Story by Stacy Vaughn, 445th Airlift Wing Public Affairs.

At the 28th Intelligence Squadron, there’s a career field that has been making strides as the squadron continues to grow. That career field is Tactical Systems Operator (TSO) specialty of the 1A8X2 – Airborne ISR Operator Air Force Specialty Code.

The 28 IS is an intelligence unit located at Hurlburt Field, Florida. It is a classic reserve associate unit supporting the 25th Intelligence Squadron in conducting airborne intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance to provide precision geolocation, real-time battlefield awareness updates, direct threat warning, and C2 relay capabilities to Air Force Special Operations Command. The squadron is the first and only Reserve squadron with tactical systems operators. Its mission is to organize and train total force integrated personnel to deliver specialized intelligence directly to United States Special Operations Forces through providing equipment maintenance and configuration, analysis and dissemination, airborne ISR, and operational support.

TSOs are airborne intelligence operators who are qualified to fly on all light fixed wing aircraft within the AFSOC inventory, and are also able to quickly plug and play on emerging tactical assets through quick field installations of a variety of carry-on systems. These members are routinely deployed and are embedded with special operations units around the globe. Currently, the 28 IS makes up 10 percent of all qualified TSO billets in the Air Force.

This small body of TSO Airmen have dedicated themselves to supporting two continuous deployment lines in austere bases within combat locations in three major AORs. The majority of the 28th’s TSOs have at least three combat deployments behind them, some even have up to ten, and they easily accumulate more combat flight hours than most fighter pilots.

TSO Airmen assigned to the 28th IS are incredibly proud to serve in their career field. Senior Master Sgt. Patience Spence, flight chief for the 28th’s TSOs, has said that doing this job is the only thing that brought her back into the Air Force after completing her six Active Duty years as a 1A8X1 with the 97th Intelligence Squadron at Offutt Air Force Base, Nebraska.

Spence was one of the X1s selected to do the SOF side of the job during the standup of the X2 career field and after completing four TSO deployments totaling 21 months in country over a three year period, there was no going back to the Rivet Joint life (sorry 49th!). Since coming into the 28th in May 2014, Spence has become an instructor and evaluator supporting the 25 IS and has deployed three times for the 25th as a special intelligence (SI) detachment training lead, MC-12W TSO lead, and was the first reservist to serve as an SI detachment senior enlisted advisor.

Another former Regular Air Force TSO, Tech. Sgt. Lori Carlin, came to the 28th from Cannon Air Force Base, New Mexico, two years ago to continue her service as an X2 and has quickly proved herself to her 25th counterparts. She completed instructor qualification training and just recently was selected for evaluator upgrade.

“Before becoming a TSO, I often asked myself, ‘Am I doing anything that’s making a difference?’ Now there’s no question. I have been an integral part in countless SOF missions and have undoubtedly played a key part in ensuring the safety and success of our joint and coalition partners on the battlefield,” said Carlin.

“My eagerness to take the fight to the enemy,” is what Master Sgt. Combs, former crew chief, said lead him to re-train to become a TSO. “I didn’t mind fixing aircraft and often thought I’d be doing that for 20 years, but one day I woke up with the an urge to do more, I wanted to be the ‘tip of the spear’.”

In 2016, Combs made the switch and has since deployed twice as an air NCO-in charge, completed flight instructor upgrade, and dedicated himself to ensure tomorrow’s TSOs are trained to be technically and tactfully proficient.

“Being a TSO has broaden my perspective on not just how major operations work but also why,” said Combs.

Senior Airman Joslyn Williams, one of the squadron’s first non-prior service Airmen, said “It’s always the best feeling in the world when you turn on the news and can say, ‘Hey I was a major part of that operation.”

Williams completed her first deployment in 2019 and gained more than 500 combat hours on that tour. Because of the skills she showed and dedication she had while on deployment, she was recently selected for upgrade to instructor by the Regular Air Force cadre at the 25 IS.

Staff Sgt. Tristan Wentworth, a former member of the 25 IS, said, “Have you ever worked on something and you never knew if it was going to go anywhere? As a TSO, I’ve never worked on anything that didn’t have results.”

Col. Kenneth Alderman, 28 IS commander, spoke highly of the men and women of his unit and all that they do.

“Our maintainers, direct support analysts, TSOs and support elements have a tremendous amount of pride in our partnership with the 25 IS. The Total Force unity of effort in this enterprise is a beautiful thing to be a part of. Barracudas deploy to austere locations as line flyers, program leads in charge of entire teams of Regular Air Force TSOs and joint personnel, and we even had our first detachment senior enlisted advisor in Fiscal year 2019.”

Col. Alderman went on to say, “In garrison, the squadron not only delivers fully qualified ISR aviators to the fight, but the TSOs, ground intelligence analysts, and maintainers support ongoing efforts to stay abreast of changes in strategic competitors and rapidly evolve both technology and training environments.”

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This story about the 28th Intelligence Squadron by Stacy Vaughn of the 445th Airlift Wing Public Affairs was originally published as “28 IS TSOs: key contributors to SOF mission success” and posted by DVIDS on November 2, 2020.

The Joint Special Operations University (JSOU) has released a new publication entitled Re-Evaluating Special Operations Forces-Led Counterterrorism Efforts. The 20-page report by Barnett S. Koven ” . . . posits that kinetic counterterrorism (CT) actions undertaken by the state to kill, capture, or otherwise disrupt terrorist groups are ineffective in isolation.”

The report on SOF-led CT efforts argues that while kinetic actions may work in the immediate term, they have little long-term effect on the ability of terrorist groups to operate. Dr. Koven’s research suggests that successful counterterrorism approaches require sequenced kinetic and non-kinetic approaches.

Barnett Koven is an adjunct faculty member of the Joint Special Operations University. He is also a researcher at the University of Maryland’s National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Response to Terrorism (START).

Counterterrorism is one of the 12 core U.S. Special Operations Command activities. Currently, according to the author, the US government has a preference for kinetic responses to terrorism. Koven believes that rigorous evaluations of the effectiveness of kinetic approaches to CT are lacking.

His paper provides an evaluation of U.S. SOF CT efforts. The first section provides a review of current studies on CT, the second introduces the research hypotheses, and the third on methodology. The results are then presented and discussed in the fourth section and the conclusion is within the fifth and last section.

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Re-Evaluating Special Operations Forces-Led Counterterrorism Efforts, by Barnett S. Koven, Joint Special Operations University (JSOU), Occasional Paper, March 2020.
https://jsou.libguides.com/ld.php?content_id=53631174

Head Shots or Body Shots? This is a Question that
Should Defend Influence Strategy, Not Lead It.

By Ajit Maan.

In an insightful recent article “Counterterrorism Targeting – Head Shots or Body Shots?” Thomas G. Pledger advocates augmenting the kill/capture counter-terrorism model with network targeting. I don’t have any problem with that as long as the question follows (defends, protects, and backs up) influence targeting of the non-kinetic variety.

While “capture when you can” is an intelligence requirement, “kill” is less advantageous. Retribution, as Pledger notes, has got us into considerable trouble.

The kill/capture model is problematic and has even been counter-productive. These operations not only have failed to eliminate al-Qaeda and other terrorist groups, they have resulted in the proliferation of violent extremism by directly feeding into the narratives that support it.

The younger leaders who have filled their ranks of those targeted individuals are more extreme, more aggressive, more lethal, and less likely to compromise diplomatically. Network targeting has been effective in slowing down adversarial operations by a few days in some cases, but their organizations are designed to take those sorts of losses.

It is past time to reconsider our own militarized narrative. The story we tell ourselves is predicated upon the belief that the U.S. is conducting a “war on terror.” Even contextualizing the conflicts as ideological is understood in militarized terms. A militarized understanding of the battlefield naturally leads to military force – capabilities to defeat the enemy. But this narrative is faulty and the weapons being used to combat extremism are ineffective because the nature of the conflict has been misidentified.

We need to counter extremism with methods and tools that shape environments and affect behaviors. Military action is only one of these tools. It should be placed behind others. Most importantly, we need to lead with a comprehensive strategic narrative that speaks to the identity of its audience.

Our adversaries understand this concept, have embraced it, and have incorporated strategic narratives across their operations. AQAP, ISIS, the Taliban al-Qaeda, and many other jihadi groups effectively disseminate their brand and reinforce their ideologies through broad information operations to control the strategic narrative.

An imperative is that ours should encompass the adversary’s narrative. This is not a counter-narrative. It is not a rebuttal. A strategic narrative will not be successful if it is limited to the narrative terrain established by extremists and should not be focused on responding to their messages. What I am suggesting involves re-narrating the events of the opposition’s narrative and co-opting their meaning. In other words, we must tell our own narrative in a way that re-frames the opposition’s and offers a bigger, better, smarter alternative of understanding, identifying and acting.

Responding to terrorist messaging has already resulted in what were predictable problems: 1) We have no footing upon which to win ideological or religious debates. 2) Losing those debates has resulted in further loss of credibility. 3) Responding elevates and legitimates the adversarial narrative. 4) Responding is a defensive position. We should not put ourselves in a defensive position. Rather, we need to position ourselves offensively, to get out ahead of their narrative, encompass it, and swallow it up.

Further, an effective strategic message must target, and be delivered to, the population not the terrorists. In an unconventional warfare campaign the key terrain is the human terrain. That is where we either win or loose. We need better messages that connect to our TA’s core identity narrative, through which both hard and soft power will be understood.

Our narrative must demonstrate how extremists are using the population as a proxy force and how they don’t, in fact, share common identities, interests, or objectives with the audiences they are trying to control. Our message should focus on the damage terrorists have done to the target population and how their actions provoke responses that will negatively affect that population. That message will resonate with the target audience because it is consistent with their immediate experience.

Developing a coherent strategic narrative is the best weapon to stem recruitment and combat extremism. It is a national security imperative. Questions about how best to enforce the strategy should come after we have a strategy.

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“Counterterrorism Targeting – Head Shots or Body Shots”, SOF News, by Thomas Pledger, April 2, 2020.
http://www.sof.news/terrorism/ct-targeting/

Ajit Maan, Ph.D. is CEO of the award winning think-and-do-tank Narrative Strategies, Professor of Politics and Global Security at Arizona State University, Affiliate Faculty at the Center for Narrative Conflict Resolution at George Mason University, Faculty at the Center for the Future of War, Member of the Brain Trust of the Weaponized Narrative Initiative, and author of seven books including Counter-Terrorism: Narrative Strategies, Narrative Warfare, and Plato’s Fear.

By Thomas G. Pledger.

Current United States counterterrorism strategy concentrates on retribution over network targeting. These different lines of effort, retribution and network targeting, compete for limited resources on an ever-expanding battlefield. Not only do these lines of effort compete for resources from each other, but they also compete for resources from all other military operations globally.

Retribution is the direct targeting of a group’s senior leaders for a kill or capture mission. Retribution operations are often seen as the delivery of justice for attacks against civilians. Retribution satisfies the emotional desire to directly target those who inspired and directed violent attacks (i.e., Osama bin Laden) and the American public’s desire for a personal response.

Network targeting, however, is the daily grind of defeating the logistics and communications networks that violent extremist organizations build in order to enable and conduct operations. Targeting these networks can be conducted via direct military operations, and / or the use of interagency, or partner nation assets. Understanding the effects retribution or network targeting have on a violent extremist organization long-term capability is crucial to understanding which type of operations should receive the priority of limited resources.

Over the past 30 years, multiple countries have conducted retribution operations around the world. Most notably, the US mission against Osama Bin Laden in 2011. Other recent US operations include Abu Musab Al-Zarqawi (AQ-I, 2006) and Abu Ayyub Al-Masri (Daesh, 2010). Israel and other countries have conducted retribution operations against violent extremist organizations around the world. A shortlist of high valued individuals targeted by Israel includes: Khalil al-Wazir (PLO, 1988), Fathi Shaqaqi (PIJ, 1995), Ahmed Ismail Yassin (Hamas, 2004) and Ahmed Jabari (Hamas, 2012). Even while suffering successful retribution operations, Hamas’s operational reach and capability have increased. Equally, Daesh continued to spread after the targeting of Zarqawi and Masri and went onto create a safe haven in Iraq and Syria.

During major combat operations, conventional forces target logistics and communication networks in an effort to prevent, delay, and limit effective adversary military actions. Destroying these nodes breaks the links, which allow communication and movement of supplies to opposition military forces. Looking at the historic aspects of attacking an adversary’s logistic networks, multiple effective examples stand out, using both lethal and non-lethal effects. The shock and awe of the first Gulf War against the Iraqi Army was the ultimate recent example of network targeting. Thirty-nine days of airstrikes, against networks, enabled a 100-hour ground campaign.

Similarly, targeting the networks of violent extremist organizations has proven effective at limiting violent extremist organization operations. Operation Christmas and Operation Rivers of Light are examples of non-lethal operations against a violent extremist organization. Conducted in 2010 and 2011 against the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia—People’s Army (FARC), specifically FARC transportation networks. Operation Christmas and Operation Rivers of Light effectively removed over 500 guerrillas from the battlefield without firing a shot, including a FARC Commander, a key bomb-maker, and a large cache of weapons. Driving the FARC to the negotiation table in 2012.

The key then becomes finding which Nodes to attack, individuals, physical locations, infrastructure, or some other target or combination thereof. Much research has been conducted on social network analysis and link analysis. Research coming from the University of Maryland illustrated the effectiveness of nodal network targeting to decrease the lethality of violent extremist organizations. This research has shown statistically that retribution operations can create more aggressive or effective violent extremist organizations. In contrast, operations against mid to upper level “staff” will reduce the effectiveness of these same violent extremist organizations. [1] Moving beyond this research, the removal of these mid-level staff by capture operations provides an additional information source for future operations against all levels of the violent extremist organization.

Network targeting is not meant to replace the retribution targeting of high valued individuals. Targeting of the facilitation networks is designed to augment high valued individual targeting by placing indirect pressure on the high valued individuals and reducing the ability of both centralized and decentralized violent extremist organizations to conduct effective operations. Reducing or stopping the number and frequency of violent actions is the goal of any counterterrorism policy.

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[1] Spezzano, Francesca, V. S. Subrahmanian, and Aaron Mannes. “Reshaping Terrorist Networks.” Communications of the ACM 57, no. 8 (2014): 60-69. Accessed February 20, 2019. doi:10.1145/2632661.2632664

Photo: AMQ-9 Reaper armed with GBU-12 Paveway II laser guided munitions and AGM-114 Hellfire missiles flies a combat mission over southern Afghanistan. (USAF photo / Lt. Col. Leslie Pratt).

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Thomas G. Pledger is an Army Infantry Officer currently serving at the Army National Guard Directorate in Washington, DC.  Tom has deployed to multiple combat zones supporting both the Conventional and Special Operations Forces.  Tom holds a Master in Public Service and Administration from the Bush School of Public Administration at Texas A&M University and a Master of Humanities in Organizational Dynamics, Group Think, and Communication from Tiffin University, and three Graduate Certificates from Texas A&M University in Intelligence, Counterterrorism, and Military Policy and Defense Affairs.  Tom has been a guest lecturer at the Department of State’s Foreign Service Institute.  Tom’s current academic and professional research is focused on a holistic approach to counter-facilitation/network, stability operations, and unconventional warfare.

Watch a video depicting United States Air Force Predator support for Roberts Ridge battle in Afghanistan. On March 4, 2002 a desperate fight between a U.S. joint special operations team composed of SEALs and Air Force combat controllers and al Qaeda and Taliban forces took place on a snowy mountain top in Afghanistan. The SOF team on the Takur Ghar mountain top was the recipient of some air support provided by MQ-1 Predator air crews that helped the small SOF team with situational awareness and fire support. Two participants in that battle would be awarded the Medal of Honor – USAF ST Combat Controller John Chapman and Navy SEAL Britt Slabinski.

Watch the video:

Roberts Ridge: Seeing Through the Fog of War, DVIDS, August 30, 2018.
www.dvidshub.net/video/622147/roberts-ridge-seeing-though-fog-war

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Photo: Predator support for Roberts Ridge battle in Afghanistan 2002. Video by Senior Airman James Thompson, 432nd Wing Public Affairs, Creech Air Force Base, Nevada. August 30, 2018.

]]> 7892 https://sof.news/update/20180312/ Mon, 12 Mar 2018 05:00:54 +0000 http://www.sof.news/?p=5286 SOF News Update 20180312 – 2003 JSOC raid into Iraq, intel in corporate world, some great SF photos, USSOCOM and ‘hard problems’, Britain’s WWII GW, conflict in Mali, Kurds shifting focus to invading Turkish forces, MQ-1 Predator to retire, 10th [...]]]>

SOF News Update 20180312 – 2003 JSOC raid into Iraq, intel in corporate world, some great SF photos, USSOCOM and ‘hard problems’, Britain’s WWII GW, conflict in Mali, Kurds shifting focus to invading Turkish forces, MQ-1 Predator to retire, 10th SFGA dietitian, Green Berets and their weapons, ‘own the night’, SERE, early SF history, USAF Reserve CSAR, and more.

Podcast – 2003 JSOC raid in Iraq. Modern War Institute’s The Spear presents a 30-minute podcast on a special operations mission into Iraq. Col. Phil Ryan, the commander of the 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment tells the story. In 2003, Ryan was a pilot in the unit when it entered Iraq at the very beginning of the invasion of Iraq. Listen to “Podcast: The Spear – a 2003 Helicopter Mission Deep into Iraq”, Modern War Institute at West Point, March 7, 2018.

Solving ‘Hard Problems’ for USSOCOM. The Special Operations Forces Acquisition, Technology & Logistics (SOF AT&L) organization within the U.S. Special Operations Command is seeking assistance to solve ‘hard problems’ in areas that are of critical importance to the success of mission accomplishment. These areas are small unit dominance, mission assured communications, and signature management. Read more about SOF Hard Problems.

Green Berets and Their Weapons. There are several military occupational specialities (MOS) on a Special Forces Operational Detachment Alpha (SFODA). Two members of the team are ‘weapons men’. These guys have the most fun. See “Watch Green Berets demonstrate a lot of cool firepower”, We Are the Mighty, March 8, 2018.

MQ-1 Predator Has Seen Its Time. The Air Force is phasing out the famed Predator UAV. Read more by Joe Chapa, a major in the U.S. Air Force. Read “The Sunset of the Predator: Reflections on the End of an Era”, War on the Rocks, March 9, 2018.

SERE: “. . . the biggest mental challenge . . .” Tom McCollum left the 82nd to go through Special Forces training. Then he hit SERE training. (Fayetteville Observer, Mar 11, 2018).

Britain’s WWII Guerrilla Warfare History. Historian Giles Milton is interviewed about his book Churchill’s Ministry of Ungentlemanly Warfare. Churchill recognized the changing nature of war and allowed a team of independent-minded operatives to operate in the new environment. Read “The Secret History of Britain’s WWII Guerrilla Warfare”, Military.com, March 8, 2018.

USAF Reserve CSAR Units Feeling the Pinch. The burgeoning economy and increase in air travel are prompting the commercial airlines to offer very attractive packages to active duty Air Force navigators and pilots. The USAF reserve units are also being affected. Read “Reserve Rescue Aircrews to Air Force: Don’t Forget About Us”, Military.com, March 10, 2018.

Early SF History. I was at a fundraising event this past Saturday night talking with a SSG from Special Forces who was manning a static display. One of my friends with me had served with the 77th SFG in the early days. The SSG had no clue there was a 77th and had no real idea on the history of Special Forces beyond what has happened since 9/11. I spent about 10 minutes bringing him up to date. By coincidence I bumped into this article on the Internet! “Becoming Special Forces”, Paraglide, March 8, 2018.

ANASOC’s Team Leader Course. The Afghan National Army Special Operations Command conducts a six-week long Noncommissioned Officer’s Team Leader Course near Kabul. Read more (DVIDS, Feb 22, 2018).

‘Own the Night’ – Not as Much Now. As the U.S. continues to provide night vision goggles to our ‘partnered forces’ (in Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere) the insurgents they fight will gradually attain night vision capability. One way this happens is when the insurgent capture the equipment in raids and ambushes. Another avenue is the corruption within these ‘partnered forces’ when the equipment is sold to insurgents. Still yet another way of attaining night vision capability is to buy commercial off-the-shelf night vision goggles. Read more in “How much longer will US and partner forces ‘own the night’ in combat?”, Army Times, March 11, 2018.

Conflict in Mali. The Tuareg militias are clashing with the Islamic State-loyal militants in northern Mali. The analysts at Threat Matrix of the Long War Journal provide info on the clashes. (March 8, 2018).

10th SFGA Dietitian. Kelsey Bailey, a Tactical Performance Dietitian for the Special Forces Group based in Colorado, says a good diet starts off at the grocery store. Read “Go Further With Food – Fort Carson Dietitian Leads Commissary Tour”, DVIDS, February 28, 2018.

Kurds of Syria Shifting Focus. Kurdish forces are shifting their focus to the Turkish invasion of Kurd-held areas of Syria. This means that the Kurds attention on the Islamic State fighters has lessened in order to confront the more immediate and severe threat from the north. One would think that the SF ODAs in Syria would get an opportunity to hit the weights; but I am sure the Bn CSM / S3 has them busy with other duties and missions. Read “Turkey’s war on Kurds unsettles fronts in northern Syria”, AP, March 9, 2018.

Afghan SOF Take Losses in Battle. At least 10 Afghan commandos (some news reports say more) were killed in an ambush in Farah province on March 9th. “Afghan special forces hit hard in deadly Taliban ambush”, FDD’s Long War Journal, March 10, 2018.

Afghan SOF Staying Busy. Maj Anthony Mayne, of NSOCC-A, provides a roll-up of recent Afghan SOF operations around Afghanistan. (DVIDS, Mar 9, 2018).

Intelligence in the Corporate World. The world of intelligence is not just for three-letter agencies of the U.S. government. Smart application of basic intelligence principles can enable business corporations to understand and adapt to a complex world of dynamically evolving threats and constantly evolving opportunities. Read “A CEO’s Brief Guide to Intelligence: Not Just for Three-Letter Agencies”, The Cipher Brief, March 9, 2018.

SF Photos – and Motivation for SFQC. View 30 great photographs from the 1st Special Forces Command Facebook and read some motivational passages targeting the candidate for Special Forces training. (The Chive, March 8, 2018).

SOF News Update 20171204 – USSOCOM 2018 Fact Book, Metz on the demise of COIN, book review No Front Line, award for “Spooky 43” aircrew, more to do in Iraq, armed drones over Niger, SOCSouth cdr promoted, USASOC birthday, Mattis abroad, ‘SFA / TAA’ not the answer, Thompson sub-machine gun in Vietnam War, AFSOC hurricane support, and more.

USSOCOM 2018 Fact Book. Each year the United States Special Operations Command provides a publication highlighting the commands and missions of USSOCOM. It is a glossy presentation that provides some facts and figures on the worldwide activities of U.S. special operations. Worth a look.
www.dvidshub.net/publication/issues/36757

Book Review – No Front Line. Chris Masters new book – No Front Line – is a comprehensive history of Australia’s Special Forces involvement in the Afghan War for over 12 years. (The Australian, Dec 2, 2017).

Armed Drones over Niger. The African country of Niger exploded onto the headlines when four U.S. Soldiers of the 3rd Special Forces Group were killed in an ambush by a terrorist group operating from across the border in Mali. One aspect of the mission that received criticism was the apparent lack of timely air support for the small patrol operating in a dangerous region. It appears that the Niger government has given approval for the U.S. to operate armed drones in their airspace. This will be a significant improvement for the force protection of U.S. special operations (and other units as well) that are operating in Niger. Read “Armed US Drones to Start Flying Over Niger”, Voice of America, November 30, 2017.

More to Do in Iraq. Emma Sky, a Brit Middle East expert, has wrote up reasons why the United States should not leave Iraq. ISIS still exists, although in a different form, but it still retains the capacity to conduct attacks internationally. The state of Iraq still needs to be strengthened and the U.S. would leave a vacuum if it left now. Sky provides us with a little bit of history on how we got from 2003 to 2014. She then maps out the political landscape of where we are now after the three year battle against ISIS (2014 – 2017). Most important, she offers ways for the United States to continue to be engaged in Iraq. Read “Mission Still Not Accomplished in Iraq”, Foreign Affairs, December 2017.

USASOC Birthday. On December 1, 1989 the United States Army Special Operations Command was activated. The was activated just prior to Operation JUST CAUSE (Panama) and Operation DESERT SHIELD and Operation DESERT STORM.

AFSOC Hurricane Support. The 27th Special Operations Wing responded very quickly to the ravages of Hurricane Irma in the Caribbean. Medics from the 27th SOW were some of the first medical professionals on the ground in the initial days. (USAF Schriever Air Force Base, Nov 29, 2017.

History of Thompson SMG in Vietnam. A short history of the Thompson submachine gun used during the Vietnam War. Read “The Tommy Gun ‘In Country’: The Thompson SMG in Vietnam”, American Rifleman, December 1,2 017.

SOCSouth Commander Promoted. A Navy SEAL has been promoted to the rank of rear admiral (upper half). Collin Green has been the commander of Special Operations Command South since 2016. (DVIDS, December 1, 2017).

Award for “Spooky 43” Aircrew. In November 2016 an AC-130U Gunship provided close-air-support to a U.S. Special Forces team and 43 Afghan soldiers near Kunduz, Afghanistan. During the course of two hours of intense combat the AC-130U repeatedly fired its weapons against ground targets threatening the Green Berets. Read “Heroic Spooky 43 aircrew receives the Mackay Trophy”, U.S Air Force, December 1, 2017.

Opinion – Review of SFQC Needed. A local North Carolina paper stepped out and commented on the controversy surrounding the Special Forces Qualification Course at Fort Bragg, North Carolina. Read “Our View: Special-ops review is wise”, The Fayetteville Observer, December 2, 2017.

Mattis Traveling Abroad. Secretary of Defense is (was) overseas hitting a number of countries during a five day trip. First up was Egypt (with 1/3 of the Arab population and a terrorist problem in the Sinai. The next stop was in Jordan to attend the Aqaba Process (current concern is West Africa). Then its on to Pakistan (love to hear those discussions) and finally Kuwait. Much of his trip is to coordinate and support the ‘network’ of countries in the fight against ISIS and other insurgent / terrorist groups.

Metz on the Demise of COIN. Steve Metz, of the Army War College, writes about the failures of counterinsurgency doctrine as a way of stopping terrorism. He advocates limited COIN operations to fight terrorism – utilizing a “clear” methodology – and skipping the “hold” and “build” aspects of COIN. Read “Abandoning Counterinsurgency: Reviving Antiterrorism Strategy”, Parameters, Autumn 2017.

Conflict in Africa – Niger investigation, France in the Sahel – do U.S. and French interests align, what is next for Libya, Belgium in Africa, rebellion in Congo, losing a SOF war in Africa, drone strikes in Somalia, counterterror strategy in sub-Saharan Africa, partnering with Somalia’s Police in CT fight, and video on Boko Haram.

Niger Investigation into SF Mission. A two-star general officer from U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) is heading a military investigation into the deaths of four members of the 3rd Special Forces Group in Niger. The investigation should be completed in early 2018. See “Pentagon: Niger investigation to be completed by January 2018”, Military Times, November 9, 2017. Other news reports indicate the SGT La David Johnson was found with his hands bound – indicating capture before his death.

French Dilemma in Africa. France is taking a leading role in affairs in the Sahel region of Africa. It has committed 4,000 personnel to assist Mali and other neighboring nations in dampening down the Islamic jihadist threat. The U.S., with a 800 man contingent in Niger and smaller elements operating in other nations in the region is working with the French. France is dependent on the ISR capability that the U.S. provides through its two drone bases in Niger. One worry that French observers have is that due to the reliance on US ISR assets the French may get sucked into operations that assist the US but that are contrary to French interests. Read more in “Just Say No: France struggles with dependency on US troops in Africa”, Defense News, November 10, 2017.

Rebellion Fears in the Congo. Small armed groups are contesting territory in remote areas of eastern Congo. While government officials describe these armed groups as ‘flash in the pan’ movements other observers state they may be around for a while. Read “Rebellion fears grow in eastern Congo”, IRIN News, October 31, 2017.

Losing a SOF War in Africa. One national security writer thinks that targeted killing by drones and SOF on the ground in Africa can be counterproductive. Read “How to Lose a Special Operations War in Africa”, The National Interest, November 12, 2017.

A Plan for Libya. Most members of the SOF community are aware of the participation of the U.S. military in Libya over the past few years. SOF units have assisted various factions in the Libyan conflict in the fight against the Islamic State fighters that took control of Sirte, Libya. The ISIS fighters have now fled to more remote areas of Libya and to some neighboring countries. However the Salafi-jihadi movement is still strong and demands attention. While limited SOF engagement and other military activities (drone attacks, etc.) are useful in keeping ISIS at bay, Emily Estelle of the American Enterprise Institute (AEI) believes a more comprehensive approach is needed. Read her thoughts in a 110-page report entitled “A Strategy for Success in Libya”, Critical Threats, November 9, 2017.

Cattle Herders Turning to Jihad. A news report examines how common every-day cattle herders from Mali and Niger morph into Islamic jihadists. (Reuters, November 12, 2017).

Drone Strikes in Somalia. U.S. forces have conducted numerous drones strikes in the last few days in Somalia in a stepped-up campaign against the Islamic extremist rebels of al-Shabab and the Islamic State. Al-Shabab has pledged allegiance to al-Qaeda and has publicly committed to planning and conducting attacks against the U.S. and neighbors in the region. The U.S. is partnering with the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) and the Somali National Security Forces (SNSF). (Time, Nov 12, 2017).

A Different Counter Terror Strategy for Africa. One writer thinks that the insertion of Special Forces teams throughout Africa to defeat terrorist groups and stop the spread of terrorism is overreaching. He believes that fostering good governance and development will go much further in halting the spread of terrorism. Read “American Amnesia: Counterterror Strategy in Sub-Saharan Africa”, Georgetown Security Studies Review, November 7, 2017.

U.S. State Dept Assisting Somalia Police Units. An elite Somalia Police Unit formed with funding and assistance from the State Department is playing a key role in stopping terror attacks in Somalia. Read “Partnering with Somalia’s Police to Build Counterterrorism Capacity”, DIPNOTE, November 7, 2017.

Belgian Military in Africa. Belgium has committed to assisting MINUSMA and other operations in Africa. (A L’Avant-Garde, Nov 11, 2017). (French language article).

Video Documentary on Nigeria’s Boko Haram. A 56-minute long online video documents the struggle in Nigeria against Boko Haram but provides an optimistic view of how all is not lost in Nigeria. Watch Journey From Evil, Voice of America (VOA), November 2017. https://projects.voanews.com/boko-haram-journey-from-evil/

SOF News Update 20171030 – USASFC honors JFK, JIDO fighting drones, Operation Barkhane (France), inside story on death of SEAL in Somalia, militant groups in Niger region, SOFWERX drone rodeo, Kurds vs. ISF, Bowe Bergdahl, hybrid war in Ukraine, Kenya’s insurgency, new spy museum, book about Extortion 17, new Army PT test, Afghan Commandos graduate hundreds, 2 SEALs suspected of murder of GB, Erick Prince’s plan for Afghanistan, SFABs and Green  Berets, and more.

Africa

Operation Barkhane. The media is full of reports about the recent deaths for four Special Forces Soldiers in Niger. This recent tragedy has highlighted the expansion of terrorist and insurgent groups in the trans-Sahel region of Africa and the U.S. response to that threat. Less well-known is how deeply involved the French are in the same region. Read more in “Operation Barkhane: France’s Counterterrorism Forces in Africa”, The Atlantic, October 24, 2017. The French mission has been very active in recent weeks – “French army kills 15 Mali jihadists”, News 24, Oct 26, 2017.

Two SEALs Under Suspicion of Murder of GB. Navy criminal authorities are investigating the death of an Army Green Beret in Mali who may have been strangled to death. Two Navy SEALs are “persons of interest”. See “2 Navy SEALs Under Suspicion in Strangling of Green Beret in Mali”, The New York Times, October 29, 2017.

Money for Sahel Force – Not so Fast. The U.S. is reluctant to provide money to a United Nations fund for the Sahel force backed by the French. The troops come from Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, Chad, and Mauritania. Washington is asking what the Sahel force strategy is. France, with 4,000 troops in the region, is not happy with Washington. (Reuters, Oct 28, 2017).

Militant Groups in Niger Region. The Jamestown Foundation provides an analysis of the various militant groups that are operating in the Niger region. Read “The Attack on U.S. Special Forces in Niger: A Preliminary Assessment”, by Jacob Zenn, October 26, 2017.

Kenya’s Insurgency. Ever since Kenya took part in peacekeeping efforts in Somalia that nation has been targeted by al-Shabab. Now the terrorists have struck in the homeland and have ignited a low-level insurgency in the Muslim part of Kenya along the coast south of Somalia. It seems the Kenya military are having difficulty in the struggle. Read more in “How Kenya’s Failure to Contain an Islamist Insurgency is Threatening Regional Prosperity”, Terrorism Monitor, Jamestown Foundation, October 27, 2017.

Support Lacking for SOF in Africa. According to a recent news story 3rd Special Forces teams now operating in Africa have to adjust to a different environment than they got used to in Afghanistan. Read “Used to Afghanistan, Special Operators Suffer From Lack of Support in Africa”, Foreign Policy, October 27, 2017.

The Death of Kyle Milliken (SEAL). Christina Golbaum writes a detailed account about the death of a Navy SEAL killed during an ‘advise and assist’ mission in Somalia. (The Daily Beast, Oct 26, 2017).

Afghanistan

Book on Extortion 17. A new book is coming out about the downing of Extortion 17 and loss of 30 Americans in August 2011. Extortion 17 was the call sign of a U.S. Army Chinook helicopter downed by the Taliban in the Tangi Valley of Afghanistan by a rocket propelled grenade. Read a review of the book entitled The Final Mission of Extortion 17. (Shreveport News, Oct 26, 2017).

Afghan Commandos Graduate School. Over 800 Soldiers of the Afghan Army graduated from a 14-week Afghan-led special operations course held at Camp Morehead (Camp Commando) near Kabul. (DVIDS, Oct 25, 2017).

160th SOAR Crew Member Dies in Afghanistan. The Department of Defense identified CWO Jacob Sims as the crew member that died in a helicopter crash in Logar province, Afghanistan on Friday, October 27th. A Resolute Support HQs press releases stated that the crash was not due to enemy action and all other crew members and passengers are accounted for and receiving medical treatment.

Erik Prince’s Plan for Afghanistan. Prince, of Blackwater fame, says 2,000 Green Berets and 6,000 contractors could win the war in Afghanistan. “A Private Military”, The Ottawa Herald, October 26, 2017.

Middle East

Kurds vs ISF and PMU. The Iraqi Security Forces (with a little help from the PMU) are clashing with the Peshmerga in northern Iraq. The most recent location (as of Friday, Oct 27th) was northeast of Tal Afar and southeast of the Mosul Dam in the Zummar district of Ninewa governorate. See “Kurdish and Iraqi forces, militias clash in northern Iraq”, Threat Matrix, October 26, 2017. On late Friday there were reports that a ceasefire may be in effect; but these later proved to be false. (VOA, Oct 27, 2017).

Miscellaneous

GB Wreath-Laying Ceremony. Each year the 1st Special Forces Command honors President John F. Kennedy in a wreath-laying ceremony at Arlington cemetery. This year’s event took place on Wednesday, October 25th. Read more in The Fayetteville Observer, October 26, 2017.

Drones Fighting Drones. The Joint Improvised-Threat Defeat Office (JIDO) is responding to the threat posed by drones employed by ISIS in Iraq (and possibly other places). Learn about their counter-drone programs currently under development in an article by Caroline Houck entitled “The Pentagon’s IED-Hunters Have a New Target: Drones”, Defense One, October 26, 2017.

Hybrid War in Ukraine. A descriptive article about hybrid warfare in Ukraine is found in “The Poet Laureate of Hybrid War”, Foreign Policy, October 26, 2017.

NY Spy Museum. A little cloak and dagger is coming up for New York City residents and visitors. SpyScape will soon open for business. Tickets are available now. https://spyscape.com

New Army PT Test. The Army has a possible replacement for the standard Physical Fitness Test – called the “Combat Readiness Test” or CRT. It isn’t a done deal yet. (Task & Purpose, Oct 25, 2017).

SOFWERX Drone Rodeo. The ThunderDrone Rapid Prototyping Rodeo will be starting on November 1st in Ybor City (Tampa, Florida). More than 20 teams of drone innovators will compete in the U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) event. It is hoped that new technologies will emerge that can be integrated into USSOCOM’s drone program. Read “Drone rodeo showcases latest technology for SOCOM”, by Howard Altman, Tampa Bay Times, October 27, 2017.

SOF News Update 20171010 – Military – media interaction, NATO in the Black Sea, podcast on drones and JSOC, U.S. military in Lake Chad Basin area, Erik Prince entering politics, CANSOF in Iraq, Russia and the disinformation war in the Baltic states, Green Berets in Niger, review of ‘Valor’ on the CW, Mattis and ‘Chaos”, fall of Hawija, and more.

Mattis Says Talk to the Press. The DoD has sent out the message that generals and admirals should engage with the press more frequently. The senior military leaders have been reluctant to talk to the media for a number of reasons. One reason is the unpredictable behavior of the President – one never knows when you are contradicting the White House. Another reason is that some of the press crowd seems to be constantly putting the Trump administration in a bad light and are not adverse to using the military to get their bad news message out. And, of course, the senior military officers are taking their lead from SECDEF Mattis – who has a different (and smart) approach to the press. However, Mattis feels the military needs to get the message out about how the military works and the importance of passing a defense spending bill that meets the military’s needs. Read more in “Mattis to Generals: Start Talking to the Press”, Defense One, October 9, 2017.

Call Sign “Chaos”. How did SECDEF Mattis get his call sign? (DoDLive, Oct 10, 2017).

Podcast on Drones and CT. Listen to a 15-minute podcast on drones. Brett Velicovich, book author, is interviewed on his new book Drone Warrior: An Elite Soldier’s Inside Account of the Hunt for America’s Most Dangerous Enemies. He is interviewed about the importance of the drone program in US military counterterrorism efforts. Listen to “Delving into the Drone Program with Brett Velicovich”, The Cipher Brief, October 8, 2017.

NATO Expanding Force in Black Sea. Much to Russia’s dismay the North Atlantic Treaty Organization is expanding its presence in Eastern Europe. Romania is the latest country to see a small multi-national defense force setup to deter possible Russian aggression. Read “NATO launches Black Sea force as latest counter to Russia”, Reuters, October 9, 2017.

U.S. Military in Lake Chad Basin Area. The 3rd Special Forces Group recently lost four members due to a 30-minute hostile engagement in Niger. Their mission was part of a larger plan to stabilize and secure the Lake Chad Basin area of Africa. The head of U.S. Army Africa is interviewed about the importance of this region and what plans the command has for future training missions and exercises. (Defense News, Oct 9, 2017).

Army to Follow SOCOM Lead in Buying Weapons. General Milley told reporters that the Army will start buying weapons the way the US Special Operations Command acquires defense equipment. The process will become more streamlined. (Breaking Defense, Oct 9, 2017).

Baltic States and Russia’s Disinformation. The countries of Lithuania, Estonia, and Latvia have been on the front lines of the war with Russia in the digital world. Read “Baltics battle Russia in online disinformation war”, Deutsche Welle, October 9, 2017.

Review of ‘Valor’. The military drama on the CW network is off to a weak start. Of the three special operations shows on TV this fall ‘Valor’ is likely the weakest. For starters,  the female star looks like she is 22 years old. The problem is she is playing the role of a Chief Warrant Officer 4 – and those guys have some years on them. Read a review “TV Review: ‘Valor’ on the CW”, Variety, October 10, 2017.

Fall of Hawija and Future Implications. The ISIS fighters in Hawija have either died, surrendered or fled. The ISIS-held area was one of the last strongholds to fall (except the Anbar province area) but it was also a buffer between Kurdish and Iraqi government forces. Now that the buffer is gone . . .

CANSOF in Iraq. Canadian special forces have been hunting down, detecting, and dismantling scores of chemical weapons used by ISIS. Members of the elite JTF-2 and CJIRU are engaged in the operation. (Globe and Mail, Oct 10, 2017).

Why Green Berets are in Niger. Steve Balestrieri explains why we have Special Forces Soldiers in Africa. “What Were Green Berets Doing in Niger? Their Job”, Special Operations.com, October 9, 2017.

Prince and Politics. The founder of Blackwater, Erik Prince, is considering a Republican primary challenge to a Wyoming Senator. (Military Times, Oct 9, 2017).