A term that has seen an increased level of use is ‘Over the Horizon’. The Department of Defense and national security commentators have been using over the horizon (OTH) in two contexts when discussing Afghanistan. One is the ability to hit terrorist targets and threats inside Afghanistan from bases or assets outside of Afghanistan. The second is the ability to provide training, advise, assistance, and support to the Afghan security ministries and Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF) from outside Afghanistan.

OTH and Counterterrorism

The United States has the most professional counterterrorism capability in the world. The Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) has proven to be extremely effective in eliminating terrorist threats whenever it has targeted them. JSOCs achievements in Iraq, Afghanistan, Syria, Somalia, and around the world are well documented. It has evolved into a very proficient killing machine that can conduct offshore, over the horizon counterterrorism (CT) operations.

Temporary Base in Afghanistan. The ability to hit specific terrorist targets in Afghanistan is hindered by the lack of bases from which to operate from in Afghanistan. The huge air base at Bagram Air Field (BAF) has now been turned over to the Afghans. The only ‘known’ U.S. military presence is at the international airport in Kabul and perhaps at a location near to the U.S. embassy. In addition, the significant intelligence capability of the military and other intelligence agencies has been severely diminished. However, it is certainly plausible that a CT strike and support package could fly into the Kabul airport (with the permission of the Afghan government) and set up a temporary base long enough to hit a terrorist target in Afghanistan. In fact, an arrangement could be made that establishes a ‘warm base’ or ‘cold base’ at either Bagram or the Kabul airport. One ready for occupation that could quickly transition to a forward operation base for SOF units.

Base in Central Asia. There are a few neighboring countries that might host U.S. counterterrorist forces on a permanent or temporary basis. Iran and Pakistan are not among these countries. This could be an agreement for U.S. CT forces to deploy for the length of a mission. Or it could be the establishment of a small base manned by a minimal number of support staff to accommodate a CT force to come in, set up, and then conduct an operation. For a number of years the Central Asian states of Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan hosted U.S. military forces during the 20-year U.S. conflict in Afghanistan. In fact, this has been a topic of discussion among national security gurus. Secretary of State Anthony Blinken hosted Uzbekistan Foreign Minister Kamilow and Tajikistan Foreign Minister Muhriddin in Washington, D.C on July 1, 2021. A discussion about permanent or temporary basing in one of those countries was likely on the meeting agenda. Of course, Russia continues to exert significant influence in the region so geopolitical concerns have to be taken into account.

Regional Bases and Assets. The U.S. has a number of air bases and facilities in the Middle East region that have a substantial number of fighter, bomber, surveillance, and tanker aircraft and drones that can hit targets in Afghanistan. In addition, these bases can support a CT ground force that can stage on a base in the Middle East and then strike a target in Afghanistan. The U.S. Air Force has long range bombers and the U.S. Navy maintains an almost constant presence in the region with an carrier strike group as well as naval vessels with cruise missile capability. The long flight times and overflight permissions are an important planning and execution factor for consideration.

OTH and Support to Afghanistan

The Resolute Support Mission (RSM) in Afghanistan has come to an end; although it hasn’t been declared as officially over. The RSM has been engaged in Security Force Assistance in Afghanistan through the Train, Advise, and Assist (TAA) mission for the past several years. The endeavor has been providing support to the Afghan National Army, the Afghan National Police, and the Afghan security institutions. Thousands of advisors and trainers from the United States, NATO, and other partner nation countries have ‘cycled’ through tours of duty providing advice and training to the Afghan security forces. So there is a wealth of advisory experience that the international community can tap into within their respective militaries in the effort to support the ASI and ANDSF.

Leveraging Technology for Communication. Of course, this training and advising mission has to be done in an over the horizon effort now that the withdrawal is complete. In a technological world that now has the internet, video conferencing, email, cell phones, and other advanced methods of communication – providing support to the Afghan security forces is entirely possible from outside the country. The world is just now coming out of a year long struggle with COVID – an event that transformed the way we communicate and work. The use of Zoom and other online communication methods have become refined over the past year. This certainly is something that needs to be leveraged by the United States and others to assist Afghanistan. Is it ideal? No. But it is a tool in the toolbox.

Training. The ‘T’ part of the TAA mission that Resolute Support conducted in Afghanistan can, to a certain extent, be done from outside the country. Online instruction grew significantly over the past year providing learning opportunities at the elementary, high school, and university level. Large and small businesses conducted internal and for profit training over the internet using Zoom and other media. Of course, the U.S. and other nations have to actually do a little work to set up organizations to carry on this training. Certainly, with funding, people, and organizations earmarked for this event it can be done. Is it as good as person-to-person instruction? No, but it can be done.

There are a host of military schools and exercises that Afghan officers and NCOs can participate in that are located in Europe, the United States, and the Middle East. One positive move is the coordination being done to host training for the Afghan SOF in Qatar.  The instruction provided at Camp Commando (near Kabul) can be augmented with the training offered by US and international SOF in Qatar for the Afghan Commandos and other Afghan SOF units. This type of arrangement could be extended to conventional Afghan military personnel and units – something that will help train the ANDSF.

For several years NATO’s Joint Force Training Centre has conducted a two-week training course for NATO officers and NCOs scheduled for deployment to Afghanistan to work as mentors and advisors. This course could be continued to allow for a readily available pool of military professionals that can train and advise the Afghan security forces – except now it would be done remotely and by bringing Afghan counterparts out of Afghanistan for meetings and training. The Joint Multinational Readiness Center (JMRC) in Germany provided training for advisor teams preparing for deployment to Afghanistan. So the JMRC has some institutional knowledge on the topic, and with some work, an onsite course for Afghan military officers could be setup to offer training on a variety of military topics.

The International Military Education and Training (IMET) program can be leveraged to professionalize the Afghan military. At one time there was a counterinsurgency academy in Afghanistan that members of the Afghan military attended – staffed by Afghan and international military officers and NCOs. This could be reestablished in a Central Asian or Middle East country. The U.S. could bring back the AfPak Hands program to maintain continuity of U.S. trainers and advisors. So there are a lot of opportunities that could be utilized from existing or past training programs.

Advising. One of the ‘As’ in the TAA mission is advising. The advisory mission began in the early years of the U.S. involvement in the Afghan conflict. It became a major effort in the 2011-2012 timeframe when the U.S. and other nations deployed hundreds of Security Force Advisory and Assistance Teams (SFAATs) to work at the kandak (army) and district (police) level all the way to the ministries. This effort lasted about two years until the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) transitioned to the Resolute Support Mission. With the transition the troop levels dropped significantly, which required a big reduction in the advisory teams. The SFAATs were pulled off the kandaks, districts, brigades, and provinces but remained at corps level. During this process Resolute Support continued the TAA mission but through innovative concepts such as the Expeditionary Advisory Package. Eventually, in the past few years, even some corps level advisory teams were removed with the TAA mission being conducted by email, cell phone, through the security ministries, and in conferences in the Kabul area.

Assisting. One of the most important aspects of the TAA mission was providing assistance. A very significant part of this assistance was helping the Afghans with their maintenance and logistical operations. This is most likely one of the weakest aspects of the security situation. The Afghan military is burdened with a vast amount of equipment – drones, aircraft, vehicles, computers, and more – that they do not have the expertise or capability to maintain and sustain. The effort to build and Afghan military to resemble the U.S. military was a huge mistake. For example, providing the Afghans with the UH-60 Blackhawk (a complex and expensive aircraft) instead of additional Mi-17s or Mi-35s was a disaster in the making. Now the U.S. has to rapidly put together a method of providing maintenance, logistical, and technical support to the ANDSF from outside the country. The U.S. will need to find a way to provide contract support by remote and virtual means. Of course, this is less effective than in-country contract workers maintaining vehicles and aircraft. Of course, continuing to fund the Afghanistan Security Forces Fund (ASFF) will be key to helping the ANDSF and ASIs.

RAA Operations. More recently – as demonstrated in Iraq and Syria – U.S. special operations forces as well as conventional forces have been using new technology and methods to offer train, advise, and assist support. This has been called remote advise and assist operations. SOF, and CF personnel, have developed persistent relationships with Afghan leadership. These relationships should be leveraged to continue an over the horizon advising capability. One way to maintain these personal relationships is to invite Afghan military leaders to one of the bases maintained by the U.S. in the Middle East. The working relationship can be continued remotely. This can be done – there just has to be some vision and a will to do it. Is it as effective as in-country advising efforts? Of course not. But it is one method of getting the job done.

Conclusion. Certainly the United States has the capability to conduct over the horizon counterterrorism missions in Afghanistan to hit targets that pose a threat to the the homeland. It won’t be as effective and responsive as operating from a base within Afghanistan; especially consider the loss of intelligence capability. But it can be done.

The advise and train mission can also be done. However, it appears that the political climate will offer a lot of lip service to this OTH training mission but the assets needed (money, people, organization, political will) is most likely lacking. Thus far – it is not apparent that much planning or preparation has occurred on conducting an OTH assistance mission for the Afghan military.

Even if the U.S. got its act together on conducting an effective OTH training mission – there is another significant factor to consider. After twenty years of the U.S. and the international community providing billions of dollars and thousands of military personnel to first fight the Taliban and then provide training and assistance – the Afghan government and military have not been able to defeat the Taliban. The likelihood of the Afghans defeating the Taliban now – even with US and international over the horizon assistance is bleak.

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Image: Map derived from a Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) map of Afghanistan.

U.S. Special Forces have deployed to Mozambique for an extended training mission with select military units of the Armed Defense Forces of Mozambique. The past few years have seen a surge of insurgent activity in northern Mozambique. ISIS is attempting to establish a “caliphate” in the southern region of Africa and seems to have established strong links with the local insurgency named al-Shabab (“young people” in Arabic). The Mozambique insurgent group is a separate entity from the Somalia-based al-Shabab insurgent group of the same name.

Foreign Terrorist Organizations Designation. The United States maintains that the Mozambique al-Shabaab is an extension of the Islamic State. On March 10, 2021, the United States listed ISIS in Mozambique as a foreign terrorist organization. The statement designated the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria – Mozambique (ISIS-Mozambique) as a Foreign Terrorist Organization. ISIS-Mozambique is also known as Ansar al-Sunna (and locally as al-Shabaab in Mozambique) according to the State Department. Another name for the group is the Ahlu Sunna Wal Jammah (ASWJ). The designation requires the US government and its allies to freeze and confiscate the assets of all those associated with ISIS-Mozambique. Some observers worry that the terrorist designation will make it difficult to conduct peace negotiations in the future and could hamper delivery of humanitarian aid and supplies.

IS’s “Central Africa Province”. The Islamic State has seen its physical caliphate in Iraq and Syria dismantled. However, it is broadening its presence throughout the world. An IS franchise can be found in eastern Afghanistan using the name of the Islamic State of Khorasan Province (ISKP). Throughout many African countries it also has ties to insurgent groups. Since 2019 IS has declared the existence of the “Central Africa Province” which includes parts of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Mozambique.

Special Forces Training for FADM. On March 15, 2021 the US embassy in Mozambique issued a press release that stated US special operations forces would support Mozambique’s efforts to prevent the spread of terrorism and violent extremism. The Green Berets are deployed on a two-month long training mission to aid in the fight against an insurgency with ties to ISIS. The Mozambique Marines will be the recipients of the training program. The Deputy Commander of US Special Operations Command Africa (SOCAFRICA) was in Maputo, the capital city of Mozambique, in mid-March and stated that the ‘modest’ training program consists of a dozen Army Green Berets. His visit coincided with the opening event of the Joint Combined Exchange Training (JCET) between the US and Mozambican forces. In addition, the US will provide advice and support in intelligence as well as some medical and communications equipment.

Portugal SOF to Assist. Portugal may be providing up to 60 members of its special forces to provide some military assistance. Arrival of the trainers could be as soon as April 2021. Mozambique is a former colony of Portugal. It gained its independence from Portugal in 1975 after a long struggle between the guerrilla forces of the Mozambique Liberation Front (FRELIMO) and Portugal. For many years during the Cold War Mozambique fell into orbit of the ‘eastern’ block of communist ruled nations. Lisbon will be encouraging the European Union to consider offering assistance to Mozambique at an informal gathering of EU defense ministers in late May 2021.

Country Profile. Mozambique is a country nearly twice the size of California with a population of almost 28 million people. It currently faces a range of political, economic, and security challenges. Mozambique is represented by people of diverse religions. Christians number about 60%, Muslims about 19%, and another 21 % are other or unknown.

Cabo Delgado Province. The northernmost province of Mozambique has seen the insurgency increase in strength since 2017. The ranks of the insurgents come from local fighters of the province. The province is located along the southern border of Tanzania and has a coastline on the Indian Ocean. The Cabo Delgado Province has about 2.3 million people – most of them Muslim. The region is rich in off-shore natural gas reserves and minerals. The conflict has resulted in a severe humanitarian crisis in northern Mozambique with many people in search of food. Hundreds of thousands of people have been displaced in the conflict area.

Insurgent Grievances. The province has a high illiteracy and unemployment rate – which breeds discontent and encourages recruits to join the insurgent group. Grievances include lack of jobs, poverty, and access to land. In addition, the rich off-shore natural gas reserves are currently being explored by multinational energy companies with little chance that the local population will benefit. There is a belief that the rich natural resources of the northern province is being exploited by central government officials and foreign corporations.

Insurgency. The insurgent group formed up in 2017. Members include poor fishermen and local workers who split off from the established religious leaders. In time more people joined and the group began conducting small-scale violent attacks against police and local officials. Over the past few years the group has become more dangerous with its attacks against security forces and civilians. The insurgent group has between 800 to 3,500 fighters – depending on the source of the information. The assistance from IS appears to be minimal. IS has provided a minimal level of media support. A United Nations report has information that trainers and explosive experts traveled to Mozambique to provide training and advise. There is a foreign fighter presence within the insurgency – most from neighboring Tanzania.

Atrocities. The Islamic State affiliated group has been conducting a number of atrocities to include the beheading of children as young as eleven years old. The US State Department estimates that ISIS-Mozambique has killed thousands of civilians. Beheadings by the jihadist group are a common occurrence.

Types of Attacks. The group is responsible for orchestrating a series of large scale and sophisticated attacks in the region. They briefly held the strategic port of Mocimboa da Praia in Cabo Delgado Province. The insurgent group targets police stations, government facilities and personnel, and local civilians. Farms have been destroyed and villages burned down. Contractors working for the U.S.-based energy firm Anadarko have been targeted as well. The weapons used include small arms and explosives. Many of its weapons have come from the government security forces during raids and ambushes conducted by the insurgents.

FADM. The Armed Defense Forces of Mozambique (FADM) are comprised of approximately 11,000 personnel. There are 10,000 Army, 200 Navy, and 1,000 Air Force personnel (CIA figure from 2019). The military’s equipment is primarily Soviet-era although India has been providing some equipment in recent years.

PMCs. Mozambique has been engaging in the services of private military corporations (PMCs) from foreign nations. Some reports indicate that there has been limited success by the security forces with the assistance of the PMCs.

At least one PMC is of Russian origin – numbering between 160 and 200. They arrived in 2019 on An-124 transport aircraft. Mozambique – despite being a poor country – has natural resources that make it attractive for outside investment. These include precious minerals and natural gas. So there is a strong incentive for the Russians to become involved in the affairs of Mozambique. Recent reports indicate that the Russians have withdrawn from the conflict area after suffering several casualties.

A more recent PMC is from South Africa – the Dyck Advisory Group (DAG). Human rights organizations have accused the South Africa mercenaries of human rights abuses. DAG provided training, advice, armored vehicles, and aviation services (helicopters and attack aircraft). The effectiveness of the South African contractors is still being determined.

Future Outlook? The Mozambique security forces are not highly skilled in counterinsurgency and lack the capability to use intelligence to target the insurgents. There is friction between the police and military which hampers the joint effort to confront the insurgency. It is hoped that the introduction of US Special Forces will improve the professionalism of the some of the Mozambique security forces to the extent that they can successfully combat and degrade the insurgent group. The advisory program will likely need to be longer than two months and scaled up in size for any real long-term benefit to occur.

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Graphic. Derived from CIA maps.

The Biden administration wasted very little time in setting a course correction in the United States role in the Yemen conflict. Citing humanitarian issues (as well as other concerns) it has decided to eliminate support for offensive operations provided to Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates in their fight against the Iran-supported Ansarallah / Houthi rebels in Yemen. The conflict has raged for many years.

Humanitarian Crisis. The Yemen conflict has resulted in a humanitarian crisis – which the United Nations says is one of the worst in the world. There are widespread food shortages resulting in malnutrition. The economy is in a shambles and government services are operating in a very basic level. The aerial bombardment by Saudi and UAE aircraft has resulted in numerous civilian casualties. There is a significant lack of medical supplies and services for the civilian population. In addition, the COVID-19 pandemic and cholera are taking a toll among the population.

The Houthis. With a strong base in the north region of Yemen the Shia group has attempted to extend its reach south and east throughout the country. It controls the capital city (Sanaa). Other religious, ethnic, and political groups have joined their movement. Most of the civilian population (estimates vary from 70 to 80%) come under Houthi control. The Houthis enjoy a strong position in the conflict – with no sign of their impending defeat in the future.

Iranian Support. The Houthi rebels have been supported by Iran for a number of years. Many observers of the conflict believe that the Houthis are an Iranian proxy group. The Iranians provide funding, weapons, equipment, trainers, and advisors to the Houthis. Through its Qods Force, Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) is very involved in the support provided to the Houthis.

Iranian Weapons and Equipment. Weapons, equipment, supplies, money, and personnel are transported to Yemen on international air flights as well as sea movement to Yemen’s ports. These weapons include short-range ballistic missiles, surface-to-air missiles, drones, and other sophisticated equipment. The missile systems and components have been used by the Houthis against Saudi oil and infrastructure targets. These weapons shipments are in violation of the U.N. Security Council Resolution 2216.

Yemeni Government. The government of President Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi was ousted from the capital city and surrounding areas in a 2014-2015 offensive – dividing the country. The United Nations- recognized Yemeni government has benefited from external support from Gulf nations. However, the government supporters are fragmented and often engaged in internal conflicts.

Saudi-led Coalition. Saudi Arabia and the UAE say that they are actively reducing Iran’s regional influence in their intervention in the Yemen conflict. The involvement by the Saudis and their allies began in 2015 after the Houthi rebels ousted the Republic of Yemen Government from the capital city Sanaa in 2014. The Saudi coalition was able to help the ousted government regain some territory to include the major city of Aden but the conflict soon turned into a stalemate.

United Arab Emirates. The UAE has stepped back on its military involvement – although it still conducts counter terrorism operations and provides support to the breakaway Southern Transitional Council. It withdrew ground forces from Yemen in 2019. Other nations that have supported the Saudi action in Yemen in the past include Kuwait and Sudan.

U.S. Support. For the past several years the U.S. has provided intelligence, logistics, precision-guided munitions, and other types of support to Saudi Arabia and its allies involved in the Yemen war. This support was increased after missile and drone attacks against Saudi oil facilities by the Houthis. The U.S. stopped providing aerial refueling support to Saudi and UAE aircraft in 2018. In the last few years U.S. support has been limited to intelligence sharing, targeting support, and training (in an attempt to limit civilian casualties). The U.S. has been criticized for its role in providing Saudi Arabia and UAE with arms and munitions used in the Yemen conflict.

U.S. SOF. In addition, the U.S. has had special operations forces advisors on the ground in Yemen providing training, advice, and assistance. U.S. SOF have worked with units from the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) as well as Yemen governmental security forces. The U.S. has also conducted unilateral counter-terrorism operations in the country against al-Qaeda and Islamic State affiliates. In January 2017 a Navy SEAL (Ryan Owens) died during a counterterrorism raid in Yemen. In January 2020 U.S. SOF conducted an unsuccessful operation to kill or capture a key IRGC-QF operative in Yemen (Abdul Reza Shahlai).

Past activities of U.S. SOF in Yemen include foreign internal defense, counterterrorism, intelligence sharing, surveillance and reconnaissance, maritime interdiction, and drone strikes. U.S. SOF involvement in Yemen has also provided the opportunity to work with and assist in the development of GCC special operations capabilities. This also lends to increased interoperability of GCC SOF with U.S. SOF. In addition, the United Kingdom and France has also deployed its special operations forces to Yemen.

Trump and Yemen. Under the Trump administration the U.S. has taken a strong stance against Iran’s activities across the Middle East. This includes attempting to diminish Iran’s influence in Yemen. The Trump administration had declared the Houthis as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO). It appears that the Biden administration may reverse this designation. The humanitarian implications of an FTO designation are significant. It would become more difficult to get foreign aid and assistance into areas of Yemen controlled by the Houthis.

Biden and Yemen. The Biden administration is likely to give priority to the nuclear talks about the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) agreement with Iran over concerns about Iranian meddling in Middle East affairs. Some sales of aircraft and munitions to Saudi Arabia and the UAE are on hold and under review by the Biden administration. U.S. activities in Yemen are likely to be curtailed. This prohibition by the Biden administration does not include the actions the United States will take against al-Qaida affiliates in Yemen – to include al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsular (AQAP).

A Diplomatic Solution? The U.S. has now announced increased support to United Nations efforts for a political settlement of the conflict. In early February the United States named Tim Lenderking, a career member of the Senior Foreign Service, as U.S. Special Envoy to Yemen. However, a ceasefire and end to the conflict is unlikely. A United Nations Special Envoy to Yemen (established in June 2012) has failed in attempts to arrange a permanent ceasefire and political agreement. The Houthis are entrenched in Sanaa and the western highlands of Yemen. However, the opposition (Hadi government) and its supporters in the Gulf Cooperation Council insist that any political solution must include a Houthi departure from Sanaa.

U.S. Interests in the Yemen Conflict. There are reasons for the United States to be concerned with the events taking place at the southern end of the Arabian peninsular. There are fears that Yemen could become a sanctuary for transnational terrorist groups like al-Qaeda and the Islamic State. The vital international shipping lanes near the Bab al Mandab Strait are at risk. In addition, Iran could possibly use Yemen in the future to threaten Saudi Arabia’s southern borders. How the Biden administration addresses these concerns while resetting the relationship with Iran will be watched with great interest.

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References:

Yemen: Civil and Regional Intervention, Congressional Research Service, CRS R43960, December 8, 2020.
https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R43960

Congress and the War in Yemen: Oversight and Legislation 2015-2020, Congressional Research Service, CRS R45046, June 19, 2020.
https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R45046

Head Shots or Body Shots? This is a Question that
Should Defend Influence Strategy, Not Lead It.

By Ajit Maan.

In an insightful recent article “Counterterrorism Targeting – Head Shots or Body Shots?” Thomas G. Pledger advocates augmenting the kill/capture counter-terrorism model with network targeting. I don’t have any problem with that as long as the question follows (defends, protects, and backs up) influence targeting of the non-kinetic variety.

While “capture when you can” is an intelligence requirement, “kill” is less advantageous. Retribution, as Pledger notes, has got us into considerable trouble.

The kill/capture model is problematic and has even been counter-productive. These operations not only have failed to eliminate al-Qaeda and other terrorist groups, they have resulted in the proliferation of violent extremism by directly feeding into the narratives that support it.

The younger leaders who have filled their ranks of those targeted individuals are more extreme, more aggressive, more lethal, and less likely to compromise diplomatically. Network targeting has been effective in slowing down adversarial operations by a few days in some cases, but their organizations are designed to take those sorts of losses.

It is past time to reconsider our own militarized narrative. The story we tell ourselves is predicated upon the belief that the U.S. is conducting a “war on terror.” Even contextualizing the conflicts as ideological is understood in militarized terms. A militarized understanding of the battlefield naturally leads to military force – capabilities to defeat the enemy. But this narrative is faulty and the weapons being used to combat extremism are ineffective because the nature of the conflict has been misidentified.

We need to counter extremism with methods and tools that shape environments and affect behaviors. Military action is only one of these tools. It should be placed behind others. Most importantly, we need to lead with a comprehensive strategic narrative that speaks to the identity of its audience.

Our adversaries understand this concept, have embraced it, and have incorporated strategic narratives across their operations. AQAP, ISIS, the Taliban al-Qaeda, and many other jihadi groups effectively disseminate their brand and reinforce their ideologies through broad information operations to control the strategic narrative.

An imperative is that ours should encompass the adversary’s narrative. This is not a counter-narrative. It is not a rebuttal. A strategic narrative will not be successful if it is limited to the narrative terrain established by extremists and should not be focused on responding to their messages. What I am suggesting involves re-narrating the events of the opposition’s narrative and co-opting their meaning. In other words, we must tell our own narrative in a way that re-frames the opposition’s and offers a bigger, better, smarter alternative of understanding, identifying and acting.

Responding to terrorist messaging has already resulted in what were predictable problems: 1) We have no footing upon which to win ideological or religious debates. 2) Losing those debates has resulted in further loss of credibility. 3) Responding elevates and legitimates the adversarial narrative. 4) Responding is a defensive position. We should not put ourselves in a defensive position. Rather, we need to position ourselves offensively, to get out ahead of their narrative, encompass it, and swallow it up.

Further, an effective strategic message must target, and be delivered to, the population not the terrorists. In an unconventional warfare campaign the key terrain is the human terrain. That is where we either win or loose. We need better messages that connect to our TA’s core identity narrative, through which both hard and soft power will be understood.

Our narrative must demonstrate how extremists are using the population as a proxy force and how they don’t, in fact, share common identities, interests, or objectives with the audiences they are trying to control. Our message should focus on the damage terrorists have done to the target population and how their actions provoke responses that will negatively affect that population. That message will resonate with the target audience because it is consistent with their immediate experience.

Developing a coherent strategic narrative is the best weapon to stem recruitment and combat extremism. It is a national security imperative. Questions about how best to enforce the strategy should come after we have a strategy.

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“Counterterrorism Targeting – Head Shots or Body Shots”, SOF News, by Thomas Pledger, April 2, 2020.
http://www.sof.news/terrorism/ct-targeting/

Ajit Maan, Ph.D. is CEO of the award winning think-and-do-tank Narrative Strategies, Professor of Politics and Global Security at Arizona State University, Affiliate Faculty at the Center for Narrative Conflict Resolution at George Mason University, Faculty at the Center for the Future of War, Member of the Brain Trust of the Weaponized Narrative Initiative, and author of seven books including Counter-Terrorism: Narrative Strategies, Narrative Warfare, and Plato’s Fear.

On March 23, 2019 the Pentagon announced the physical defeat of the Daesh caliphate in Syria. Over 110,000 square miles were liberated and 7.7 million people freed from Daesh oppression. The Syrian Democratic Front was assisted by U.S. airpower, ISR, and special operations forces in its defeat of the Islamic State fighters. The SDF had finally captured Baghouz – the last Islamic State physical enclave in Syria.

The Special Operations Joint Task Force – Operation Inherent Resolve (SOJTF-OIR) published this story below on March 18, 2020 summarizing the rise and fall of the Daesh in Iraq and Syria. The article details the final battle for the last ISIS enclave of Baghouz where the SDF defeated the ISIS fighters in their last piece of physical terrain.

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“At the height of their power, the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria, now referred to as Daesh, operated in 18 different countries and had an annual budget of $1 billion with an estimated 30,000 members. They conducted ground attacks on both government forces and any other force that opposed them. Their goal: to establish a so-called caliphate in the region.

On Aug. 7th, 2014, the U.S.-led coalition launched airstrikes against Daesh. On March 23rd, 2019, the Pentagon announced the physical defeat of the Daesh caliphate in Syria. Over 110,000 square miles were liberated. Approximately 7.7 million people were freed from Daesh oppression. In Baghouz, Syria, where the final battle took place, a yellow flag was flown atop a building by U.S.-backed Syrian forces as they celebrated their victory over Daesh.

Founded in 1999 under the name Jamāʻat al-Tawḥīd wa-al-Jihād and changing to Islamic State of Iraq in 2006, and with an allegiance to al-Qaeda, the oppressive presence of Daesh in the region grew once Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi came to power in 2010. Al-Baghdadi became involved with Daesh while detained in Camp Bucca in the early 2000’s. When released from detainment, he quickly rose in prominence by being directly involved in the violent atrocities conducted by Daesh.

Throughout the next several years with al-Baghdadi as head, Daesh seized control of several major cities in Iraq. Kidnappings, mass murder, and extortion were common crimes committed by Daesh members. By declaring the creation of a so-called caliphate, Daesh gave al-Baghdadi self-proclaimed authority over the Muslims of the world. Their declaration as a caliphate was criticized and disputed by Middle Eastern governments. They were officially declared a terrorist organization by both Iraq and Syria, along with many other nations of the world.

Coalition troops were sent into Iraq to support the defeat of Daesh. In October of 2014, this combined effort was given the name Operation Inherent Resolve. Along with Iraqi and Syrian forces, over 30 countries combined together for the sole mission of defeating Daesh. The Combined Joint Task Force- Operation Inherent Resolve (CJTF-OIR) worked with partner forces to free the nearly 8 million people under the control of Daesh.

By mid-2015, Kurdish fighters expelled Daesh out of towns in Syria and reclaimed military bases that had fallen under Daesh control. In late 2015, Iraqi forces took control of Ramadi from Daesh and then Fallujah just six months later. After several years of combined assaults, Daesh was quickly losing control of central Iraq.

Mosul was retaken from Daesh control toward the end of 2016. Mosul was considered by Daesh as their capital city in the two years since it fell under their control. By early 2017, Daesh had lost all control of central Iraq. At the end of July 2017, it was reported that Daesh had lost an estimated 73% of the territory they had once controlled in Iraq. By the end of the year, the Iraqi Army announced all of Iraq had been liberated and their people freed from Daesh oppression.

On March 23rd, 2019, the Syrian Democratic Forces announced that Daesh had lost its final stronghold in Syria, bringing an end to their so-called caliphate. On Oct. 26th, 2019, during a raid conducted by U.S. forces, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi was killed in Northwest Syria.

CJTF-OIR continues its pursuit of Daesh remnants to this day. The remains still linger, but with few resources and the inability to project power to the same degree as they did in 2012, they have very little influence in the region. The continued training of partner forces within the scope of the Defeat Daesh mission is now the focus of Operation Inherent Resolve, along with preventing Daesh from re-emerging in the region and recruiting members to fight for them once again.

Iraq is working hard to establish a stable, unified government. After being devastated by the threat of Daesh, the Iraqi people are primed and ready for this transition, moving closer to being a free and sovereign nation withstanding against any third-party interference. Its military is ready to take a more active role in the safety and security of Iraq, and demonstrate its ability to protect the people and interests of Iraq.

The last of Daesh’s territory in Syria crumbled at the battle of Baghouz. The SDF were the critical land force in this offensive and through their significant sacrifice eliminated the last territorial stronghold held by Daesh. By taking a disciplined, incremental approach to the battle the SDF were able to spare the large civilian population that Daesh fighters used as human shields in the densely populated area. The tactical effectiveness of their approach mixed with the fair treatment of civilians showed the SDF to be an honorable and powerful fighting force.

After over a month of fighting, The SDF declared final victory over Daesh on March 23, 2019, marking the end of Daesh controlled territory in Syria. Their legacy: millions of people have been liberated from Daesh’s barbaric cruelty and fear, and over 900 Daesh fighters surrendering by the end of the battle.

In the last year, the role of the Coalition has been to work alongside partner forces in Iraq and Syria in preventing the remnants of Daesh from returning to power, and to keep the extremist ideologies of Daesh suppressed. The destruction of Daesh provides partners the space and time to recover from the physical and emotional damage that has been left behind in their wake.

The lessons of the rise and fall of Daesh have shown the international community the need to remain vigilant and prepared, to swiftly respond to any threat by third-party actors or violent extremist organizations. The fortitude of the Iraqi and Syrian people and the continued Coalition support of our partner forces, what was once darkened by Daesh, is rejuvenated with the aspirations of a free people.”

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The above article is from “The Defeat of Daesh: One Year Later”, Special Operations Joint Task force – Operation Inherent Resolve (SOJTF-OIR), by Specialist Brian Redmer, March 18, 2020.
https://www.dvidshub.net/news/365422/defeat-daesh-one-year-later-nemabuna-reva-dais-salek-pase

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Top Photo: Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) provide security for a Coalition mortar crew providing fires support to SDF against ISIS locations in Operation Round Up taking place in the Middle Euphrates River Valley (MERV) in Syria. (photo by SSG Timothy Koster, CJTF-OIR, May 13, 2018).

Central Command released a statement saying that two U.S. service members were killed in action in Iraq on Sunday, March 8, 2020.

“Two U.S. service members were killed by enemy forces while advising and accompanying Iraqi Security Forces during a mission to eliminate an ISIS terrorist stronghold in a mountainous area of north central Iraq.”

Both Marines were assigned to the 2nd Marine Raider Battalion, Marine Forces Special Operations Command, Camp Lejeune, North Carolina. They were identified as:

Gunnery Sergeant Diego D. Pongo, age 34, of Simi Valley, California

Captain Moises A. Navas, age 34, of Germantown, Maryland

Some reports say that the recovery effort of the wounded and deceased took over six hours and involved a unit from the Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC). The operation took place in the mountains more than 35 miles south of Erbil. The raid on the terrorist base was described as a partnered company-sized operation by ISOF.

The target was a terrorist training camp located in a tunnel and cave complex in the Qara Chockh mountains. Four other U.S. service members were wounded. News reports say that the U.S. conducted airstrikes with F-15 fighter jets, drones, and Apache attack helicopters. It is estimated that between 20 to 25 ISIS fighters died in the engagement.

The last death in Iraq due to combat action was a Marine Raider – killed on August 10, 2019. Gunnery Sergeant Scott Koppenhafer died after being engaged by enemy small arms fire while advising and accompanying Iraqi security forces on a planned operation in Ninewah province. Koppenhafer was a member of the Marine Corps Forces Special Operations Command (MARSOC).

The Marine Corps Forces Special Operations Command was created as a major command within the Corps and a co-equal component of United States Special Operations Command (SOCOM). The majority of the MARSOC units are based at Camp Lejeune, North Carolina. The subunits of MARSOC include the Marine Raider Regiment, the Marine Raider Support Group, and the Marine Raider Training Center. The Marine Raider Regiment has a headquarters company and three Marine Raider Battalions. Two Marine Raider Battalions are located at Camp Lejuene and one at Camp Pendleton.

Over 5,000 U.S. service members are in Iraq to assist the Iraqi Security Forces in the counter ISIS fight. U.S. special operations units are actively involved in partner operations with Iraqi SOF forces in advise and accompany operations.

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References:

DOD Identifies Marine Casualties, DOD, March 10, 2020.

Current news, analysis, and commentary on special operations, national security, and conflicts from around the world.

SOF News

USSF Fighting ISIS in Afghanistan. Thomas Gibbons-Neff provides a glimpse of the activities of a Special Forces team engaged in the fight against the Islamic State of Khorasan Province (ISKP) in the mountains of eastern Afghanistan. Read “U.S. Special Forces Battle Against ISIS Turns to Containment, and Concern”, The New York Times, June 14, 2019. (NYT’s offers a limited number of article views before you encounter their paywall).

CA Roles . . . and “Paying Attention”. Andrew J. Bibb, a Civil Affairs officer, uses the thoughts of Winston Churchill to explain how Civil Affairs provides ‘awareness’ for the U.S. military. Read “Civil Affairs, Winston Churchill, and the Powers of Paying Attention”, Small Wars Journal, June 16, 2019.

Navy Frogman Reminisces About Apollo Recovery. It has been 50 years since the Apollo 11 astronauts were recovered at sea by the USS Hornet. The first person to reach that historic capsule was a Navy frogman. (San Francisco Bay Area, June 13, 2019.

Bill Dean (SF) Remembered. There have been a number of news articles about the recent death of Bill Dean. He was a retired Green Beret who died during a mountaineering expedition. See “Quiet professional remembered: Bill Dean had a lasting impact on ISIS fight” (Stars and Stripes, June 14, 2019).

Author Steve Dimodica (retired Green Beret) has several of his books available at special prices prior to “Father’s Day”. During the Father’s Day week , in honor of father’s everywhere, the publisher will be running a special for those readers who prefer their material in electronic form. From 12 June through 19 June, all of Steve’s espionage thrillers will be significantly discounted from list prices during the days surrounding the special Sunday for Fathers. Do not miss this opportunity to load up Dad’s Kindle library with a summer’s worth of page turners.

Foreign SOF

Kopassus – Back in the Fold. Under the Leahy Admendment (of the 1998 Foreign Operations Appropriations Act), U.S. Special Forces were forbidden to provide training or assistance to the Indonesian Special Forces for a couple of decades. That has now changed. Read “Abusive Indonesian unit back in America’s good graces”, Asia Times, June 14, 2019.

Army Ranger Wing to Mali. Ireland’s special operations unit will be sending a small contingent to join a coalition of nations engaged in a counter-terrorism operation in Mali. The United Nations force – known as MINUSMA – is composed of personnel from more than 50 countries. Read more in “Ireland has quietly joined a dangerous war”, The Irish Times, June 14, 2019.

Australian Special Forces Medics. In an eight-part series the secret world of the fighting soldiers whose first job is to save lives is explored. Read “Voodoo Medics: watch the award-winning series”, The Australian, June 17, 2019.

NATO

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization continues to conduct exercises and develop contingency plans for the defense of eastern Europe and in the Baltic States region to deter Russian aggression.

NATO in Eastern Europe. Michael O’Hanlon and Christopher Skaluba collaborate on an article about NATO standing up to Russian aggression in eastern Europe. Read “A Report From NATO’s Front Lines”, Brookings Institute, June 13, 2019.

Role of Nordic Countries. A credible deterrence policy in the Nordic-Baltic region requires the participation of two non-NATO countries. Both Sweden and Finland are key to an effective defense of the region. SOF is briefly mentioned a few times in this report. Read a comprehensive 136-page report on this topic entitled Deterrence in the Nordic-Baltic Region: The Role of the Nordic Countries Together With the U.S. Army, Strategic Studies Institute (SSI), U.S. Army War College, June 4, 2019.
https://ssi.armywarcollege.edu/pubs/display.cfm?pubID=1415

Middle East

Oil Tanker War? Over the past few months several oil tankers have been targeted. Speculation (or intel if you want to believe DoD / State Dept. sources) is that Iranian proxy groups are behind the attacks. Read more in “A Tanker War in the Middle East – Again?”, by Robin Wright, The New Yorker, June 13, 2019.

MQ-9 Reaper Drone Shot Down. an MQ-9 was shot down over Yemen by a Houthi SA-6 surface to air missile in early June 2019. A week later a modified Iranian SA-7 surface to air missile attempted to shoot down a U.S. MQ-9 over the Gulf of Oman that was observing the IRGC attack on the M/T Kokuka Courageous. Things are heating up in the Gulf region. (CENTCOM, June 16, 2019).

Africa

New CJTF-HOA Commander. Major General Mike Turello (SF) has replaced Major General J.D. Craig (SF) as commander of Combined Joint Task Force – Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA) located at Camp Lemonnier, Djibouti. The two Special Forces officers are well-known to each other so it should be a smooth transition. There is the possibility that the command will see some organizational changes in the future – with a proposed transition to Joint Task Force – Africa. The new task force would be permanent in nature and expand its area of operations beyond the chunk of East Africa comprised of 12 countries. The base currently houses about 4,500 U.S. troops and contractors. The French and Chinese also maintain a significant presence in Djibouti as well. Read “New Commander Takes Over Horn of Africa Mission Ahead of Proposed US Shift”, Stars and Stripes, June 13, 2019.

Prince’s Enterprise in Congo. Erik Prince, former Navy SEAL and founder of Blackwater, has established a commercial presence in the Democratic Republic of Congo. Read “Blackwater founder expands operations in Congo”, Reuters, June 13, 2019.

AQIM in the Maghreb. Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) has gone quiet for a couple of years . . . but they still are a threat. Read “Residual, Not Irrelevant: AQIM’s Lingering Threat to the Maghreb”, Terrorism Monitor, The Jamestown Foundation, by Dario Cristini, June 14, 2019.

Commentary

U.S. Army Cyber Command and IO. Conrad Crane, author and employee at the U.S. Army War College, believes that now is the time for the Army’s Cyber Command to reestablish Army dominance in information warfare. That would require a change in name, new doctrine, and regaining control of relevant organizations. Read his article in “The United States needs an information warfare command: A historical examination”, War on the Rocks, June 14, 2019.

Defense Budget Analyzed. The 2020 Defense Budget is examined in this 32-page paper. Read Strategy to Ask: Analysis of the 2020 Defense Budget Request, by Susanna V. Blume, Center for a New American Security (CNAS), May 2019.

Political Warfare Threatens West. The chief of Australia’s Defence Force (ADF), General Angus Campbell, says that Western democracies risk being outmanoeuvered by totalitarian regimes that are unhindered by rules. These nations use information operations, cyber operations, coercion, and other ‘gray zone’ means to advance their national interests. Read “ADF chief: West faces a new threat from political warfare”, The Strategist, Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI), June 14, 2019.

Videos

Rangers Climb Pointe du Hoc 75 Years Later. Army Rangers from the 75th Ranger Regiment scaled the cliffs of France in observance of the D-Day observance of the allied invasion of France. During the invasion 75 years ago 135 men were killed or wounded capturing Pointe du Hoc. (U.S. Army video, 1 min, 14 June 2019).

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Photo: A U.S. Army AH-64 Apache helicopter flies at Schofield Barracks, Hawaii, Dec. 17, 2018. (U.S. Army photo by 1st Lt. Ryan DeBooy).

The Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) has published a new report on Afghanistan – with a focus on security sector assistance efforts. This 210-page report, published on June 14, 2019, is entitled Divided Responsibility: Lessons From U.S. Security Sector Assistance Efforts in Afghanistan.

The report  examines the various security sector assistance activities and programs undertaken by dozens of U.S. entities and international partners to develop the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF), Ministry of Defense (MOD), and Ministry of Interior (MOI) since 2001. The report looks critically at five core SSA efforts: field advising, ministerial-level advising, equipping the force, U.S.-based training, and working as part of a NATO coalition.

The report describes how advisor and staff personnel were selected, trained, and assigned to fulfill these key functions. It also examines the consequences associated with the US and NATO approach to SSA in Afghanistan, such as not assigning organizations responsibility for key functions; implementing a command and control relationship that did not consistently link ministerial and tactical advising efforts; not having a comprehensive, enduring plan to guide all efforts; and relying on a NATO command that strained unity of effort and hindered the standardization of SSA activities.

Chapter 1: “Introduction”. Provides an overview for policy makers, explains what Security Sector Assistance is, and provides information on SSA’s role in U.S. history.

Chapter 2: “Field Advising”. Contains information and descriptions of the early Embedded Training Teams (ETTs), augmented Brigade Combat Teams (BCTs), SFATs, SFAATs, SFABs (the early ones), and air advising.

Chapter 3: “Ministerial Advising”. Explains the role of the ministerial-level advisor, selection and training for advisors, and Afghan input to the advising and training process.

Chapter 4 : “Equipping the Force”. Covers the nuts and bolts (and processes) of providing equipment to the ANDSF.

Chapter 5: “U.S.-Based Training”. Explores the different programs used to train Afghan military personnel. This includes a section on the high rate of ‘AWOLs’ that disappear from U.S. training bases while attending training schools and courses.

Chapter 6: “By, With, and Through NATO”. Provides information of how NATO became involved with Afghanistan, the policies and processes that created challenges in establishing unity of effort, how the U.S. enabled and optimized NATO involvement in Afghanistan, and more.

Chapter 7: “Conclusions”. Each chapter ends with “Key Findings” and “Recommendations”. This chapter provides a summary of “Lessons” and “Recommendations”.

Chapter 8: “Appendices and Endnotes”. This extensive section provides the resources used to research Divided Responsibility: Lessons From U.S. Security Sector Assistance Efforts in Afghanistan . It provides an explanation of the methodology for writing the report and a listing of acronyms.

This document is a good read for those interested in security sector reform, security force assistance, or the effort to organize, equip, and train the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces.

To read or download (PDF) Divided Responsibility: Lessons From U.S. Security Sector Assistance Efforts in Afghanistan visit the website of SIGAR:
https://www.sigar.mil/pdf/lessonslearned/SIGAR-19-39-LL.pdf

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Photo: From the cover of the SIGAR report.

In December 19, 2018 President Trump surprised just about everyone when he announced that the U.S. would begin immediately withdrawing its 2,200 military personnel from northeastern Syria. This decision was apparently the result of a phone call with the Turkish president that took place a few days earlier on December 14, 2018. This abrupt shift in policy was at odds with previous statements by administration, state, defense, and CJTF-OIR officials.

In the months prior to the phone call numerous officials had stressed the long-term commitment to helping the Syrian Democratic Front (SDF). In fact, the initial purpose of the phone call was to warn the Turkish president not to proceed with plans to attack U.S.-backed Kurdish forces in Syria. Instead Trump basically invited the Turks to do what they want in Syria. A part of the conversation included Trump asking the Turkish president if his forces were up to the task of cleaning up the remnants of ISIS.

In an attempt to alleviate concern about the unfinished fight against ISIS in Syria President Trump stated that Turkey can finish the job. On December 23, 2018 – just four days after announcing the U.S. military withdrawal from Syria – President Trump tweeted:

“President @RT_Erdogan of Turkey has very strongly informed me that he will eradicate whatever is left of ISIS in Syria . . . and he is a man who can do it plus, Turkey is right “next door”. Our troops are coming home!”

During a subsequent trip to visit U.S. troops in Iraq President Trump stated:

“We’ve knocked them silly. I will tell you I’ve had some very good talks with President Erdogan who wants to knock them out also, and he’ll do it.”

For the last few years, since early 2015, the United States has been providing training, advise, assistance, weapons, equipment, intelligence, and ‘enablers’ to the Syrian Democratic Front. The SDF has been the primary ground force in Syria that has been fighting ISIS. The SDF has been enabled by the U.S. and other Coalition partners with fires support (artillery and mortar) and airstrikes. As a result of SDF military operations the Islamic State has seen its territorial holdings in Syria diminish significantly. Currently, ISIS controls a few pockets of territory along the Middle Euphrates River Valley (MERV).

The SDF, assisted by the U.S. and Coalition nations, has liberated more than 20,000 square miles of previously held ISIS territory in Syria. More than 3 million civilians have been liberated from ISIS rule. The SDF is a local Arab and Kurdish military militia. However, the majority of the SDF is made up of fighters from the Kurdish People’s Protection Units (YPG). There are also some smaller ethnic groups in the SDF such as the Yezidis and Syriac Christians.

Photo caption: US tactical vehicle provides security on roads near Manbij, Syria. Manbij is an SDF stronghold that separates the SDF enclave from areas held by Turkish-backed Syrian forces. Photo by Staff Sgt. Timothy Koster, Combined Joint Task Force – Operation Inherent Resolve, June 20, 2018.

The Islamic State is not quite defeated. There are more military operations that need to be conducted to eliminate the few remaining pockets of IS resistance. In addition, IS has already shifted its strategy from that of a conventional force holding ground to an insurgency. It is now operating in the shadows with small groups of fighters, an intelligence apparatus, and a support structure hidden from view. It has adopted insurgent and terrorist tactics now that its conventional military capability has been significantly degraded.

President Trump’s decision to immediately start the withdrawal of U.S. military personnel from Syria puts the fight against IS in jeopardy. If the Kurds lose the support of the U.S. and the Coalition partners then it will be in danger of attacks by the Turkish military and its proxy Syrian militia forces. The Kurds will likely shift their attention from the remaining ISIS pockets and focus on the threat of Turkish incursions.

The situation in Syria is certainly complex. Russia, a key Assad ally, does not view the YPG as a terrorist organization. Russia considers Kurdish held territory as a future holding of the Syrian government; not territory that should be ceded to a Turkish occupation. The Syrian government sees any Turkish military presence in Syria as illegal and against its interests. Another major player, Iran, is concerned about ISIS regaining strength in Syria – which could affect the fight against ISIS in Iraq. Turkey would likely meet with varying degrees of resistance from these major players should it attempt to send military forces to the areas where ISIS is currently operating within Syria.

However, President Trump says to not worry about ISIS. He has the assurance from President Erdogan that Turkey’s military forces will clean up the remaining ISIS threat. Certainly, this statement will alleviate the concern that some Trump supporters have about abruptly leaving Syria without finishing the mission of killing off the remaining IS fighters. But . . .

A brief look at the map above that depicts which warring faction holds what territory in Syria quickly will cast doubt on Turkey’s ability to chase down and defeat ISIS fighters. Turkish forces are either in Turkey along the Turkish Syrian border or located in a small pocket of Syria (Afrin) to the west of the SDF held territory. The remaining pockets of ISIS are in the central eastern region of Syria along the Euphrates River. It would be extremely difficult for Turkish military forces to conduct operations in the part of Syria where ISIS is currently found without traversing territory (almost 250 kms) held by the Syrian government forces or the SDF.

Turkey views the YPG – the Kurdish element of the SDF – as an extension of the Kurdish Workers Party (PKK). The PKK is a Kurdish resistance group in Turkey that has been labeled as a terrorist organization by both Ankara and Washington. The PKK has been conducting insurgent military operations within Turkey for several decades. The Turks would like to eliminate the Kurdish enclave in Syria and establish a buffer zone in Syria south of the Turkish border to provide greater security against possible Kurdish attacks and attempts to support the PKK.

Turkish desire to eliminate ISIS as a threat is certainly secondary to its aim to diminish the Kurdish control of northeastern Syria. The Turks are not that concerned about an ISIS organization that has been at war with the Syrian Kurds and the Assad regime. In addition, in order to reach the areas where ISIS now exists the Turks would have to traverse across areas of Syria now held by either the SDF or Syrian government forces. President Trump’s assertion that Turkey will finish the fight against ISIS is misplaced optimism.

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Top photo: SDF mortar team fires 120mm at ISIS target near Deir ez-Zor in the Middle Euphrates River Valley, Syria. Photo by SGT Matthew Crane, CJTF-OIR, November 16, 2018.

The Department of Defense has identified three of the four Americans who died on Wednesday, January 16, 2019 in Manbji, Syria in a suicide bombing. The patrol was on an engagement patrol when the attack occurred. A suicide bomber detonated his explosive vest killing one Special Forces Warrant Officer, a Navy Sailor, and a DoD civilian. A DoD contractor also died in the attack. The contractor was a naturalized U.S. citizen who was working as a contract interpreter.

Three other U.S. servicemembers were wounded. Approximately nine Syrians were also killed and others wounded. Members of the Manbij Military Council (MMC) were also among the 16 people who were killed. The MMC has controlled the city since it was liberated from ISIS.

Chief Warrant Officer 2 Jonathan Farmer was a member of 3rd Battalion, 5th Special Forces Group. 5th SFGA has been rotating units into Syria to conduct operations and training with the Syrian Democratic Front.

Shannon Kent was a Navy Chief Cryptologic Technician based at Fort George Meade, Maryland. She was assigned to the Cryptologic Warfare Activity 66 (CWA 66). Chief Petty Officer Kent hailed from upstate New York and enlisted in the Navy in 2003.

Shannon was a wife and mother to two young boys. She had deployed multiple times, was a cancer survivor, and was to start a graduate program this year. Read more about Shannon Kent in “Navy Identifies Sailor Killed in Manbij, Syria”, Navy.mil, January 18, 2019.

The DoD Civilian was Scott Wirtz. He was assigned to the Defense Intelligence Agency as an operations support specialist. He was a former Navy SEAL. Wirtz, age 42, was a native of St. Louis. He had been assigned as an operations support specialist (HUMINT) since February 2017 and had served on multiple deployments. Read more about Scott in “Defense Intelligence Agency civilian killed in Syria identified”, Defense Intelligence Agency, January 18, 2019.

The Arabic interpreter was from East Point, Georgia. Ghadir Taher, age 27, immigrated with her family from Syria. She was employed by Valiant Integrated Services, a defense contractor. She was born and raised in Damascus and became an American citizen in 2001. She had studied international business at Georgia State University before going to work for Valiant. Read more in “East Point woman among 19 killed in suicide bombing in Syria”, Atlanta Journal-Constitution, January 18, 2019.

The Islamic State of Syria has claimed responsibility for the attack. ISIS controlled Manbij until it was forced out in 2016. Despite the proclamations of some Trump administration officials the Islamic State is far from defeated in Syria. The terrorist group has now shifted tactics and resumed its insurgent activities. It will continue to have a deep reach in Syria for some time.

A Sikorsky S-92 helicopter conducted the medical evacuation of the U.S. victims of the attack. The attack took place near the popular Palace of Princes restaurant.

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Edits: Additional information has been added to this article as it has come available.

Additional References:

January 21, 2019. “Parents of slain Navy SEAL finding comfort reading old emails”, KPLR 11.com.

January 18, 2019, “Green Beret, Navy linguist, SEAL-turned-DIA civilian among Americans killed in ISIS-claimed bombing in Syria”, Stars and Stripes.

January 18, 2019, “DoD Identifies Three Operation Inherent Resolve Casualties”, Department of Defense.

January 18, 2019, Statement by Valiant Integrated Services.

January 16, 2019, “Explosion Kills Four in Manbij”, CENTCOM.