By Anthony Bryant.

KALIX, Sweden – A U.S. Army Special Forces team assigned to 10th Special Forces Group (Airborne) acted as both Observer Coach Trainers and opposition forces for the Swedish Armed Forces Home Guard in Swedish Lapland from May 28 – June 2, 2023, to strengthen Special Operations Forces (SOF) capabilities and enhance partner force readiness.

“My role at the beginning of the exercise was to work with, observe and offer any help I could with company-level training,” said a Special Forces medical sergeant with 1st Battalion, 10th SFG (A). “First, we established a baseline of the capabilities of our partner force …And then we’d offer ways we’d tweak things or ways to make their (tactics, techniques and procedures) a bit more compatible with ours so that we could work together.”

Midway through the exercise, U.S. and Swedish Forces shifted from shooting ranges and combat drills to the scenario where Green Berets trained a simulated guerilla force composed of soldiers from a sister battalion to take on the Home Guard.

“The aircraft we were flying in went down and we landed somewhere we didn’t plan to and made a link-up with our partner force,” said the medical sergeant. “We eventually met up with the rest of our team, minus one [teammate]. We then conducted a hasty personnel recovery mission based on some limited intelligence we got in the scenario.”

Over the next few days, the Special Forces team conducted mission planning alongside their partner force to perform actions that would degrade, disrupt or destroy Home Guard capabilities.

“The scenario gave us time to almost completely rehearse what we’d be doing in irregular warfare – conducting a link-up with a force we didn’t know too much about; working through assessments, hitting a few targets to see what their capabilities are, what we have to work with and what direction we need to go,” said the Special Forces team sergeant. “What it really did was give us the time over five days to work through a very surface-level unconventional warfare campaign.”

The Department of Defense defines unconventional warfare as activities conducted to enable a resistance movement or insurgency to coerce, disrupt, or overthrow a government or occupying power by operating through or with an underground, auxiliary, and guerrilla force in a denied area.

“There was one mission where we conducted a recon on one of the Home Guard positions,” said the medical sergeant. “We took the opportunity to discuss procedures for conducting that recon, and we walked through how we’d do it…to adapt to what the threat was.”

Unconventional warfare is a thinking man’s game, and you will be thrown into scenarios where you have to make quick decisions that have strategic outcomes, the team sergeant said. The team took full advantage of the opportunity to train.

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This story by Staff Sgt. Anthony Bryant was first published by the U.S. Army on June 22, 2023. DoD content is in the public domain.

Top photo: A U.S. Army Special Forces medical sergeant assigned to 10th Special Forces Group (Airborne) instructs Soldiers with the Swedish Armed Forces Home Guard on combat tourniquet application in Kalix, Sweden, May 28, 2023. Photo by Staff Sgt. Anthony Bryant.

By Otto Fiala and Ulrica Pettersson, PRISM, Vol. 8, No. 4, June 2020.
The complete article can be accessed here – PRISM or view the PDF.

During the Cold War, NATO, led by the United States, and the Warsaw Pact, led by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), maintained vast numbers of military forces in Central Europe, facing each other along what Winston Churchill labeled as an Iron Curtain. On the western side, in addition to these conventional forces, several NATO allies also maintained what were called “stay-behind networks,” intended to remain within territory potentially over-run by Soviet forces in a war.

These networks were established to remain within Soviet occupied territories, to conduct sabotage and other guerrilla type activities against Soviet forces, and to send intelligence to NATO allies. The networks were intended to engage in resistance against a Soviet occupation. Upon the dissolution of the USSR, these stay-behind networks were completely dismantled, due to the perception that the threat had disappeared with the end of the Cold War.

In the 21st century, Russia, which had been the core of the former USSR, became resurgent and began to re-assert its power and influence in and over several former Soviet Republics. In 2008, Russia seized the Georgian provinces of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. In 2014, Russia seized the Crimea from Ukraine and continues to support separatist activities in Eastern Ukraine. These aggressive acts, coupled with additional aggressive Russian behavior toward the Baltic nations, prompted the 2014 U.S. European Reassurance Initiative, renamed the European Deterrence Initiative (EDI) in 2017. This was an initiative of the Obama administration in 2014, which was included in the Department of Defense’s FY 2015 Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) budget request to Congress.

Since FY 2015, the initiative has provided funding in support of five lines of effort: (1) Increased Presence, (2) Exercises (e.g., Exercise BALTOPS is an annual, multinational maritime exercise focused on interoperability, maritime security, and cooperation among Baltic Sea and regional partners) and Training, (3) Enhanced Prepositioning, (4) Improved Infrastructure, and (5) Building Partnership Capacity. Additionally, at NATO’s 2016 summit in Warsaw, the United States sponsored and NATO adopted the enhanced forward presence (EFP) program to expand the number of NATO participants forward deploying troops into the Baltic NATO allies on a rotational basis. This resulted in a continuing NATO program whereby the United States rotates a forward deployed battalion size Army presence in northeastern Poland, near the Suwalki Corridor, while the United Kingdom, Canada, and Germany rotate similar-sized elements in Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, respectively. These sponsoring nations rotate their troops on a heel-to-toe basis approximately every six months, resulting in a seamless continuous presence.

Concurrently, United States Special Operations Command Europe (SOCEUR) began its concept exploration of resistance, as it recognized that the forward deployed NATO conventional forces were not adequate to defeat a major incursion. SOCEUR then collaborated with the Baltic NATO allies Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, as well as with other allies and partners in seminars and workshops, to relearn what had been forgotten from the previous stay-behind organizations of Western Europe, to add new knowledge, and to develop a practical and effective Resistance Concept.

Read the remainder of the article here.

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“ROC(K) Solid Preparedness: Resistance Operations Concept in the Shadow of Russia”, by Otto Fiala and Ulrica Pettersson, PRISM, Vol. 8, No. 4, National Defense University Press, June 2020.

COL (R) O. Fiala, PhD, JD is the author of the Resistance Operating Concept at SOCEUR. Ulrica Pettersson PhD, is an Associate Professor at Swedish Defence University.

This article was first published in PRISM on June 11, 2020. Re-posted by SOF News with the permission of the PRISM editorial staff.

Download PDF, 12 pages.

Image: From the article.

In 2014 the Resistance Operating Concept (ROC) began its early stages of development. The Special Operations Command Europe (SOCEUR), commanded by Major General (MG) Mike Repass, began this academic effort. Subsequent SOCEUR commanders and their staffs along with other members of the European special operations community continued the endeavor.

A series of seminars, conferences, and workshops were held to refine the doctrine for unconventional warfare in Europe. The actions of a resurgent and aggressive Russia made this effort a priority within the European special operations community. The ROC is a concept that will aid Northern and Eastern European countries to deter and resist aggression in Eastern Europe.

These workshops, conferences, and seminars led to the writing of a book entitled Resistance Operating Concept. The chief editor was Otto C. Fiala of SOCEUR. The book was printed and distributed in limited copies by Arkitektkpia in Stockholm, Sweden in late 2019.

In December 2019 the Swedish Defence University and SOCEUR jointly announced the finished product. The editor of SOF News was fortunate to receive a hard bound copy for review. The book is certainly a superb addition to the library of the military academic – especially one with a keen interest in Unconventional Warfare. It is very professionally done and full of great material about historical and contemporary unconventional warfare topics.

The foreword is provided by Major General Kirk Smith – a former commander of SOCEUR. BG Anders Lofberg, the commander of the Swedish Special Operations Command also provided a foreword. The four chapters are:

• Chapter 1 – Introduction
• Chapter 2 – Resilience as a Foundation for Resistance
• Chapter 3 – Resistance
• Chapter 4 – Interagency Planning and Preparation

There are ten appendices on the topics of legal considerations, methods of nonviolent resistance, Russian hybrid warfare tactics, Second World War case studies, Cold War resistance case studies, case studies lessons learned, assessing resilience, population interaction with a foreign occupier, government interagency planning, and more. The glossary provides terms, definitions, abbreviation, and acronyms. The book is very documented with 624 endnotes.

A new printing of Resistance Operating Concept is currently being done by the Joint Special Operations University (JSOU) Press at MacDill Air Force Base, Tampa, Florida. This printing is a collaborative work between SOCEUR and JSOU. A digital version of the book (PDF) is available online. (see references below).

The Resistance Operating Concept is being used by European SOF in academic and field environments. In collaboration with SOCEUR and Latvian special operations forces, the Joint Special Operations University conducted a National Resistance Course in Riga, Latvia during December 2019. More than 40 students, the majority from the Zemessardze (Territorial Forces), studied unconventional warfare.

The Resistance Operating Concept will be a guiding publication used by European SOF and US SOF for many years to come. It will certainly be integrated into the curriculum of SOF centric courses and schools. It is also a great addition for the military professional’s library.

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References:

Resistance Operating Concept, JSOU Press, 2020
https://jsou.edu/Press/PublicationDashboard/25

Resistance Operating Concept, SOCEUR and Swedish Defence University, edited by Otto Fiala, 2019, 251 pages. PDF Document Online at Digitala Vetenskapliga Arkivet.
https://www.diva-portal.org/smash/get/diva2:1392106/FULLTEXT01.pdf

“SOCEUR and Resistance Operating Concept”, by John Friberg, SOF News, July 19, 2019.
http://www.sof.news/uw/resistance-operating-concept/

Joint Special Operations University (JSOU) Press Publications
https://jsou.libguides.com/jsoupublications

Will Irwin, a senior fellow at the Joint Special Operations University (JSOU), has provided a detailed study of U.S. government (and military) support to resistance movements since World War II. The report – Support to Resistance: Strategic Purpose and Effectivness, JSOU Report 19-2, – was published in April 2019.

This publication is organized into four chapters as well as having an introduction, appendix, listing of acronyms, and numerous endnotes. Lieutenant General (R) John F. Mulholland provides a foreword to this report.

Chapters:

• Support to Resistance as a Tool of Disruption
• Support to Resistance as a Tool of Coercion
• Support to Resistance to Enable Regime Change
• Conclusion

The author provides “. . . case studies focused on the United States Government’s support to resistance movements. For each of his case studies the author summarizes in a clear, concise manner the duration of U.S. support, the political environments or conditions, the type of operation, the purpose or objective of U.S. support, and the ultimate outcome: success, partial success, failure, or an inconclusive outcome.” (1)

This report by Will Irwin “. . . brings real and meaningful value most immediately to those whose professional interest touches on the various dimensions of political conflict, political warfare, insurgency and counterinsurgency . . .” (2)

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Support to Resistance: Strategic Purpose and Effectiveness, by Will Irwin, JSOU, April 2019.
https://jsou.libguides.com/ld.php?content_id=48094050

Footnotes:

(1) Page vii, “From the Dean”.

(2) Page xi, “Foreword”

About the author: Will Irwin is a Resident Senior Fellow at the Joint Special Operations University. Since his retirement as a U.S. Army Special Forces officer he has worked as a defense analyst, researcher, historian, instructor, and writer.

The U.S. Special Operations Command Europe has, working with NATO and other allies, developed the Resistance Operating Concept (ROC) that will contribute to deterring and resisting aggression in Eastern Europe. The ROC is a concept that will assist Nordic and Baltic countries to conduct ‘resistance operations’ in the event of an invasion or occupation by Russian military forces.

Russia’s Military Advantage. Almost all observers of the Eastern Europe security situation will acknowledge the military advantages that the Russian military has should it’s national leadership decide to cross the borders into the Baltic states, Scandinavian countries, or Poland. It has a significant ground force in its Western Military Region (WMD) as well as in Kaliningrad. The ability of the one of Russia’s neighbors to stop a conventional force attack is limited.

“In the event of a ground attack on a NATO member in the Baltic region, Russia would have a substantial time-distance advantage in the initial days and weeks of its ground campaign because of its strong starting position and ability to reinforce with ground and air units from elsewhere in Russia.” (1)

Defending Eastern Europe. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization will have a difficult time defending Eastern Europe. Not only does Russia pose a ‘traditional conventional threat but Russian hybrid warfare (some national security observes prefer the term Russian New Generation Warfare) could be instrumental in leveraging the Russian ethnic minority in the Baltic states (as it did in eastern Ukraine).

SOF and Defense of Eastern and Northern Europe. SOCEUR units participate in a number of multinational exercises focused on the defense of the Nordic and Baltic regions. It is continually working in conjunction with the SOF units of Latvia, Estonia, Lithuanian, Sweden, and other regional countries. While many of these exercises have incorporated the full spectrum of special operations; some are specifically focused on irregular warfare in enemy occupied territory.

UW for the Baltic States. This fact, of Russian military superiority in proximity to its borders, has prompted the Scandinavian, Baltic, and other East European nations to step up its resistance capabilities to both deter Russia (making an invasion and occupation painful) and to set conditions for a reversal of a Russian occupation. In U.S. doctrine, this is a classic case of unconventional warfare (UW) for which U.S. Army Special Forces is uniquely trained and postured to conduct in Eastern Europe. (2)

ROC – UW with European Flavor. The U.S. has a long history of conducting UW – beginning with the OSS in World War II. However, the Resistance Operating Concept puts a European flavor on UW methodology. The Baltic states, Poland, and some of the Scandinavian nations have a rich history of resisting foreign occupiers. Finland proved to be a difficult conquest for the Soviets in the WWII era. Norway successfully established a resistance network against the Germans in WWII as well. The Baltic states and Poland had their insurgencies that were active against the Soviets. (3)

Modern Day UW. The nature of unconventional warfare has changed from the OSS efforts in Nazi-occupied Europe and the Cold War Flintlock exercise conducted by the 10th Special Forces Group in the 60s, 70s, and 80s.

“We must advance from the nostalgic vision of remote guerrilla bases in denied territory and adapt to a world of split-second communications and data transfer, nonviolent resistance, cyber and economic warfare, and the manipulation of international law to undermine national sovereignty.”

Major General Lengyel, opening remarks at the ROC Conference, Tartu, Estonia, November 2014. At the time he was the Commander of U.S. Special Operations Command Europe.

SOCEUR. The Special Operations Command – Europe mission is to enable deterrence, strengthen European security capabilities and interoperability, and counter transnational threats. It’s area of responsibility consists of 51 countries extending from Greenland in the west to Russia in the east and south to the Mediterranean Sea. However, the theater special operations command’s (TSOC) primary area of focus is to defend NATO on the eastern flank. Poland, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania are all NATO countries.

SF and UW. The premier unit for conducting unconventional warfare is the Army’s special forces units. There are seven SF groups; all regionally aligned. The 10th Special Forces Group – based at Fort Carson, Colorado, with a forward deployed battalion in Germany – is responsible for Europe and works with SOCEUR. (Units of the 19th and 20th Special Forces Group of the National Guard also conduct training in Europe as well).

UW is one of the 12 Army Special Operations Forces (ARSOF) core activities. (4) UW is also one of the five functions of irregular warfare (IW). The six core activities of UW include:

• preparation of the battlefield
• subversion
• sabotage
• personnel recovery
• guerrilla warfare
• intelligence operations

What is ROC? SOCEUR is working with Baltic, Nordic, and other partner nations to further develop coordination and refine concepts associated with partisan warfare, resistance movements, and unconventional warfare. It is doing this through coordination and planning conferences, training exercises (5), seminars, workshops, table talk exercises (6), publications, and the exchange of information within Subject Matter Expert (SME) networks. Resistance is framed by ROC as a national effort to regain sovereignty after an invasion and occupation by an aggressor nation. It is a whole-of-society effort encompassing a total resistance posture.

What Does a Baltic Resistance Movement Look Like? The intent of the ROC is to further refine ‘resistance’ doctrine, increase resistance options, and increase regional cooperation. In ‘historical U.S. UW doctrine’ there are three components of a resistance movement: guerrillas, underground, and auxiliary. In the Baltic states the guerrilla component may have less emphasis. There would likely be a shadow government and a official government in exile. In addition, the ROC envisions a whole-of -society approach to resistance – national or societal resilience.

Future of ROC? The Resistance Operating Concept will continue to be a high priority for SOCEUR as well as the participating countries. The workshops, exercises, conference, and coordination will continue in the future. It is projected that a publication entitled Resistance Operating Concept will soon be published in 2019 by the Swedish Defense University. It should be interesting reading.

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Footnotes:

(1) Assessing the Conventional Force Imbalance in Europe: Implications for Countering Russian Local Superiority, RAND Corporation, 2018. This fifteen-page report examines in detail the difficulties of defending and responding to a Russia attack on either Poland or the Baltic states. See also Reinforcing Deterrence on NATO’s Eastern Flank: Wargaming the Defense of the Baltics, RAND Corporation, 2016. This 16-page paper summarizes the difficulty of defending the Baltic states against a Russian attack.

(2) See “Special Forces, Unconventional Warfare, and the Baltic States”, SOF News, January 5, 2017.

(3) James K. Wither, a retired British Army Officer, has penned an informative article of historical cases of Baltic states resisting the Soviets as well as current ‘resistance’ capabilities. See “Modern Guerrillas and the Defense of the Baltic States”, Small Wars Journal, 2018.

(4) See Field Manual 3-05, Army Special Operations, DA, January 2014.

(5) Read about an UW exercise conducted in 2018 in “Trojan Footprint – UW in the Baltic States”, SOF News, June 15, 2018.

(6) SOCEUR recently (June 2019) hosted a Resistance Tabletop Exercise (TTX) in Germany that included representatives from Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and the United States. See “U.S. Special Operations hosts Baltic resistance wargame”, SOCEUR DVIDS, July 16, 2019.

References:

Resistance Operating Concept, JSOU Press, 2020
https://jsou.edu/Press/PublicationDashboard/25

Resistance Views: Essays on Unconventional Warfare and Small State Resistance, Joint Special Operations University (JSOU), 2018. SOCEUR began sponsoring, in 2014, a series of seminars about countering Russian aggression in Eastern Europe – using resistance as a means of national defense. This publication by JSOU is derived from the 2nd Senior Unconventional Warfare and Resistance Seminar hosted by JSOU, SOCEUR, and other European SOF organizations in Tartu, Estonia in November 2014.
https://jsou.libguides.com/ld.php?content_id=39164007

UW Pocket Guide, USASOC, April 2016.
http://www.sof.news/uw/uw-pocket-guide/

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A recent exercise in Eastern Europe – Trojan Footprint – provided the opportunity for U.S. and NATO special operations forces to simulate an operation to ‘clear the way’ for a counteroffensive by NATO’s conventional military forces to liberate the Baltic States from a Russian invasion and occupation. The use of unconventional warfare in the Baltics is one option for the US and NATO in the event of a Russian military move on Estonia, Latvia, or Lithuania.

The Trojan Footprint 18 exercise is a U.S. Special Operations Command Europe led event that took place over land, sea, and air that rapidly deployed 2,000 NATO, U.S., and partner nation special operations forces from 13 nations to the Baltic region. Countries that participated included the United Kingdom, United States, Denmark, Sweden, Norway, Poland, Latvia, Estonia, Lithuania, Germany, the Netherlands, Belgium, and Canada.

The exercise provided the opportunity to rehearse and evaluate the ability to rapidly deploy SOF into a crisis, establish the appropriate command structures, and integrate SOF and conventional forces. Trojan Footprint replicates a denied environment in multiple countries requiring the introduction of SOF units. The Trojan Footprint exercise was linked to the Flaming Sword exercise conducted by the Lithuanian Armed Forces – which was also a SOF event.

The exercise included U.S. units from Army Special Forces (10th SFGA), U.S. Navy SEALs, and AFSOC units flying CV-22 Ospreys and MC-130 Talons. In addition, other U.S. aircraft participated to include F-16c Fighting Falcons and B-1B Lancers. The Special Operations Command Europe provided staff while the Army’s 10th Special Forces Group (based in Colorado and Germany) provided Special Forces teams. Air Force Special Operations Command (AFSOC) and Naval Special Warfare (NSW) units took part as well.

U.S., NATO, and partner nation special operations forces were infiltrated into the operational areas at the start of the exercise to the countries of Latvia, Estonia, and Lithuania. The SOF forces were received by the host nation SOF units and worked with organizations such as the Latvian National Guard, Lithuanian National Defense Forces, and the Estonia Defense League.

The exercise is similar to the old Flintlock exercise conducted by the 10th Special Forces Group in the 1970s and 1980s. The present day Flintlock exercise is conducted by Special Operations Command Africa in northwestern Africa on an annual basis. But in prior decades during the Cold War the exercise had an unconventional warfare focus in Europe. Flintlock usually involved the deployment of SF teams from the United States to England where they isolated in a Special Operations Operational Base (SFOB) and they infiltrated into an Soviet Bloc occupied Germany where they conducted UW and other missions. The Trident Footprint exercise is likely similar to the old Flintlock exercise in many respects.

In Trident Footprint type scenario one or more SFOBs would likely be established in Poland, Germany, or perhaps a Scandinavian country. The SOF teams would infiltrate using various methods (air, land, and sea) into the denied areas to conduct UW and other types of SOF missions to prepare the region for a NATO counteroffensive to regain lost territory from Russian occupying forces.

The exercise provides an opportunity for SOF interoperability between NATO and partner nation forces. It also presents a scenario for the interaction between SOF and conventional forces. In addition, one of the exercise’s key overall objectives is to deter Russia from military adventures in the Baltic region.

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Photo: Trojan Footprint UW in Baltic States. U.S. and Danish maritime special operations forces board a ship in the Baltic Sea. Photo by SOCEUR, June 4, 2018.

]]> 6579 https://sof.news/uw/uw-or-political-warfare/ Sat, 07 Oct 2017 04:12:51 +0000 http://www.sof.news/?p=4009 UW or Political Warfare – Is it time to update Special Operations doctrine? Unconventional Warfare (UW) is one of the five primary missions of U.S. Army Special Forces. [1] Most Special Forces (SF) veterans associate the term UW with guerrilla [...]]]>

UW or Political Warfare – Is it time to update Special Operations doctrine?

Unconventional Warfare (UW) is one of the five primary missions of U.S. Army Special Forces. [1] Most Special Forces (SF) veterans associate the term UW with guerrilla warfare where an SF detachment infiltrates behind enemy lines to train, equip, advise, and assist indigenous forces in denied areas. A typical scenario would be an SF team working with a resistance movement that has guerrilla force, underground, and auxiliary components. (Think OSS Jedburgh teams linking up with the French resistance in World War II).

By doctrine an Unconventional Warfare operation could last months or even years. Various types of missions would likely be conducted (in conjunction with indigenous forces) to include intelligence collection, armed attacks against enemy forces or infrastructure, sabotage, subversion, and unconventional assisted recovery.

UW and SFQC. Currently the seven phases of UW are taught at the basic level to Special Forces students during their training in the Special Forces Qualification Course (SFQC). Completion of the Robin Sage exercise in the later part of the SFQC exposes the Special Forces candidate to the basics of UW. The successful graduate will then be exposed to the advanced UW skills required of the Special Forces Soldier through unit training exercises and advanced academic courses within the military educational system.

Flintlock. 10th Special Forces veterans of the 1950s – 1980s era will fondly remember yearly Flintlock training exercises with an isolation phase at an English airbase, infiltration in the middle of the night by parachute into a German farmer’s field, linkup with a guerrilla force, a training period with the guerrillas, and then the conduct of combat operations. While the focus of the recent Flintlock missions has shifted to Africa (and CT / COIN) other more contemporary exercises conducted by the various special operations units put into practice advanced UW skills.

UW Beyond SF. Of course, the conduct of UW is not just the domain of U.S. Army Special Forces. It is a core activity of Army Special Operations (ARSOF) and the United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM). There are also a few three-letter agencies that dabble in the art (or science) as well.

Recent UW Campaigns. A very recent (and successful) UW operation was the infiltration of Special Forces detachments into Afghanistan to topple the Taliban regime. SF teams from the 5th Special Forces Group linked up with the Northern Alliance in the north of Afghanistan as well as resistance forces in the south of Afghanistan. Joined by Air Force special operations airmen (who controlled airstrikes) and the occasional CIA agent (with bags of money) the SF teams were able to quickly assist the resistance movements in routing the Taliban from the major cities of Kabul, Mazar-e Sharif, and Kandahar. And one shouldn’t ignore the success of 10th Special Forces teams linking up with the Kurdish Peshmerga in northern Iraq prior to and during the 2003 invasion.

Little ‘Green Men’. The United States is not alone in its use of Unconventional Warfare. Russia, China, Iran and other nations are very adept in the use of UW. However, these countries use of UW is as a function within a larger construct – often referred to as Hybrid Warfare or Irregular Warfare. Some military observers have pointed out the successful use of ‘little green men’ by Russia in the Crimea and western Ukraine as examples of modern day Hybrid Warfare. [2] There are a number of other terms that could be used to describe this type of warfare to include UW, Political Warfare, Gray Zone, Asymmetric Warfare, Irregular Warfare, and more. For many people the complex set of terms are bewildering.

UW or Political Warfare. One writer, Douglas Livermore, has penned a paper that suggests the special operations community is handicapped with the UW term. He believes that senior policy makers have trouble understanding UW and that the broader concept of Political Warfare needs to be introduced (or reintroduced). He also thinks that the SOF community should move away from the unhelpful doctrinal term of Unconventional Warfare and replace it with the more descriptive term of “support to indigenous resistance”. This term would be a function within the broader concept of SOF support to Political Warfare. Livermore believes the UW term served us well during the Cold War (think Flintlock) but that over the course of time the term has been distorted. He thinks the more comprehensive ‘whole of government’ concept of Political Warfare “. . . incorporates all elements of U.S. national power . . .” and is more useful for senior policy makers in the support of U.S. national objectives.

Author. Douglas Livermore is a Special Forces Officer with Special Forces Detachment – NATO (SOD-N) in the Maryland Army National Guard. He also works for the Department of Defense as an operational advisor and has had multiple deployments to Iraq, Afghanistan, and Africa. His article (link provided below) is a good read and would be very informative for the special operations practitioner.

“It’s Time For Special Operations to Dump ‘Unconventional Warfare'”, by Doug Livermore, War on the Rocks, October 6, 2017.
https://warontherocks.com/2017/10/its-time-for-special-operations-to-dump-unconventional-warfare/

Footnotes:

[1] The other core missions are counterterrorism (CT), direct action (DA), foreign internal defense (FID), and special reconnaissance (SR).

[2] A great concern of the Baltic States and Poland is the use of Hybrid Warfare by Russia to expand its influence and control into eastern Europe. NATO is taking a very proactive stance in signaling their opposition to Russia’s aggressive moves by the forward staging of air and ground assets into Poland, Lithuania, Estonia, and Latvia and through the conduct of numerous exercises in eastern Europe. However, the likely threat from Russia will not not be conventional but a form of Hybrid Warfare (or Political Warfare).

References:

A listing of documents, publications, and articles about Unconventional Warfare can be found at the following link:
https://national-security.info/topics/unconventional-warfare-uw.html

UW Pocket Guide, United States Army Special Operations Command (USASOC), April 2016.
www.sof.news/uw/uw-pocket-guide/

Hybrid Warfare – Russian hybrid warfare and Finland, Germany victim of Russian moves, Russian UW in Ukraine, and more.

Finland – a Target of Russian Hybrid Warfare. The Finns share a common border with Russia that puts it at risk and also ensures that it will forever need to endure a ‘special relationship’. Russia is very keen to protect its borders and keeping Finland in the ‘neutral corner’ is one of its aims. It does not want a robust North Atlantic Treaty Organization presence in Finland. Russia does not need to mount offensive military operations against Finland to attain its national interests; it can use hybrid warfare as a mechanism to achieve its aims. Read “Hybrid influence – lessons from Finland”, NATO Review, June 28, 2017.

Germany As a Target. Russia has used its manipulative ways with countries in addition to the United States. Germany has been a frequent target of Russian disinformation campaigns, cyber attacks, economic pressure, blackmail, use of proxies, and exploitation of minorities. And Why? One prime reason for Russia’s attacks against Germany is the German response to the Russian involvement in the Ukrainian conflict and its conquest of Crimea. Read more in “Germany Confronts Russian Hybrid Warfare”, Carnegie Europe, July 26,2017.

Russia’s Ukraine Moves. General (Ret) Charles Cleveland, former commander of the United States Army Special Operations Command (USASOC), testified before the Senate Committee on Armed Services in March 2017. The topic was the unconventional warfare activities of Russia in the Ukraine. See “Russian Influence and Unconventional Warfare Operations in the “Grey Zone”: Lessons from Ukraine”, March 29, 2017.

Further Reading:

Read more articles posted on SOF News about hybrid warfare.
www.sof.news/?s=hybrid+warfare

Hybrid Warfare
www.specialforcestraining.info/topics/hybrid-warfare.htm

Special Forces and Baltic States – Unconventional Warfare is an option for the East European security dilemma. If ever an unconventional warfare (UW) mission cried out for attention it is in the context of the security situation of the Baltic States – Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. One could add Poland to the mix as well. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is putting out quite a bit of publicity about its military preparedness to defend the Baltic States against aggression (that, of course, would be Russia). The Russians have invaded and annexed Crimea, have a past history with Georgia, and are busy with their insertion of “little green men” into eastern Ukraine in support of a separatist movement that is Russian-leaning. It is no surprise that the Baltic States are somewhat apprehensive about their biggest neighbor. Complicating this security situation is the number of ethnic Russians living in each country.

Quick Russian Conquest. The reality is that the Russians could occupy those three small countries with military forces rather rapidly. The small military’s of each of the countries would no doubt put up a valiant fight but would soon be overwhelmed by the vast numbers of the Russian military machine. Russia can easily mobilize and move up to 70,000 troops within a few days and have them positioned to cross the border into each of the countries.

What Can NATO Do? The response by NATO will be insignificant and futile. Plans to have a NATO battalion pre-positioned in each of the four countries (Latvia, Estonia, Lithuania, and Poland) are admirable but they serve only as a trip-wire. Once the wire has tripped there really are few options where NATO can militarily respond. They will be presented with a situation that is not easily reversed. Positioning a truly significant number of NATO military forces in the region as a deterrence may very well be looked upon by Russia as a provocation and could easily slip the region into an increased level of conflict (or war) as well.

Insurgent Warfare? One option is for the conventional forces of the four countries in danger of invasion to train up in insurgent warfare. While their small conventional armies are next to useless in stopping the Russians the threat of a long-term insurgency acting against occupying Russian forces could provide a strong deterrent. There is a history of the Baltic States employing guerrilla warfare. From 1944 (after the Soviets invaded) to the mid-1950s all three countries conducted an organized resistance to the Russians. [1]

‘Resistance Manual’. Lithuania has recently distributed a ‘preparation manual’ to instruct its citizens on how to resist a Russian invasion and occupation. [2] In addition, it recently re-established a national conscript requirement for military service.

‘Nation of Insurgents’. The Estonian military is very small – its 6,000 members would be quickly defeated by a Russian invasion. However, it is very likely that some members of the Estonian population of 1.3 million would resist an occupation. The Estonian Defense League has over 25,000 members who take part in weekend training sessions that provide instruction in insurgent warfare. [3]

Can NATO Assist? Is there a readily available resource from which these small nations could re-learn the art and science of insurgency?

What About U.S. Special Forces? The United States Army has a unique capability in its seven Special Forces Groups that are well-versed in the art of Unconventional Warfare. Part of the initial training for Green Berets is the Robin Sage exercise where the aspiring SF students are thrust into a resistance force environment working with a guerrilla force in a denied area. More advanced training events like the old FLINTLOCK exercise conducted by the 10th Special Forces Group in the 1960s-1970s prepared the SF Soldiers for working with resistance forces fighting a Soviet block invasion and occupation of Western Europe. While it would take a concerted effort with the participation of NATO Special Operations Forces (most likely led by U.S. SOF) it is possible to train up the military of each of these four countries in insurgent warfare to the extent that the Russians would take notice. The threat of insurgent warfare against occupying Russian forces may very well be the deterrence needed for the eastern Europe security situation. There already has been a very small U.S. SOF presence in the Baltic States – this presence could be expanded in size and focus. [4]

Further Readings:

For additional info on the inability of NATO to defend the Baltic States against Russia read Reinforcing Deterrence on NATO’s Eastern Flank: Wargaming the Defense of the Baltics, RAND Corporation, 2016, 16 pages.
www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR1200/RR1253/RAND_RR1253.pdf

For more on this topic read “Insurgency and Deterrence on NATO’s Northeastern Flank”, by Alexander Lanoszka and Michael Hunzeker, Modern War Institute, December 21, 2016.
http://mwi.usma.edu/insurgency-deterrence-natos-northeastern-flank/

See an article describing local volunteer militias in Estonia. “NATO’s Jittery Baltic Members Move to Beef Up Own Defenses”, The Wall Street Journal, January 3, 2017.

Footnotes:

[1] For a little history on the Baltic States resistance after the Soviet invasion of 1944 see an entry by WikipediA.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Guerrilla_war_in_the_Baltic_states

[2] Read “Baltic States are training in extreme survival skills to prepare for ‘Russian invasion'”, Independent (UK), December 1, 2016.

[3] See “Spooked by Russia, Tiny Estonia Trains a Nation of Insurgents”, The New York Times, October 31, 2016.

[4] General Swartz (COMSOCEUR) and General Thomas (USSOCOM) have each visited the region in the past few months. In addition, each country has seen small SOF detachments deployed there for training on a temporary basis. See “U.S. Lending Support to Baltic States Fearing Russia”, by Eric Schmitt, The New York Times, January 1, 2017.

The Gray Zone – the United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) based at MacDill Air Force Base in Tampa, Florida recently rolled out a new term in September 2015 [1] to describe a specific type of conflict. The Gray Zone is method of categorization for the conflict that occurs in the space between peace and open warfare. Some would simply call it Unconventional Warfare.

What is certain is that there already exist a plethora of terms to use that come very close to the meaning of the Gray Zone. Since the appearance of this new term in favor by USSOCOM a number of military observers, international relations scholars, and national security writers have wrote articles adding their two cents to the explanation of this new security challenge that presents novel complications for U.S. policy and interests in the 21st century.

One such writer, an instructor at West Point, provides his take in two recent articles. Captain John Chambers, U.S. Army, is also a scholar with the Modern War Institute at West Point. Read his thoughts below:

“Owning the ‘gray zone'”, Army Times, by John Chambers, November 6, 2016.
Countering Gray-Zone Hybrid Threats, by John Chambers, Modern War Institute, West Point, October 18, 2016.

Footnotes:
[1] The Gray Zone, White Paper by United States Special Operations Command, 9 September 2015.

For Further Reading:
“Special Operations and the Challenge of Working in the Gray Zone”, by John Friberg, SOFREP.com, February 1, 2016.
“Project Gray – Join the Conversation”, USAJFKSWCS,
www.projectgray.org
“Gray Zone”, Special Forces Training.
www.specialforcestraining.info/topics/gray-zone.html