tested the ability of conventional forces to fight in a conventional war scenario to demonstrate American determination. The first REFORGER exercise was conducted on Jan. 6, 1969, with V Corps participating in each exercise that same year.

The A/75 Infantry worked with 1st Cavalry Division primarily by July 1972, but always had to stay on a high mission training status for V Corps’ original mission set for the LRRP. The A/75 Infantry maintained their presence in Germany and deployed in 1973 to participate in the year’s annual REFORGER exercise. Just as V Corps’ LRRP Company before them, the Soldiers of A/75 developed as a unit dedicated to service in Europe. On Dec. 19, 1974, the company was deactivated and cased its colors for the last time.

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Author: This article by Spc. Devin Klecan of Victory Corps was first published on February 1, 2023 by the Defense Visual Information Distribution Service. DVIDS content is in the public domain.

Image: Various photos show V Corps’ Long Range Recon Patrol Company training in Germany in the 1960s, with the unit patch being displayed in the center. U.S. Army photo illustration by Spc. Devin Klecan.