Head Shots or Body Shots? This is a Question that
Should Defend Influence Strategy, Not Lead It.

By Ajit Maan.

In an insightful recent article “Counterterrorism Targeting – Head Shots or Body Shots?” Thomas G. Pledger advocates augmenting the kill/capture counter-terrorism model with network targeting. I don’t have any problem with that as long as the question follows (defends, protects, and backs up) influence targeting of the non-kinetic variety.

While “capture when you can” is an intelligence requirement, “kill” is less advantageous. Retribution, as Pledger notes, has got us into considerable trouble.

The kill/capture model is problematic and has even been counter-productive. These operations not only have failed to eliminate al-Qaeda and other terrorist groups, they have resulted in the proliferation of violent extremism by directly feeding into the narratives that support it.

The younger leaders who have filled their ranks of those targeted individuals are more extreme, more aggressive, more lethal, and less likely to compromise diplomatically. Network targeting has been effective in slowing down adversarial operations by a few days in some cases, but their organizations are designed to take those sorts of losses.

It is past time to reconsider our own militarized narrative. The story we tell ourselves is predicated upon the belief that the U.S. is conducting a “war on terror.” Even contextualizing the conflicts as ideological is understood in militarized terms. A militarized understanding of the battlefield naturally leads to military force – capabilities to defeat the enemy. But this narrative is faulty and the weapons being used to combat extremism are ineffective because the nature of the conflict has been misidentified.

We need to counter extremism with methods and tools that shape environments and affect behaviors. Military action is only one of these tools. It should be placed behind others. Most importantly, we need to lead with a comprehensive strategic narrative that speaks to the identity of its audience.

Our adversaries understand this concept, have embraced it, and have incorporated strategic narratives across their operations. AQAP, ISIS, the Taliban al-Qaeda, and many other jihadi groups effectively disseminate their brand and reinforce their ideologies through broad information operations to control the strategic narrative.

An imperative is that ours should encompass the adversary’s narrative. This is not a counter-narrative. It is not a rebuttal. A strategic narrative will not be successful if it is limited to the narrative terrain established by extremists and should not be focused on responding to their messages. What I am suggesting involves re-narrating the events of the opposition’s narrative and co-opting their meaning. In other words, we must tell our own narrative in a way that re-frames the opposition’s and offers a bigger, better, smarter alternative of understanding, identifying and acting.

Responding to terrorist messaging has already resulted in what were predictable problems: 1) We have no footing upon which to win ideological or religious debates. 2) Losing those debates has resulted in further loss of credibility. 3) Responding elevates and legitimates the adversarial narrative. 4) Responding is a defensive position. We should not put ourselves in a defensive position. Rather, we need to position ourselves offensively, to get out ahead of their narrative, encompass it, and swallow it up.

Further, an effective strategic message must target, and be delivered to, the population not the terrorists. In an unconventional warfare campaign the key terrain is the human terrain. That is where we either win or loose. We need better messages that connect to our TA’s core identity narrative, through which both hard and soft power will be understood.

Our narrative must demonstrate how extremists are using the population as a proxy force and how they don’t, in fact, share common identities, interests, or objectives with the audiences they are trying to control. Our message should focus on the damage terrorists have done to the target population and how their actions provoke responses that will negatively affect that population. That message will resonate with the target audience because it is consistent with their immediate experience.

Developing a coherent strategic narrative is the best weapon to stem recruitment and combat extremism. It is a national security imperative. Questions about how best to enforce the strategy should come after we have a strategy.

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“Counterterrorism Targeting – Head Shots or Body Shots”, SOF News, by Thomas Pledger, April 2, 2020.
http://www.sof.news/terrorism/ct-targeting/

Ajit Maan, Ph.D. is CEO of the award winning think-and-do-tank Narrative Strategies, Professor of Politics and Global Security at Arizona State University, Affiliate Faculty at the Center for Narrative Conflict Resolution at George Mason University, Faculty at the Center for the Future of War, Member of the Brain Trust of the Weaponized Narrative Initiative, and author of seven books including Counter-Terrorism: Narrative Strategies, Narrative Warfare, and Plato’s Fear.

By Thomas G. Pledger.

Current United States counterterrorism strategy concentrates on retribution over network targeting. These different lines of effort, retribution and network targeting, compete for limited resources on an ever-expanding battlefield. Not only do these lines of effort compete for resources from each other, but they also compete for resources from all other military operations globally.

Retribution is the direct targeting of a group’s senior leaders for a kill or capture mission. Retribution operations are often seen as the delivery of justice for attacks against civilians. Retribution satisfies the emotional desire to directly target those who inspired and directed violent attacks (i.e., Osama bin Laden) and the American public’s desire for a personal response.

Network targeting, however, is the daily grind of defeating the logistics and communications networks that violent extremist organizations build in order to enable and conduct operations. Targeting these networks can be conducted via direct military operations, and / or the use of interagency, or partner nation assets. Understanding the effects retribution or network targeting have on a violent extremist organization long-term capability is crucial to understanding which type of operations should receive the priority of limited resources.

Over the past 30 years, multiple countries have conducted retribution operations around the world. Most notably, the US mission against Osama Bin Laden in 2011. Other recent US operations include Abu Musab Al-Zarqawi (AQ-I, 2006) and Abu Ayyub Al-Masri (Daesh, 2010). Israel and other countries have conducted retribution operations against violent extremist organizations around the world. A shortlist of high valued individuals targeted by Israel includes: Khalil al-Wazir (PLO, 1988), Fathi Shaqaqi (PIJ, 1995), Ahmed Ismail Yassin (Hamas, 2004) and Ahmed Jabari (Hamas, 2012). Even while suffering successful retribution operations, Hamas’s operational reach and capability have increased. Equally, Daesh continued to spread after the targeting of Zarqawi and Masri and went onto create a safe haven in Iraq and Syria.

During major combat operations, conventional forces target logistics and communication networks in an effort to prevent, delay, and limit effective adversary military actions. Destroying these nodes breaks the links, which allow communication and movement of supplies to opposition military forces. Looking at the historic aspects of attacking an adversary’s logistic networks, multiple effective examples stand out, using both lethal and non-lethal effects. The shock and awe of the first Gulf War against the Iraqi Army was the ultimate recent example of network targeting. Thirty-nine days of airstrikes, against networks, enabled a 100-hour ground campaign.

Similarly, targeting the networks of violent extremist organizations has proven effective at limiting violent extremist organization operations. Operation Christmas and Operation Rivers of Light are examples of non-lethal operations against a violent extremist organization. Conducted in 2010 and 2011 against the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia—People’s Army (FARC), specifically FARC transportation networks. Operation Christmas and Operation Rivers of Light effectively removed over 500 guerrillas from the battlefield without firing a shot, including a FARC Commander, a key bomb-maker, and a large cache of weapons. Driving the FARC to the negotiation table in 2012.

The key then becomes finding which Nodes to attack, individuals, physical locations, infrastructure, or some other target or combination thereof. Much research has been conducted on social network analysis and link analysis. Research coming from the University of Maryland illustrated the effectiveness of nodal network targeting to decrease the lethality of violent extremist organizations. This research has shown statistically that retribution operations can create more aggressive or effective violent extremist organizations. In contrast, operations against mid to upper level “staff” will reduce the effectiveness of these same violent extremist organizations. [1] Moving beyond this research, the removal of these mid-level staff by capture operations provides an additional information source for future operations against all levels of the violent extremist organization.

Network targeting is not meant to replace the retribution targeting of high valued individuals. Targeting of the facilitation networks is designed to augment high valued individual targeting by placing indirect pressure on the high valued individuals and reducing the ability of both centralized and decentralized violent extremist organizations to conduct effective operations. Reducing or stopping the number and frequency of violent actions is the goal of any counterterrorism policy.

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[1] Spezzano, Francesca, V. S. Subrahmanian, and Aaron Mannes. “Reshaping Terrorist Networks.” Communications of the ACM 57, no. 8 (2014): 60-69. Accessed February 20, 2019. doi:10.1145/2632661.2632664

Photo: AMQ-9 Reaper armed with GBU-12 Paveway II laser guided munitions and AGM-114 Hellfire missiles flies a combat mission over southern Afghanistan. (USAF photo / Lt. Col. Leslie Pratt).

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Thomas G. Pledger is an Army Infantry Officer currently serving at the Army National Guard Directorate in Washington, DC.  Tom has deployed to multiple combat zones supporting both the Conventional and Special Operations Forces.  Tom holds a Master in Public Service and Administration from the Bush School of Public Administration at Texas A&M University and a Master of Humanities in Organizational Dynamics, Group Think, and Communication from Tiffin University, and three Graduate Certificates from Texas A&M University in Intelligence, Counterterrorism, and Military Policy and Defense Affairs.  Tom has been a guest lecturer at the Department of State’s Foreign Service Institute.  Tom’s current academic and professional research is focused on a holistic approach to counter-facilitation/network, stability operations, and unconventional warfare.

Since 9/11 the United States has significantly scaled up its counterterrorism (CT) activities in Africa. The U.S. has conducted unilateral CT operations as well as extensive training for African partner forces involved in the CT fight. Despite this long counterterrorism campaign the growth of jihadist groups continues in Somalia, north Africa, and west Africa. Many of the violent extremist organizations (VEOs) are aligned with either al-Qa’ida or the Islamic State.

PSI and TSCTI. In 2002 the U.S. established its Pan Sahel Initiative (PSI) aimed to improve the intelligence and border security capability of some Sahelian countries. [1] Later, in 2005, a much larger program labeled the Trans-Saharan Counter Terrorism Initiative (TSCTI) involved economic, political, diplomatic, and military components. The military component of TSCTI was Operation Enduring Freedom – Trans Sahara. In 2002 the U.S. established a presence at Camp Lemonier in Djibouti – initially basing SOF elements to respond to counterterrorism events in the region. The base has grown and currently houses 3,000 troops that conduct operations throughout the Horn of Africa, east Africa, and beyond.

AFRICOM and SOCAFRICA. An annual special operations exercise (FLINTLOCK) was instituted in 2005 supported by SOCEUR and later by SOCAFRICA involving several nations in the region. In 2007 the U.S. established Africa Command (AFRICOM). For many years the United States has been deploying forces to Africa to conduct counterterrorism (CT) operations and to advise, assist, train, and accompany security forces of partner nations conducting CT operations.

Training Teams. U.S. Special Forces, MARSOC, other units have been providing training and assistance to countries in the Sahel, Lake Chad, and Horn of Africa regions. Over time many of these operations became known to the public. However some of these CT operations were ‘under the radar’. Other missions barely register in the press – such as the operation against the Lord’s Resistance Army in central Africa. A few became well-known due to unfavorable events.

Costly Operations. One example of an event that caught Americans by surprise includes the U.S. military involvement in Niger where four members of the 3rd Special Forces Group were killed in an ambush in October 2017. Another operation is the al Shabaab raid on Camp Simba at the Manda Bay Airfield where three Americans died in January 2020.

Support to Partners. In addition to ‘boots on the ground’ the United States has provided logistical and intelligence support to African and European nations in the CT fight – especially in west Africa. This includes three critical components to the CT campaign: in-flight refueling of European aircraft, airlift of European and African soldiers and vehicles, and all sources of U.S. intelligence. AFRICOMs efforts in CT in Africa is complemented by those of the U.S. State Department. [2]

Spotty Progress. There have been some successes in the counterterrorism fight in Africa but there have also been cases where progress has been very slow. Long running conflicts are in progress in Somalia, Libya, and the Sahel region of Africa and they are unlikely to end soon. The United States has had a presence in all of these areas – employing conventional and special operations forces for several years in these conflicts. However, it appears that insecurity and instability has gotten worse over the past decade despite efforts by the United States and other international actors.

Somalia

Somalia has been a failed state for many decades. Al-Shabaab militants have contributed to this state of insecurity and instability in Somalia. The group holds large areas of the rural countryside and conducts frequent attacks in the cities of Somalia. The al-Qaeda affiliated insurgent / terrorist group has been intent on toppling the UN-backed federal government. In addition to establishing a caliphate in Somalia, Al Shabaab has a stated desire to attack the U.S. homeland. The Defense Intelligence Agency has assessed that the threat from al Shabaab and ISIS-Somalia remains high. The strength of al Shabaab is estimated to be between 5,000 to 7,000. ISIS-Somalia is much smaller, estimated at 100 to 300 fighters.

In 2019 the U.S. conducted over 110 airstrikes in Central and Southern Somalia killing over 800 militants. U.S. military personnel (about 700) have been providing advise, assistance, and accompanying Somalia forces and partner nations of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). [3] SOF teams have been training select Somali units to include the Danab Advance Infantry Brigade.

Lake Chad Basin

The Boko Harem group has had a long presence in the Lake Chad Basin area of Africa. It’s area of operations straddles the border of Nigeria, Chad, Cameroon, and Niger. ISIS-West Africa also operates in this region. The VEOs in the Lake Chad Basin area have not been significantly degraded. Other jihadist groups aligned with Middle Eastern organizations threaten to expand as well.

The VEOs are aided by the corruption and ineffectiveness of the regional governments – notably the Nigerian government. The Nigerian Army has not been able to defend remote locations and is now consolidating its forces onto larger more defendable bases yielding much of the Nigerian northeast countryside to Boko Harem. The US posture in this region has gone from a “degrade” strategy to one of “containment”.

Sahel Region

Islamist militants have been a source of insecurity in the Sahel area of Africa. The militants, aligned with al Qaeda, are fighting for control of the land along Niger’s western border with Mali and in other Sahel nations. The militants operate with basic weapons, pickup trucks, and motorcycles and are very mobile. They have been increasingly active the last several months in Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger. The VEOs in the Sahel region have not been degraded nor contained. There are indications that the VEOs will continue to expand their operational area. The most active and effective VEO in this region is Jama’at Nusrat al Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM).

The U.S. currently has Special Forces teams operating in the region conducting a train, advise, and assist mission. An airfield was built and is now operational in Agadez, Niger to assist the regional government forces in providing security for its threatened areas. The airfield also functions as a U.S. drone base – beginning ISR operations in November 2019. However, there have been rumors that, having just completed the base, the U.S. may phase out or scale down operations at Air Base 201.

Libya

From 2014 to 2016 the Islamic State had a big presence in Libya but has since drifted south into the desert. The current civil war in Libya makes it difficult to truly assess the Islamic State in Libya. ISIS-Libya and al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) have been a bit quiet in north Africa the last part of 2019.

Past and current CT efforts by the United States in Libya include drone strikes against ISIS leadership. A small contingent of U.S. SOF was withdrawn from Libya in April 2019 due to the unpredictable security environment. The presence of Russian mercenary forces impede U.S. counterterrorism operations in Libya. [4] Complicating the Libyan security environment has been the introduction of proxy forces from Syria, Sudan, and Chad.

U.S. Partners in Africa

France – the Sahel Lead. The United States is fortunate to have good international partners to work in the CT effort in Africa. The French have been in the lead for several years in the Sahel region. They currently have about 4,500 troops in this area of Africa supporting Operation Barkhane which started in 2014. In addition, France has (as of 2020) established a special operations task force – Operation Takuba will have several European countries participating.

G5 Sahel Joint Force. The five nations of Burkina Faso, Mali, Niger, Chad, and Mauritania are currently trying to secure the region and its borders but it is facing some challenges. The G5 Sahel, established in 2017, remains under resourced and lacks sufficient training. The French play a major role in assisting the G5 Sahel force. The U.S. provides a limited footprint of training and equipping activities to the G5 Sahel.

MINUSMA. The United Nations is assisting in the security effort. The United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali is engaged in an important but difficult peacekeeping mission. It is assisted by the United States and other international partners.

AMISON. The countries of Kenya, Ethiopia, Uganda, and others have been contributing troops for a number of years to this joint mission in Somalia. The troops of the African Union Mission in Somalia has begun its withdrawal. By 2021 the AMISON mission in Somalia should be finished; although the security situation in Somalia is unlikely to significantly improve by then.

Key African Allies. There are some key African nations who are important partners – including Kenya, Niger and others. U.S. special operations forces are working with selected African units to improve their capability to fight the terrorists and insurgents. These include the Danab in Somalia, the 11th and 51st Special Intervention Battalion in Niger, and the Kenya Special Forces and Rangers, and others.

Root Causes of Discontent

Some African nations are struggling with internal divisions in their country that are conducive to the growth of violent extremist organizations. Tribal grievances, disenfranchised minorities, conflicts between farmers and herdsmen, lack of government services in rural areas, ethnic divisions, poor governance, heavy-handed government reaction to VEOs and the general population, human rights abuses, and other factors are reasons why VEOs can recruit and maintain support within some members of African society.

SOCAFRICA has taken the position that the counterterrorism effort needs to be conducted in conjunction with programs that improve governance, development, and economic opportunity in these African nations at risk. The “three Ds”: defense, diplomacy, and development – are important components to defeating VEOs. [5]

Future U.S. CT Engagement in Africa?

Changing Focus and Resource Competition. The current national defense strategy mandates a shift in focus from the counterinsurgency and counterterrorism fight of the past two decades to a concentration on great power competition. This means resources and personnel applied to the threat posed by Russia and China in Europe, the Indo-Pacific, and elsewhere. AFRICOM and SOCAFRICA will be competing with other Combatant Commands for training teams (SOF, SFAB, etc.), ISR, medical evacuation assets, personnel recovery assets, and more. There is a finite amount of SOF, intelligence, and other resources – something has to give. In this case it appears that Africa may come up on the short end of the stick.

Downsizing the Africa Mission. The Department of Defense has recently indicated that it is planning to reduce the footprint for the newly established drone base in Niger. It plans to cut back back on SOF forces being deployed to Africa. Of note are plans to deploy elements of the newly formed Security Force Assistance Brigades (SFABs) to conduct training and advising missions. [6]

There is some Congressional resistance to this shift in resources away from Africa. Our European allies are also displeased with a loss of U.S. support for the counterterrorism fight in Africa. The U.S. commitment in Africa is currently ‘under review’ and we should see some policy shifts within the next few months that indicate which path the U.S. will take in Africa. Many national security observers that follow events in Africa recognize that in order to continue to contain or degrade VEOs the U.S. will need to provide long-term assistance and advising until partner forces can deal with jihadists threats on their own.

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Footnotes:

[1] In conjunction with the Pan Sahel Initiative detachments from the 10th Special Forces Group began training military forces in Africa.

[2] See Counterterrorism in Africa – Innovation, Lessons Learned and Staying Ahead of the Threat, address at UN CT Regional Conference, State.gov, July 2019.

[3] See “AFRICOM predicts mission training Somalia’s ‘Lightning Brigade’ will last until 2027”, Military Times, March 17, 2020.

[4] The intelligence community has assessed that Russian paramilitary forces fighting alongside the Libyan National Army (LNA) shot down a U.S. surveillance drone over Tripoli in the later part of 2019.

[5] From “A View from the CT Foxhole” below.

[6] There are no known numbers provided as to how many SFAB ‘teams’ will deploy; but it does make for a good soundbite. While a ’12-man’ SFAB team is specifically trained to train, advise, and assist (TAA) foreign conventional partner forces it is a poor choice to partner with foreign SOF partner forces.

References:

East Africa and North and West Africa Counterterrorism Operations, Lead Inspector General Report to the United States Congress, February 2020.
https://www.dodig.mil/Reports/Lead-Inspector-General-Reports/Article/2080495/lead-inspector-general-for-east-africa-and-north-and-west-africa-counterterrori/

“A View from the CT Foxhole: Brigadier General Dagvin R.M. Anderson, Commander, U.S. Special Operations Command Africa”, CTC Sentinel, Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, February 2020.
https://ctc.usma.edu/view-ct-foxhole-brigadier-general-dagvin-r-m-anderson-commander-u-s-special-operations-command-africa/

U.S. Counterterrorism Priorities and Challenges in Africa”, Congressional Research Service (CRS), December 16, 2019.
https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/TE/TE10044

“The Future Role of U.S. Counterterrorism Operations in Africa”, CTC Sentinel, Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, February 2014.
https://ctc.usma.edu/africa-special-issue/

Images: Top image derived from map found in CRS 2019 report cited above.

Terrorism Update 20170110 – U.S. Department of Statement CT Bureau notes for 2016, Perspectives on Terrorism (December 2016), CTC Sentinel, book review of Blood Year: The Unraveling of Western Counterterrorism, and more.

DoS CT Bureau Update 2016. The U.S. Department of State’s Counterterrorism Bureau has been busy for the past year. Some of the highlights of the CT Bureau’s counterterrorism diplomatic initiatives include the designation of five new Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTOs) and numerous individuals. A core aspect of the U.S. Counter-ISIL strategy is to prevent the travel of foreign terrorist fighters (FTFs) to and from the conflicts in Iraq and Syria. Read more in “2016 in Review: Advancing Counterterrorism Policy”, DIPNOTE, January 3, 2017.

CTC Sentinel Nov / Dec 2016. The Combating Terrorism Center’s CTC Sentinel (of West Piont) is now available online. Numerous articles about terrorism.
www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/november-december-2016

How to Counter Violent Extremism. One observer says it needs to be a comprehensive approach. Read “Future Counter Terrorism Modeling”, by Jack Gaines, LinkedIn Pulse, December 23, 2016.

Book Review – Blood Year: the Unraveling of Western Counterterrorism. A review of a new book on terrorism. James Dobbins, a former intel guy, provides his thoughts on David Kilcullen’s newest book . (Prism, Dec 2016).

Perspectives on Terrorism. Volume X, Issue 6, December 2016 is now available online from the Terrorism Research Initiative (TRI). Articles include “Jihadi Terrorism in Europe: The IS-Effect”, “Foreign Fighters in Syria”, “Jihadism in Norway”, “The French Iraqi Networks”, and many others.
www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot

The idea or concept of using remotely piloted aircraft or RPA for reconnaissance purposes has been around for a long time. In the early 1980s the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) outfitted drones with modern-day technology. The early remotely piloted vehicles (RPAs) were the GNAT 750 – which led to the development and production of the RQ-1 Predator in the early 1990s. The Predators would soon be flying over the Balkans in the 1990s conducting intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance missions.

The armed RPA (or drone as some refer to RPAs) came about in the early 2000’s. The MQ-1 Predator was retrofitted to carry the AGM-114 Hellfire anti-tank missile. It would soon see action in Afghanistan and later in Iraq, Somalia, Yemen, and . . . perhaps a few other locations around the world.

Read more about the history of armed drones in “The evolution of the combat RPA”, by Senior Airman Christian Clausen, 423nd Wing Air Expeditionary Public Affairs, December 18, 2016.

Terrorism news, reports, and publications – ISIS, al Qaeda, interactive map depicting worldwide terrorist attacks, a new strategy to prevent terrorist attacks, Hezbollah, Global Terrorism Index 2016, and more.

Report – The Jihadi Threat. The United States Institute of Peace and Wilson Center have published a 48-page report entitled The Jihadi Threat: ISIS, al Qaeda, and beyond, December 12, 2016.

Map of Terrorist Events. The IntelCenter.com has posted an interactive map that depicts the number of people killed in terrorist and rebel attacks by country in 2016. More than 25,000 people were killed in 10,000 plus attacks according to the database of IntelCenter as of mid-December 2016.
https://intelcenter.com/maps/country-killed-2016.html#gs.IeG5A2A

Interview with Hezbollah’s 2nd IC. Robin Wright visited Lebanon and recently spent some time with a head official of Hezbollah. Read about it in “Having Tea With Hezbollah’s No. 2”, The New Yorker, December 13, 2016.

New Strategy for Confronting Terrorism? Shannon N. Green of the Center for Strategic & International Studies (CSIS) has penned a paper entitled “Do we need a new strategy to prevent terrorist attacks on the United States?”, CSIS, December 15, 2016.

Crime and Terror in Europe. Colin P. Clarke, a political scientist at RAND Corporation, writes on the merging of crime groups and terror organizations in Europe. Read Crime and Terror in Europe: Where the Nexus Is Alive and Well, RAND Corporation, December 13, 2016.

Global Terrorism Index 2016. A 108-page report by the Institute for Economics and Peace has recently been published. The report provides a summary of terrorist events, a map of terrorist incidents, terrorist trends, terrorist groups, economic impact of terrorism, and more. Read Global Terrorism Index 2016.

Terrorism Update for 19 November 2016 – recent publications, papers, events, conferences, news reports, and commentary from around the world on the topic of terrorism and counter-terrorism. Topics include a paper by ECFR on military operations against terrorist groups, Global Terrorism Index 2016, Middle East Institute’s Countering Violent Transnational Movements project, and more.

Paper of Counter-Terrorism Military Action – The European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR) has published a policy brief entitled Europe’s New Counter-Terror Wars, by Anthony Dworking, October 2016, 20 pages. The author examines recent military operations against terrorist groups by member states of the European Union (EU). He observes that these member states need to pay close attention to the risks of conducting these operations, that political action needs to match military action, and that legal precedents are at risk. He provides several recommendations for the tightening of guidelines on when military force should be used against terrorist groups like the Islamic State.

A Little History on Terrorism. Daniel Byman, a foreign policy editor of Lawfare, provides us a bit of history on terrorism over the past century. In addition, he provides a glimpse of the counter-terror campaigns employed to defeat the various types of terrorist activities. Read “Learning from Past Counterterrorism Eras”, Lawfare, November 14, 2016.

MEI’s CVTM Project. The Middle East Institute has launched (Oct 2016) it’s Countering Violent Transnational Movements project to conduct in-depth research and analysis into the region’s varied terrorist threats. It aims to propose effective policy responses. This resource should provide us with a good periodic terrorism update.
www.mei.edu/countering-terrorism

Global Terrorism Index 2016. Each year the Institute for Economics and Peace publishes a report the measures and informs us on the impact of terrorism around the world. The Global Terrorism Index 2016 is a 108-page report that covers topics such as terrorist incidents, terrorism trends in 2015, ten countries most impacted by terrorism, terrorist groups, economic impact of terrorism correlates and drivers of terrorism, and more.

Trump and Fighting Terrorism. Will Trumps campaign rhetoric about fighting terrorism become a reality (targeting families of terrorists, bringing back waterboarding, etc.)? Read more in “Fighting Terrorism in the Age of Trump”, Government Executive, November 14, 2016.

Study of Terrorists. Terrorism expert Jessica Stern – author and Boston University researcher – has been studying why terrorists do what they do for over 20 years. Read more in “Lessons From Terrorists”, BU Today Special Report, November 14, 2016.

The U.S. military conducted a counterterrorism strike against al-qaida operatives in Yemen – killing three. The strike took place on August 4th in the Shabwah Governate in central Yemen. The U.S. is putting pressure on the al-Qaida organization in Yemen to prevent them from plotting and executing attacks against the United States and Americans. Al-Qaida continues to be a significant threat and has had a destabilizing effect on Yemen. Read a news release about the strike by U.S. DoD, August 5, 2016.