Courtesy story by SOCAFRICA.

Military and government leaders from the across the globe came together for Silent Warrior 23, Dec. 4 – 7, 2023 in Garmisch-Partenkirchen, Germany.

The multi-day conference, hosted by Special Operations Command Africa, aimed to facilitate forums for senior military leaders to discuss shared concerns and identify collaborative solutions to the strategic, operational, and tactical issues in Africa. Many leaders in attendance were also from their respective countries’ special operations forces.

The annual conference, now in its 12th year, had 55 nations in attendance – 22 African countries and 33 international partners. This year, the conference placed a heavy emphasis on violent extremist organizations (VEOs) and the unique challenges they pose across the African continent.

U.S. Navy Rear Adm. Ron Foy, SOCAFRICA’s commander, stated during opening remarks for the conference that the best way to combat the aforementioned VEOs was through sustained partnerships.

“We recognize the strong potential Africa brings not only to the continent but to the globe as a whole,” said Foy. “A stable and prosperous Africa continues to and always will be in the world’s best interest.”

Also in attendance was the U.S. Africa Command team, U.S. Marine Corps Gen. Michael Langley, AFRICOM commander, and U.S. Marine Corps Command Sgt. Maj. Michael Woods, AFRICOM senior enlisted leader. Langley provided opening remarks for the conference.

“Sessions such as Silent Warrior 23, give me the opportunity to listen,” said Langley. “Listen to your viewpoints. Listen to some of the challenges but moreover, listen to the opportunities across the continent of Africa.”

“Whether it be the enduring fight against al-Shabaab or against violent extremist organizations across the Sahel,” said Langley. “I am listening to you and your ideas collectively.”

Senior officials from SOCAFRICA’s African partner nations were some of the guest speakers for the event. On theme with the conference, Brig. Gen. John Njeru, Kenya Defence Force, organized an in-depth discussion on al-Shabaab, a VEO that has posed a significant security threat in Njeru’s home country of Kenya and other nations throughout east Africa.

Njeru spoke about the increasing capabilities of al-Shabaab, such as the spread of disinformation, large scale recruitment and the increasing use of drones and how those challenges can be addressed through partnerships and collective efforts.

The conference also afforded leadership the opportunity to have small-group discussions on various topics. One breakout session focused on enlisted development within not only U.S. forces, but SOCAFRICA’s international and African partners as well.

Command Sgt. Maj. Garrick Banfield, the senior enlisted leader for SOCAFRICA, stressed the importance of enlisted service members and the benefits they bring to multilateral planning and operations.

“Enlisted leaders provide a unique perspective and a vantage point,” said Banfield. “These vantage points illuminate a situation which can then enable enlisted leaders to provide advice and counsel to their officers.”

Multiple agencies came together to ensure the success of the conference. SOCAFRICA staff took on a heavy load with the logistics and planning efforts of the conference. Airmen from the Language Enabled Airman Program ensured the practices shared were translated to French, Arabic and Portuguese-speaking countries.

“In conferences like Silent Warrior, we facilitate clear and accurate communication across languages and cultures,” said U.S. Air Force Maj. Scott Guthrie, LEAP interpreter and 52nd Health Care Operations Squadron physician. “This not only enhances mutual understanding and cooperation but also respects and acknowledges the cultural diversity of the participants – leading to more effective international collaborations.”

Foy thanked those in attendance for battling the elements to participate in the discussions, briefs, and breakout sessions. He also stressed the importance of SOCAFRICA’s enduring partnerships with their African partners.

“Partnerships serve as the backbone for our resolve to defeat violent extremism”, said Foy. “And I can say without reservation no VEO can match our collective strength. None. We’re much stronger together.”

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This article by SOCAFRICA was first published by the Defense Visual Information Distribution Service on December 7, 2023. DVIDS content is in the public domain. Photo: Attendees at Silent Warrior 23 conference hosted by SOCAFRICA. (photo by Senior Airman Tyler McQuiston, Dec 5, 2023)

By Michael A. Marra and Brett D. Weigle.

October 3, 2023, marked the somber 30th anniversary of the Battle of Mogadishu, Somalia – another tragic event in another “small war” waged far away from United States soil in a nation few American citizens could find on a map. On that fateful day, U.S. forces serving as part of the second United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM II) incurred 17 killed and 85 wounded in action in addition to an estimated 1,500 Somali casualties. [1] What was meant to be a routine special operations raid to capture several warlord leaders resulted in a bloody all-day firefight that coined the phrase “Blackhawk down” for future difficult interventions. Ironically, this battle was the culmination of a years-long United Nations effort to rectify a complex catastrophe of environmental, political, and social upheaval in Somalia.

Beginning in early 1992, the first UN effort, UNOSOM I, was unable to suppress the warlords to deliver humanitarian aid. In April 1992, the UN Security Council created the Unified Task Force (UNITAF), led by the United States with the authority to “use all necessary means to establish as soon as possible a secure environment for humanitarian relief operations in Somalia.” [2] UNITAF accomplished this mission by early 1993 and was replaced by UNOSOM II in May with a new mandate. The establishing UN Security Council resolution included language about the importance of “a comprehensive and effective programme for disarming Somali parties, including movements and factions.” [3] This additional mandate departed from the initial UNITAF task of feeding a starving population by providing security for food distribution; instead, this expanded mission led to the raids by special operations forces that culminated in the Battle of Mogadishu. The United Nations and the United States unwillingly were drawn into conflict. How can such good intentions go so horribly wrong?

Can we continue to learn from small wars that provide strategically painful lessons from long ago? With the U.S. military now primarily focused on large scale combat operations in Europe and the Pacific, do small wars like Somalia still matter?

We think so. If the global competition during the first Cold War should be judged by the number of proxy wars it promulgated, then we need to pay attention now – not after we are deeply embedded in another armed intervention. Thinking through the externalities of a coming second Cold War as China, Russia, and the United States compete for their interests will help us campaign in competition and avoid conflicts like UNOSOM II in the future.

Chinese and Russian influence have spread across the Maghreb, the Sahel, and other regions of Africa; for example, China builds infrastructure projects under its Belt and Road Initiative while the Wagner Group’s military involvement destabilizes Libya, Central African Republic, Mali, and Sudan. [4] Seeing this, we understand the struggle for power and influence is an ongoing effort with no “end state,” only a “next state.” As coups and civil wars erupt along these fault lines in Africa, we will be tempted to intervene to preserve our investments and influence via diplomatic, development, and defense efforts. With U.S. military and civilian personnel currently stationed in several African fragile states, American policymakers and planners have a responsibility to continually assess our level of involvement and subsequent risk to U.S. personnel and national prestige.

The full history and internal political machinations of Somalia are well-documented elsewhere, and not the focus of this offering. [5] Rather, our argument concerns the strategic and operational aspects of the decisions to intervene and enforce a peace that was fiercely resisted by the very people the United States was trying to assist. We offer several reflections on lessons civilian and military leaders can learn from this small war for future interventions, since the application of military power to achieve national policies is a matter of supreme political judgement. Far different from other endeavors, failure in war has repercussions that reverberate through decades.

Somalia, like numerous hot spots around the world, is burdened by instability, environmental stress, and deep social fissures leading to violence for many decades. From the infamous Battle of Mogadishu thirty years ago to the present day, Somalia has ranked first or second since 2008 on the Fragile States Index published by the Fund for Peace. [6]  In 2023 alone, the U.S. military flew at least 14 airstrikes in Somalia and one special operations mission that killed Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) leader Bilal al-Sudani, according to Jeff Schogol writing in Task and Purpose. [7] Despite billions of dollars of assistance invested for decades in Somalia, there is a frustrating paucity of progress. The United States alone provided $818 million in humanitarian and military aid in FY2020 and $792 million to date in 2023, according to the Department of State. [8]

These eight lessons from Somalia are as relevant now as they were three decades ago.

Strategy is more difficult than policy or tactics. This intervention in 1993 required an overall strategy, not just a contingency plan. The value of the U.S. national security interest was never clearly defined; was this something we were going to pay for, fight for, kill for, or die for? It clearly ranked as a peripheral national interest but at times the United States acted as though Somalia’s situation were a vital interest. [9] A lack of deep and broad thinking on the “next state” of Somalia after the initial intervention created a “mission creep” due to lack of vision regarding where the operation was going after initial successes in stopping the worst of the famine. While the crisis did need immediate attention to save lives, U.S. policymakers and planners must think through their strategy to ensure all elements of national power are engaged when mapping how we want to help a nation reach its desired future state. After the United States forces departed in 1994, Somalia has struggled to defeat various insurgent groups that threaten the functioning of a Somali central government. [10].

It is more difficult to make peace than it is to make war. Peacemaking, peace-enforcement, and peacekeeping between factions in the same nation is complex, costly, and often contested. Somalia is still in desperate need of a lasting peace so that the rebuilding of society can begin in earnest. There is still a level of unacceptable violence in Somalia that belies the efforts of peacemakers. As the United States engages in African places of unrest, we must admit we will eventually favor one side over another, creating the appearance of partisanship. In areas of fractured societies where multiple groups are contesting for power, the danger of siding with one may mean unifying the remainder against the intervening force – as we saw on the streets of Mogadishu in 1993.

“Resistance = Means × Will” is an enduring axiom. While irregular Somali warlord forces had little training, inadequate equipment, and no real communications gear, their will compensated for their lack of means by multiplying their power of resistance. They were a worthy adversary who inflicted deep costs on U.S. military forces on 3 October 1993. While “will” is extremely hard to measure from afar, it is easy to recognize, and these highly motivated Somali warlords and foot soldiers were a dangerous adversary.

The enemy, regardless of size, gets a vote. Despite our highly motivated soldiers and aviators, exquisite plans, and special operations capabilities, the Somalis fought back hard. Irregular forces stymied our best efforts that day, and on other occasions before UNISOM II departed Somalia in 1994. The enemy always gets a vote, and when they are fighting at home, they have many advantages.

Friction during intervention is unavoidable. Going into complex catastrophes like Somalia requires adaptation because the myriad problems cannot all be anticipated. However, the United States must understand the strong African antipathy to unilateral Western interventions and must seek coalition partners with regional familiarity. Operating in a strong coalition, preferably with the full backing of the United Nations or African Union, is the right approach in Africa. As a corollary, coalition timelines must be more realistic – and that inevitably means longer. The United States must be careful to avoid unnecessary friction by the imposition of rigid timelines on a fluid environment. Speaking in terms of “years” instead of “months” is a smart way to telegraph U.S. commitment and ease friction.

Strategic history punishes good intentions. The turbulent and bloody history of Somalia was well known in 1993, yet the successful 1991 Persian Gulf War may have given false confidence to U.S. Central Command planners that UNITAF would also accomplish its mission according to plan. Having the best intentions for the entire Somali population was simply not enough to overcome the factions who did not appreciate the presence of foreign troops in their cities and villages.

Tragedy happens even in small wars. As the intervention bloomed into a shooting war, the number of civilian and military casualties soared. Firefights between UNISOM II soldiers and Somali fighters—or indiscriminate fires by warlords and rebels—inevitably caught civilians in crossfire. While American combatants survived most wounds during the Battle of Mogadishu, civilian casualties were not that fortunate. In recognition that this tragedy will most certainly recur, in 2022 the Department of Defense implemented its Civilian Harm Mitigation and Response Action Plan. [11]

War is always a gamble – even a “small war.” We witnessed in Somalia a minor military operation that captured the headlines of every major newspaper and lead every television news program in the world. Suddenly, the risk of a small raid in a small war looked like a failed gamble by the United States in an intervention that seemed difficult to exit. A tactical operation was magnified into strategic consequences by flashing images and first-person descriptions delivered within hours of the event. Wars, even small ones, do not always go the way they are planned, and almost never adhere to sequential and compact timelines on PowerPoint slide shows.

In today’s increasingly fraught global security environment [12], we must acknowledge the hard lessons learned from past small wars like Somalia—lessons whose tuition was paid with blood and treasure. The nature of small wars will not change their root causes, and motivations of external actors to intervene will remain noble. However, the character of a U.S. response need not copy our experience in Somalia in 1992–1994.

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Illustration credit: “On the Alert,” Jeffrey Manuszak, 1994, reference [1], p. 17.

[1] Richard W. Stewart, The United States Army in Somalia (Washington, DC: U.S. Army Center for Military History, December 2002), 19,
https://history.army.mil/html/books/070/70-81-1/cmhPub_70-81-1.pdf

[2] United Nations, Security Council Resolution 794 (1992), April 24, 1992, para. 3, http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/794.

[3] United Nations, Security Council Resolution 814 (1993), March 26, 1993, para. 7, http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/814.

[4] Alex Vines and Jon Wallace, “China-Africa relations,” Explainer, Chatham House, January 18, 2023, https://www.chathamhouse.org/2023/01/china-africa-relations; Joseph Siegle, “Inflection Point for Africa-Russia Relations after Prigozhin’s Death,” Africa Center for Strategic Studies, September 6, 2023, https://africacenter.org/spotlight/‌inflection-point-for-africa-russia-relations-after-prigozhins-death/.

[5] For example, see “Somalia profile – Timeline,” BBC News, January 4, 2018, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-14094632.

[6] Fund for Peace, “Fragile States Index,” accessed September 9, 2023, https://fragilestatesindex.org/country-data/.

[7] Jeff Schogol, “US airstrike in Somalia kills 13 al-Shabab fighters,” Africa News, Task and Purpose, August 28, 2023, https://taskandpurpose.com/news/us-airstrike-somalia-13-fighters-killed/; Foundation for Defense of Democracies, “US airstrikes in Somalia,” Long War Journal, accessed September 9, 2023, https://www.longwarjournal.org/us-airstrikes-in-the-long-war; Lloyd J. Austin III, “Statement on Somalia Operation,” press release, Department of Defense, January 26, 2023, https://www.defense.‌gov/‌‌‌‌‌News/Releases/Release/Article/3279923/statement-by-secretary-of-defense-lloyd-j-austin-iii-on-somalia-operation/.

[8] Lauren Ploch Blanchard, Somalia (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, July 27, 2023), 2, https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF10155

[9] U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Strategy, Joint Doctrine Note 1-18 (Washington, DC: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, April 25, 2018), p. vii, https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/jdn_jg/jdn1_18.pdf

[10] For example, see Adam Abdelmoula, “Somalia is on the path of recovery, but real challenges remain,” Deputy Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General, Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator for Somalia, United Nations Somalia, December 21, 2021, accessed October 28, 2023, https://somalia.un.org/en/166388-somalia-path-recovery-real-challenges-remain; Ken Menkhaus, “Governance without Government in Somalia: Spoilers, State Building, and the Politics of Coping,” International Security 31(3) (2007): 74–106, doi: https://doi.org/10.1162/isec.2007.31.3.74

[11] Lloyd J. Austin III, “Department of Defense Releases Memorandum on Improving Civilian Harm Mitigation and Response,” press release, Department of Defense, January 27, 2022, https://www.defense.gov/News/Releases/Release/Article/2914764/department-of-defense-releases-memorandum-on-improving-civilian-harm-mitigation/

[12] National Intelligence Council, Global Trends 2040: A More Contested World (Washington, DC: Office of the Director of National Intelligence, March 2021), https://www.dni.gov/index.php/gt2040-home.

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The views expressed are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Army, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government. 

About the Authors

Professor Michael A. Marra, Colonel (retired), U.S. Air Force, is a veteran of conflicts in Central America, Somalia, Bosnia, Haiti, Liberia, and served in major operations including Desert Shield/Storm/Calm, Enduring Freedom, and Iraqi Freedom as a commander, staff officer and aviator. He is an Associate Professor at the U.S. Army War College in the Department of Military Strategy, Planning and Operations.

Dr. Brett D. Weigle is a retired U.S. Army logistics Colonel. He worked in joint, multinational, and Army command and staff positions in the United States, Bahrain, Germany, Turkey (NATO), Spain (NATO), North Macedonia (NATO), and twice in Korea. He is a veteran of Operations RESTORE HOPE (UNITAF) in Somalia (1992–1993) and JOINT ENDEAVOR in Bosnia (1995–1996). He is an Associate Professor at the U.S. Army War College in the Department of Military Strategy, Planning and Operations.

Story by Dhruv Gopinath.

Wherever U.S. service members may find themselves, Air Force rescue squadrons stand ready to rapidly mobilize, deploy and employ to provide combat and peacetime search and rescue in support of U.S. national security interests. In the Horn of Africa and the 449th Air Expeditionary Group’s area of responsibility, that task falls on members of the 303rd Expeditionary Rescue Squadron and their HH-60W Jolly Green IIs.

“Our role in supporting airpower in East Africa includes providing a continuous 24/7 personnel recovery capability for all U.S. and allied air-assets,” says Capt. John Rudy, 303d ERQS director of operations. “If any emergency occurs, we can respond immediately to rescue those downed aircrew members.”

The geography and situation on the ground in the Horn of Africa create challenges that members of the 303d ERQS plan meticulously around to make sure they can complete their missions.

Photo: U.S. Air Force Tech. Sgt. Justin Frawley, center right, is a special missions aviator assigned to the 303rd Expeditionary Rescue Squadron in the Horn of Africa. (Photo by Tech. Sgt. Dhruv Gopinath).

“East Africa is massive, which creates time, distance, and fuel considerations which impact the mission and require quick coordination to ensure we have what we need to get to the survivor,” says Tech. Sgt. Justin Frawley, an HH-60W Special Mission Aviator with the 303d ERQS. “This forces us to be critical thinkers and come up with sound game plans on the fly.”

When the mission relies on saving lives, it’s critical for members of the 303rd ERQS to maintain not only a high level of readiness but to also be on the same page as their mission partners.

“We work hard to maintain a high level of proficiency with our aircraft and to keep up with current events in our area of responsibility,” says Frawley. “We integrate with multiple units from different services, so every situation we encounter is unique and must be solved differently in order to achieve mission success. Since we deal in lives, our mission cannot fail.”

Working in service of others is a key theme for members of the 303rd, something which is often a family tradition.

Photo: A U.S. Air Force HH-60W Jolly Green II assigned to the 303rd Expeditionary Rescue Squadron sits on the flightline at an undisclosed location in the Horn of Africa, Sept. 4, 2023. (Courtesy photo, Tech. Sgt. Dhruv Gopinath)

“My family has been serving in the military since World War II,” says SrA Bryan Estes, an electrical and environmental journeyman assigned to the 303d ERQS. “To carry on that tradition, I chose this job and I felt this position would allow me to contribute the most toward the mission.”

For Estes, whose home station is Moody Air Force Base, Georgia, being deployed to East Africa has been an eye-opening experience and provided him with a different perspective on the job he performs.

“Out here, there is a heightened sense of purpose because we directly witness the impact of our work we’re a much smaller group of maintenance personnel, so every career field gets to see and learn first-hand how everyone else works,” says Estes. “Seeing the results of what we do first-hand is one of the most rewarding things I have ever experienced in my career.”

The 303rd has been kept busy, not only working with joint forces but with local partners as well.

Photo: U.S. Air Force Capt. John Rudy, 303rd Expeditionary Rescue Squadron director of operations, pilots an HH-60W Jolly Green II over the Horn of Africa, Sept. 5, 2023. (Courtesy photo by Tech. Sgt. Dhruv Gopinath)

“Along with maintaining our personnel recovery alert, our primary task here has been casualty evacuation for local forces in their fight against violent extremist organizations,” says Rudy. “Our ability to launch immediately following the report of injuries and capability to land directly at the point of injury with our highly-skilled pararescue brethren gives our partner force members the best chances of survival after sustaining life-threatening injuries.”

No matter how far from home the members of the 303d ERQS may find themselves, their unique mission and the close bonds they share make the deployment experience incredibly memorable.

“We get to fly, shoot guns and save lives with our best friends,” says Frawley. “Out here I’m a part of the best community the DOD has to offer!”

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This story by Tech. Sgt. Dhruv Gopinath of the 406th Air Expeditionary Wing was first published on September 8, 2023, by the Defense Visual Information Distribution Service. Image derived from CIA map and photos courtesy of DVIDS (photos by Tech. Sgt. Dhruv Gopinath, Sep 2023).

On July 26, 2023, military officers of Niger’s armed forces seized power after detaining the elected president, Mohamed Bazoum. This action has reversed many years of U.S. efforts to assist that country’s transition to a democratic nation. It is also a setback to U.S. efforts to counter jihadist power and influence in the Sahel region of Western Africa. This is the fifth coup in Niger since 1960 (Aljazeera) when it gained its independence as a French colony.

The coup leaders stated that they acted in response to a deteriorating security situation, lack of action against jihadists, and ‘bad governance’. The ousted president is being held in his private residence near the presidential palace in Niamey, the Niger capital. The coup leaders have established a transitional government called the ‘National Council for the Safeguard of the Homeland’. General Abdou Sidikou Issa, Niger’s Chief of Defense, has declared the army’s support for the coup. Some members of the Niger government and senior leaders of political parties have been arrested and detained.

General Tchiani. The coup was led by the president’s own ‘Presidential Guard’. It appears that General Abdourahamane Tchiani, the leader of the Presidential Guard since 2011, has taken the reins of power in Niger. Tchiani has received military training in the United States and France. He received training at the College of International Security Affairs at Fort McNair, Washington, D.C. The Niger president had attempted to force Tchiani into retirement.

West African Nations Reaction. The news of the coup was viewed with dismay by several nations in the region. Some neighboring countries are threatening military intervention against the coup leaders if the president is not restored to power within a week. Nations belonging to the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) have stated that they will restore the president to power using military force; however, that is very unlikely to happen. Niger could be suspended from ECOWAS and be subject to economic sanctions. An economic blockade by ECOWAS could be severe economic ramifications for the landlocked country. ECOWAS has established a no-fly zone for commericial flights in and out of Niger. The country’s finanicial assets in ECOWAS central and commerical bans have been frozen, and a travel ban has been instituted.

Support for the Coup Leaders. A few countries where recent military coups have taken place, like Mali (Africa Center) and Burkina Faso (SOF News), have stated they would support the Niger junta if it is attacked. Both nations were suspended from ECOWAS after military coups replaced the civilian governments of each country.

Reaction of ‘The West’. The United States, the United Nations, the European Union, and other nations have strongly objected to the coup and are pressuring the junta to give up power and return the nation to democratic rule. Many nations have suspended aid programs. There are no indications that the U.S. or European powers will intervene with military force. Of course, if the security situation deteriorates significantly then a ‘limited military operation’ could be conducted to evacuate embassy staff and families as well as foreign nationals.

Status of Foreigners. Embassies are advising their diplomatic staff and foreign nationals to ‘shelter in place’, register with their respective embassies, and await further instructions. Many nations have provided updated information for their citizens on the security situation in Niger. (United Kingdom, United States, Canada, etc.) There have been large crowds at the airport in Niamey and foreigners have been advised not to go to the airport until instructed. The airport is currently closed and is scheduled to reopen on August 5th.

Evacuations. Some countries have begun planning for the evacuation of their citizens and scaling back their embassy personnel in Niamey. France, Spain, and Italy appear to be the leading nations willing to conduct evacuations – promising that they will evacuate citizens of European Union countries. There are news reports that as of Tuesday, August 1st more than 250 Europeans were evacuated from the capital on a French military Airbus 330 that flew to Paris. (New York Times) It is reported that a military plane also departed Niger for Rome as well on Wednesday. French soldiers are at the airport processing evacuees for flights being conducted by the French and Italian military.

U.S. in Niger. As of mid-2023, the U.S. had over 1,100 troops stationed in Niger (some estimates say more); mostly in the capital and in the northern city of Agadez. This is the second-largest U.S. military presence in Africa after the U.S. base – Camp Lemonier – in Djibouti. Niger has been a top recipient of U.S. security assistance and humanitarian aid. It has been, up to now, an important partner for the U.S. and European nations in the middle of a troubled region in the Sahel. Insurgents and terrorists affiliated with Al Qaeda, the Islamic State, and Boko Harma (SOF News) are active in the border regions of Niger.

U.S Reaction. In the past week the United States has suspended its counterterrorism training (The Hill) with soldiers in Niger. Currently (as of Tuesday, August 1st), the U.S. has no plans to evacuate U.S. citizens or diplomatic staff. The U.S. State Department is pursuing diplomatic efforts to reverse the coup. Meanwhile, top Pentagon officials remain in contact with the Niger military to avoid friction and incidents.

A Troubled Region. Niger is a land-locked country surrounded by other nations that are experiencing insurgent and terrorist activity. The countries of Libya, Chad, Mali, Burkina Faso, and Nigeria are all experiencing strife by violent extremist groups. Western nations – U.S. and European countries – have sent a lot of aid and advisors to the region to counter the jihadist groups. The U.S. Special Operations Command – Africa (SOCAFRICA) conducts an annual military exercise in the region where West and Central African nations are trained up in counterinsurgency operations. Niger has been a participant in the Flintlock exercises for many years.

U.S. Drone Bases in Niger. There are two sites where U.S. drones conduct intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) missions that cover the Sahel and eastern Africa. The United States has spent millions of dollars establishing Air Base 201 (AFRICOM) in Agadez, Niger for the purpose of basing drones for ISR. The ISR flights began in 2019 from the Agadez airbase (War Zone provides a detailed description of AB 201); in addition to ISR flights from a second base in Niger. Most of the U.S. military presence is at the Agadez airbase (Google Maps).

U.S. Special Forces Presence in Niger. United States Special Forces has had a years-long presence in Niger working with that nations military forces. The Green Berets have sought (SOF News) to enhance the capabilities of the country’s anti-terrorism units to counter the various terrorist / insurgent groups found in the region. (SOF News). The deployment of U.S. advisors, usually from the 3rd Special Forces Group (SOF News), to Niger has come with a cost. In October 2017, four soldiers lost their lives in an ambush in Niger (SOF News) by insurgents.

Photo: U.S. SOF Training Nigerien Troops during Flintlock Exercise in March, 2017 (Photo by SPC Zayid Ballesteros, U.S. Army)

European Involvement in the Region. Many nations from Europe have contributed troops to the Sahel region in an attempt to mitigate the jihadist threat. The French have lead these efforts in this regard – an example was the establishment of Task Force Takuba (SOF News) – a European SOF organization that conducted operations in the Sahel – as well as Operation Barkhane (Wikipedia). There are reports that there are at least 1,000 French troops in Niger.

Russia’s Involvement? Russia has quietly displaced American and European military advisors in some African nations with paramilitary members of the Wagner Group. In 2022, Mali expelled 5,000 French troops; and 1,500 mercenairies from the Wagner Group soon arrived. The coup in Niger was greeted with favorable comments from Russian leaders and the head of the Wagner Group. The head of the Russian paramilitary group, Yevgeny Prigozhin, described the Niger coup as a good event and has promised assistance to the junta if requested. There are no indications that the Wagner Group played a role in the coup.

Conclusion. The military coup is a significant setback to the efforts to defeat or degrade insurgent and terrorist jihadist organizations in the western and central Sahel region of Africa. It is unlikely that the coup will be reversed – despite the diplomatic efforts of the many nations criticizing the coup leaders and calling for the return of the president to power. Threats by some regional nations to use military force to restore the Nigerien president to office are likely not to be followed through with military intervention. The United States has lost an important ally in its effort to stave off the ever-growing jihadist threat in the region.

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Maps: All maps courtesy of or derived from Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).

Related articles:

“SF Deaths in Niger – The Aftermath”, SOF News, October 20, 2017.
“Special Forces in Niger – Countering Terrorist Groups“, SOF News, October 4, 2017.
“SOF and Boko Haram – Nigeria’s Long-Term Insurgent Nightmare”, SOF News, December 28, 2016.

References:

Niger: In Focus, Congressional Research Service, CRS IF12464, July 31, 2023, PDF, 3 pages. https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF12464

Conflict has enveloped the country of Sudan and U.S. citizens are at risk; many of them seeking to escape the chaos and return to the United States. It is estimated that there are over 16,000 American citizens in Sudan. Some live and work there on a permanent basis. Others traveled there on short-term business trips or were vacationing and visiting family during Ramadan. While many may opt to stay in Sudan and ‘ride it out’; there are thousands who wish to leave – as soon as possible.

The conflict in Sudan (SOF News, Apr 21, 2023) began almost two weeks ago when the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) and Rapid Support Forces (RSF) began fighting each other in the streets of the capital city, Khartoum, and across the country. The fighting took place as the country was scheduled to transition to civilian rule. As the situation deteriorated, many nations decided to evacuate their diplomatic staff. Some got their embassy personnel out as well as a number of their citizens.

The United States conducted an evacuation of the U.S. Embassy staff (SOF News, April 22, 2023) during a period of darkness in the early morning of Sunday, April 23rd (Sudan time). U.S. special operations forces landed helicopters at the location of the U.S. Embassy in Khartoum and evacuated around 70 U.S. embassy staff and families along with about 30 other foreign nationals to Djibouti. The extraction was performed within one hour with no casualties or shots fired. The air assets were fixed-wing aircraft from AFSOC, rotary-wing aircraft from the 160th SOAR, and a ground element of U.S. Navy SEALs. There are some reports that members of the 3rd Special Forces Group were involved as well.

Other nations conducted their embassy staff evacuations during this timeframe or within a few days of the U.S. embassy evacuation. In addition, many nations began evacuating their citizens – putting troops on the ground and landing aircraft at various locations to extract their citizens. However, the United States chose not to conduct a large-scale evacuation of U.S. citizens.

U.S. Is Avoiding a Large-Scale Evacuation

The Department of State is citing security concerns, logistical obstacles, and several other reasons for this non-evacuation of AMCITs policy. It also pointed out that State has issued several ‘do not travel’ warnings for Sudan over the past few yeas. In addition, numerous comments have been made by Biden administration spokesmen that have been stressing the ‘dual-citizenship’ status of the thousands of AMCITs in Sudan; many who have settled there permanently.

There are differences in how different nations are handling the evacuation. Compare the U.S. help for its AMCITs with how the British are doing the evacuation of their citizens. Posted on the UK website are these instructions:

“The British Government will help British nationals to leave Sudan from 25 April. Flights leave from Wadi Saeedna airfield (GPS: 15° 48 10 N, 32° 29 32 E; WhatThreeWords: refusals.atom.herds). Please travel to this location as soon as possible to be processed for the flight.”

GOV.UK, April 25, 2023

The current policy of the United States is to help AMCITs from ‘afar’ – by remotely assisting Americans trying to flee the country . This means ‘no boots on the ground’ (BOG) and no U.S. airplanes landing on Sudan soil. So what type of assistance is State offering? For one, the U.S. is providing drone coverage for the main road between Khartoum in the center of the country and Port Sudan on the coast of the Red Sea. This ‘intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance’ (ISR) information will be shared with allies (UK, France, and others) who do have troops on the ground and who are running convoys to Port Sudan. Apparently, the U.S. is coordinating with other nations who are running evac convoys to take along U.S. citizens. In addition, the U.S. has moved (and continues) to move U.S. Navy vessels to the Red Sea in the vicinity of Port Sudan; ships that can help evacuate AMCITs who make it Port Sudan.

The U.S. State Department is offering the following guidance:

U.S. Department of State Travel Advisory for 24 April 2023:
“Situation in Sudan: Information for U.S. Citizens in Sudan”
https://travel.state.gov/content/travel/en/traveladvisories/ea/situation-in-sudan-2023.html

U.S. Citizens who would like to be informed of options to leave Sudan as security conditions permit should complete this form.
https://cacms.state.gov/s/crisis-intake

State Department says it will assist any private American citizens in Sudan that make their way to Port Sudan and find a way to get onto a ferry to Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. Once in Jeddah consular officers in Jeddah are available to assist them. (Reuters, Apr 25, 2023)

Conducting a Large Scale NEO

Does the U.S. have the capability to conduct a large-scale non-combatant evacuation operation (NEO). Of course it does. It has done this successfully many times in the past. In August 2021, over a two week period, the Department of Defense successfully brought out over 70,000 to 80,000 evacuees from the Hamid Karzai International Airport (HKIA) in Afghanistan. The men and women of the various military services performed extremely well under difficult and dangerous circumstances. However, it was a messy and chaotic affair. The State Department got a big black eye on its decisions and performance and the Biden administration took a huge political hit.

The assets available to the U.S. for a NEO are plentiful. There are numerous U.S. Navy and Air Force bases scattered throughout the Middle East and Europe. Camp Lemonnier in Djibouti is about 800 miles (flying) from Khartoum. U.S. Navy vessels are currently positioned in the Red Sea off the coast of Port Sudan and more are in the region.

There are multiple ‘ground elements’ that could undertake or support a NEO in Sudan. These units include the Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC), The East Africa Response Force (EARF) located at Camp Lemonnier, the 82nd Airborne Division’s Immediate Response Force (IRF), an Amphibious Ready Group (ARG) currently in the Pacific, Special Forces and SEAL units of the Special Operations Command Africa based in Stuttgart, Germany, and other units as well.

Behind the Scenes?

Is the U.S. quietly helping out selected individuals in Sudan? Certainly JSOC and the CIA are not sitting this one out in the embassy compounds and on U.S. military ‘bases’ (small and large) of Ethiopia, Egypt, Kenya, Djibouti, and elsewhere. As in Afghanistan in August 2021, when SOF and the agency had folks going into hostile areas picking up ‘selected’ individuals and bringing them to safety; the same is probably taking place now in Sudan. One wonders if that extra effort is being extended to the typical American family of four from New York City who went to Sudan for a vacation to visit family and got caught up in an unexpected outbreak of hostilities.

What Comes Next?

For the time being, the Biden administration seems content to ‘help from afar’. Hopefully the AMCITs among the 16,000 who are in Sudan and want out, will ‘find their way’ to safety. Most likely, this will happen through the good will, hard work, and bravery of our allies who are ‘on the ground’.

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References:

Sudan NEO, daily log of the conflict in Sudan and evacuation efforts of foreign nationals.
https://www.national-security.info/country/sudan/sudan-neo.html

“U.S. Embassy Staff Evacuated from Khartoum”, SOF News, April 22, 2023
https://sof.news/africa/sudan-embassy-evacuation/

“Crisis in Sudan”, SOF News, April 21, 2023
https://sof.news/africa/sudan-crisis-2023/

On April 22, 2023, Saturday evening (EST), U.S. Special Operations Forces (SOF) evacuated just under 100 American embassy staff from the Khartoum, Sudan embassy. The evacuation took place at approximately 8:00 pm Saturday evening (Washington, D.C. time), about 3:00 am on Sunday morning (Khartoum time).

Screen capture of FIightaware24 showing presence of AJ-130J Ghostrider over Sudan on Saturday evening, April 23, 2023 (Washington, D.C. time).

Air Activity Over Sudan. OSINT twitters began tweeting about the presence of U.S. aircraft over Sudan on Saturday evening just prior to 8:00 pm (D.C. time). The @air_intel Twitter account reported that a HC-13J and two MC-130Js were over Sudan on Saturday evening. Social media from Sudan announced the presence of U.S. helicopters hovering over the U.S. Embassy in Khartoum (@War_Mapper Twitter). For a short while, Flightradar24 depicted an aircraft flying over Khartoum and labeled it as an AC-130J Ghostrider. There were likely more than one AC-130J in the air during the evacuation operation. It has been reported that three MH-47 Chinook helicopters departed Djibouti at 9 am Eastern on Saturday, landed in Ethiopia to refuel, and then proceeded for three more hours to Khartoum. Some news reports say six aircraft from the 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment (SOAR) were used. The air operation was conducted in the early morning hours of Sunday (local time) during periods of darkness by the ‘Night Stalker’ air crews.

On the Ground. According to news reporter Jim LaPorta, elements of the Navy’s SEAL Team Six and the Army’s 3rd Special Forces Group participated in the evacuation of the U.S. Embassy in Khartoum. Al-Monitor is reporting that the evacuation was conducted by US Navy SEAL Team 6 and Army Special Operations personnel, planned by US Africa Command and Joint Special Operations Command. It has been reported that the personnel were picked up helicopters. In the beginning days of the conflict the embassy personnel were ‘sheltering in place’ in various locations in Khartoum; but gathered at the embassy compound for evacuation by Friday night. The helicopters spent about one hour on the ground in Khartoum. There were a number of DoD assets for a NEO operation in the Sudan region; this being a relatively limited NEO DoD went with a JSOC and some SF elements.

News Announcements of the Evacuation. The Rapid Support Forces (RSF) announced on their Twitter account that they had help coordinate and support the evacuation of the U.S. Embassy staff. It is a matter of speculation exactly how much the RSF actually assisted in the evacuation; the U.S. State Department says the cooperation was minimal. (DoS) Soon other social media accounts and news outlets were sending out bulletins about the evacuation of embassy personnel approximately 9:00 pm (D.C. time).

Flown to Djibouti. The evacuees were flown to Camp Lemonnier, Djibouti where they either were bunked down for the remainder of the early morning or immediately transloaded onto waiting C-17s for a military base in Europe. Camp Lemonnier is a big naval base that at one time housed over 2,500 U.S. military service personnel. The flight of the helicopters from DJ to Sudan and back encompassed 800 miles each way. Among those evacuated were members of the Marine Corps who had been providing security for the embassy on a permanent basis.

Coordination Aspects of NEO. The governments of Djibouti, Ethiopia, and Saudi Arabia aided the U.S. evacuation operation. The evacuation was under the command of U.S. Africa Command and conducted in close coordination wit the U.S. State Department.

News stories on the Evacuation:

• “US evacuates embassy in Sudan’s capital Khartoum”, Al-Monitor, April 22, 2023.
• “US embassy personnel in Sudan evacuated amid violent conflict”, Fox News, April 22, 2023.
• “US Embassy Staff Evacuated from Sudan”, Voice of America, April 22, 2023.
• “Statement from President Joe Biden on the Situation in Sudan”, White House, April 23, 2023.

Statement by SECDEF: (link)

“Today, at the direction of the President, the U.S. military conducted a successful operation to safely evacuate U.S. government personnel out of Sudan. This action, led by U.S. Africa Command and conducted in close coordination with the U.S. State Department, demonstrates the Department of Defense’s support for our nation’s diplomatic personnel. I’m proud of our extraordinary service members who executed and supported this operation with outstanding precision and professionalism. We also thank our allies and partners, including Djibouti, Ethiopia, and Saudi Arabia, which were critical to the success of this operation.”

Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin II on Sudan, April 22, 2023

And the American Citizens? The United States has stated that the evacuation was only for U.S. embassy staff. There may be a larger, coalition led operation for the evacuation of foreign nationals. There are approximately 16,000 Americans in Sudan; many of them likely dual-citizens. The Pentagon and State Department are exploring options to make the overland route out of the country more viable. The land route would likely end at Port Sudan where the American citizens could board U.S., partner nation, or contracted ships for a voyage to other locations – possibly Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. Inquiries related to U.S. citizens in Sudan should be directed to ACSKhartoum@state.gov. The land route takes approximately 12 hours according to some news sources and it is a dangerous trip that may not provide fuel, water, and food along the route.

DoD Assistance for American Citizens? U.S. Naval vessels from the U.S. Navy’s 5th Fleet based in Bahrain are being moved to the Red Sea where they will position off the coast near Port Sudan. It was announced (DoS) that a deconfliction cell would be established at the U.S. Africa Command in Stuttgart, Germany to coordinate and support an overland route. DoD will use intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities to explore viable and safe land routes for American citizens.

The Department of State has suspended operations at the U.S. Embassy in Khartoum. On the evening of April 22, 2023 it issued another advisory – do not travel to Sudan. It advises those Americans in Sudan to enroll in the Smart Traveler Enrollment Program (STEP) and to review the OSAC Country Security Report for Sudan.

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THIS IS A DEVELOPING STORY AND WILL BE UPDATED AS NEW INFORMATION IS AVAILABLE.

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Maps: Derived from CIA maps.

References:

“Crisis in Sudan”, SOF News, April 21, 2023.
Briefing, Department of State, April 22, 2023
Sudan NEO by national-security.info
Maps of Sudan by national-security.info
NEO References by national-security.info

Over the last several days the security situation in Sudan has become worse. There is fighting in the capital city of Khartoum, the airport is closed, hundreds of lives have been lost, and thousands injured. Most of the essentials of living (food, water, electricity, medical care, etc.) are in short supply or no longer available. It is unclear which faction controls what part of the country. The fighting has interrupted what many had hoped would be a peaceful transition to civilian rule in the coming weeks; one that should have started at the beginning of April.

Fight Between Two Warring Parties. The clash between the warring parties began on or about April 14, 2023. The two factions are the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and a paramilitary group known as the Rapid Support Forces (RSF). Both commanded by opposing Sudanese generals. In addition, there are a host of other local warlords, militias, and violent groups within Sudan contributing to the chaos. The leaders of both factions have been jockeying for power in the soon to be formed civilian government.

Al-Burhan and SAF. Sudanese President Genearl Abdel Fattah al-Burhan is head of the country’s transitional governing Sovereign Council. Sudanese soldiers are loyal to army chief Abdel Fattah al-Burhan (Wikipedia). The situation has been, according to al-Burhan, characterized as a rebellion and coup against the government of Sudan.

Dagalo and RSF. The Rapid Support Forces forces or RSF are led by Vice President General Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo; he is deputy head of the Sovereign Council. Dagalo is a former camel herder from the Darfur region and has economic interests in minerals and livestock. The RSF was created in 2013 by former President Omar Hassan al-Bashir. The roots of the RSF can be found in a pro-government Janjaweed militia that was active in Darfur in the early 2000s where a local rebellion was defeated. The RSF also sent fighters to Yemen in the battle against Iran-aligned rebels; on behalf of some Gulf region countries.

Background to the Conflict. The two generals had been sharing power since an October 2021 coup. Disagreements arose over the integration of the Rapid Support Forces into the Sudanese Armed Forces. In addition, members of the Sudanese military feared the loss of control over revenue generating functions in the government and in society with a move to civilian control. Corruption has always played a large role in Sudan. A breakdown of the origins of the current conflict is presented by Jelena Pejic in “The Fighting in Sudan is an Armed Conflict: Here’s What Law Applies”, Just Security, April 20, 2023. The Pejic article also explores the legal status of the SAF and RSF.

Other Actors. There are reports that some regional nations may be providing support to the combatant forces. Egypt is believed to have sent aircraft to Sudan and possibly tanks and military personnel to support the government forces. It has close ties with Sudan’s military as it sees it as an ally against Ethiopia. Some reports indicate that the Russian paramilitary organization – the Wagner Group – could be aiding the RSF (CNN, Apr 21, 2023). The PMC is reported to have operated in Sudan since 2017. Russia would like to set up a small naval contingent in Port Sudan on the Red Sea. In addition, international media sources say that General Dagalo and the RSF are backed by Libyan warlord Khalifa Haftar. The United Arab Emirates has close ties with the RSF.

Embassy Staff. Nations around the world are worried about their diplomatic staffs and their nationals that are living and working in Sudan. The United States has Department of State (DoS) embassy personnel that need to be evacuated but no attempt has been made thus far. DoS is instructing embassy personnel to ‘shelter in place’. The Department of State says it has ‘full accountability’ of its embassy personnel.

U.S. Citizens. Thousands of U.S. citizens who live or work in Sudan are in danger as well; many of them dual citizens. There are reports that at least one American citizen has died in the violence (according to DoS). It is impossible to leave the country by air as the Khartoum International Airport is closed due to battle damage and battles occurring on or near the airport. The State Department has stated that it is not safe to undertake a U.S. government coordinated evacuation of private American citizens at this time. There are about 19,000 Americans in Sudan. A Department of State spokesman ‘waffled’ a bit on April 20th when asked by journalists at a press conference if the U.S. was prepared or planning to evacuate U.S. citizens who were not embassy employees.

Refugees, Displaced Civilians, and Humanitarian Issues. Thousands of Sudanese, most from the Darfur region (Wikipedia), have fled to neighboring countries; many to Chad (CIA map). They are traveling along the roads as air travel is nonexistent in Sudan at this time. There are reports that Sudan’s southern border with Chad has been closed. Many Sudanese have fled the areas of the fighting for safer regions of Sudan. They are suffering from lack of shelter and food. Delivery of humanitarian supplies by international organizations has been extremely curtained due to the security situation.

U.S. Response. Up to now, the United States response to the crisis has been to encourage the two opponents to cease hostilities and to engage regional powers close to Sudan to use their influence to end the conflict. Secretary of State Antony Blinken has spoken with (DoS) the two generals leading the forces in the conflict; asking for a ceasefire. Thus far, the diplomatic efforts have been a failure; at least from what can be gleaned from open source news reports.

International Response. Countries around the world are weighing in on the conflict – using their influence to negotiate a ceasefire and end to the hostilities. The United Nations has been very active in attempts to bring an end to the conflict as well. Germany and Norway made some initial attempts to evacuate embassy personnel but these did not pan out. Some other nations are positioning forces in the region (aircraft, etc.) but they have not entered Sudan as of yet. Most of the international response has been public comments and diplomacy behind the scenes.

Ceasefire. Two cessations to the fighting have occurred, but both were unsuccessful. There is hope that another ceasefire will take place over the Eid al-Fitr celebrations. This would allow citizens to escape the conflict zones, receive medical care, and find food and shelter. The U.S. Department of State said on April 20th (DoS) that the “24-hour ceasefire announced on April 19th has mostly held.” The statement that the ceasefire ‘has mostly held’ has been questioned by many observers of the conflict. The Department of State is hoping that the ceasefire can be extended (DoS) to Sunday, April 23rd, which would be the end of Eid.

NEO. At this point, the United States has determined that it can’t evacuate its embassy staff or any of the thousands of American citizens. That is, until the security situation improves. At some point, the United States may decide to conduct a non-combatant evacuation operation. A Sudan NEO would most likely be preceded with some intense negotiations between the United States and the two warring factions to ensure that the U.S. does not get dragged into a civil war. It is unlikely that the United States would conduct a ‘forcible entry’ into the airport.

Khartoum International Airport. The largest airport in Sudan, Khartoum International Airport (Wikipedia), is located in the capital city. As of April 20th it was closed to air traffic. Media reports indicate that the airport was a target of heavy shelling with destroyed airplanes on the runways and ramps.

U.S. Forces Moving. The U.S. is currently positioning military forces and assets at Camp Lemonnier (Wikipedia) in the country of Djibouti (CIA map). Camp Lemonnier is usually home to about 2,500 service members who belong to Combined Joint Task Force – Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA). This TF conducts a variety of operations in the Horn of Africa region. Forces in Djibouti are about 1,000 miles distant (1,700 kilometers); about a 4 hour and 40 minute flight. Camp Lemonnier is the best location from which to stage a NEO and to where evacuees would first be sent before their onward movement to another location.

U.S. Future Actions? The current administration has still not recovered from the chaotic Afghanistan non-combatant evacuation operation (Afghan War News) conducted in August 2021. One hopes that the Department of State has learned a few lessons since then. If it decides to conduct a NEO then hopefully the planning has already been done and the Department of Defense is ready to execute it.

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Maps: Derived from maps by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).

A military coup took place in in Burkina Faso in September 2022 and Captain Ibrahim Traore seems to be in charge on the country at this time. The coup displaced Lt. Col. Paul-Henri Sandaogo Damiba who came to power in a military coup in January 2022. The new leader, in his mid-30s, joined the Burkina Faso army in 2009. He has fought in counterinsurgency campaigns in the north of the country and was promoted to Captain in 2020. He initially supported Damiba in early 2022; but like many supporters, grew discontented with Damiba’s policies. Burkina Faso is a former French colony in West Africa. It is reported that the September coup was supported by the Cobras ‘special forces’ unit.

Burkina Faso has a population of about 22 million people and is roughly the size of the state of Colorado (USA). The country is faced with violence by insurgents affiliated with Al Qaeda and the Islamic State (IS). The impoverished country is experiencing humanitarian situations.

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Burkina Faso: Conflict and Military Rule, Congressional Research Office (CRS), 2022.
https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF10434

Master Sgt. Steven Corely of the 20th Special Forces Group was awarded the Purple Heart for action in northwest Africa in January 2022. Photo by Staff Sgt. Jasmonet Holmes, April 8, 2022.

In a rare public recognition of U.S. special operations forces in Africa, Master Sgt. Steven Corley, an intelligence noncommissioned officer with 2nd Battalion, 20th Special Forces Group (Airborne), was awarded the Purple Heart during a ceremony in Stuttgart, Germany, April 8, 2022.

The Purple Heart medal is one of the U.S. military’s oldest medals dating back to 1782. It recognizes military members who were wounded or killed in combat.

Master Sgt. Corley earned the award in January of 2022 while serving as the leader of a six-person team in northwest Africa where he was responsible for intelligence exploitation and integration with partners and allies. Though wounded in an attack on base where he was assigned, he assisted partner forces in locating the point from which his element was attacked.

“Wherever you look in Africa, when it’s somewhere tough or dangerous, SOCAFRICA is there,” said Gen. Steven Townsend, AFRICOM commander. “Master Sergeant Corley did what U.S. forces typically do when wounded, stay in the fight until they pass out or are instructed to stand down.”

Master Sgt. Corley was medically evacuated the following day and has spent his time since the attack focusing on physical recovery and staying in the fight from SOCAFRICA headquarters in Stuttgart, Germany.

“This has been an amazing rotation in seeing how much the battalion has done for the mission,” said Master Sgt. Corley. “I especially want to thank my family, my battalion, and the staff at Landstuhl [military hospital], especially the rehab team, for doing an amazing job taking care of me. I’m very fortunate to be here to accept this medal.”

Special Operations Command Africa engages with partner-force militaries on the African continent daily, both in person and virtually.

“Master Sgt. Corley’s service and sacrifice are indicative of the great work our teams do across the continent,” said Rear Adm. Milton J. Sands III, Special Operations Commander Africa commander. “We have folks in Africa who are in harm’s way to ensure we see threats coming that could threaten our nation. There are those out in the world who would attack America – Special Operations Command Africa service members, like Master Sgt. Corley, stands as a sentinel.”

Master Sgt. Corley joined the U.S. Army in September 2001, enlisting in 2nd Battalion 20th Special Forces Group (Airborne), Mississippi Army National Guard. He has deployed in support of Operation Enduring Freedom six times, including three times to Afghanistan, once to Lebanon, and currently serving his second tour with Special Operations Task Force – Northwest Africa under Special Operations Command Africa.

Some of his previous awards and decorations include two Bronze Stars, a Meritorious Service Medal, Joint Service Commendation Medal, six Army Commendation Medals, and the Humanitarian Assistance Medal for Hurricane Katrina.

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This courtesy story by Special Operations Command Africa was originally published on April 8, 2022 by the Defense Visual Information Distribution Service. DVIDS content is in the public domain.

U.S. Special Forces have deployed to Mozambique for an extended training mission with select military units of the Armed Defense Forces of Mozambique. The past few years have seen a surge of insurgent activity in northern Mozambique. ISIS is attempting to establish a “caliphate” in the southern region of Africa and seems to have established strong links with the local insurgency named al-Shabab (“young people” in Arabic). The Mozambique insurgent group is a separate entity from the Somalia-based al-Shabab insurgent group of the same name.

Foreign Terrorist Organizations Designation. The United States maintains that the Mozambique al-Shabaab is an extension of the Islamic State. On March 10, 2021, the United States listed ISIS in Mozambique as a foreign terrorist organization. The statement designated the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria – Mozambique (ISIS-Mozambique) as a Foreign Terrorist Organization. ISIS-Mozambique is also known as Ansar al-Sunna (and locally as al-Shabaab in Mozambique) according to the State Department. Another name for the group is the Ahlu Sunna Wal Jammah (ASWJ). The designation requires the US government and its allies to freeze and confiscate the assets of all those associated with ISIS-Mozambique. Some observers worry that the terrorist designation will make it difficult to conduct peace negotiations in the future and could hamper delivery of humanitarian aid and supplies.

IS’s “Central Africa Province”. The Islamic State has seen its physical caliphate in Iraq and Syria dismantled. However, it is broadening its presence throughout the world. An IS franchise can be found in eastern Afghanistan using the name of the Islamic State of Khorasan Province (ISKP). Throughout many African countries it also has ties to insurgent groups. Since 2019 IS has declared the existence of the “Central Africa Province” which includes parts of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Mozambique.

Special Forces Training for FADM. On March 15, 2021 the US embassy in Mozambique issued a press release that stated US special operations forces would support Mozambique’s efforts to prevent the spread of terrorism and violent extremism. The Green Berets are deployed on a two-month long training mission to aid in the fight against an insurgency with ties to ISIS. The Mozambique Marines will be the recipients of the training program. The Deputy Commander of US Special Operations Command Africa (SOCAFRICA) was in Maputo, the capital city of Mozambique, in mid-March and stated that the ‘modest’ training program consists of a dozen Army Green Berets. His visit coincided with the opening event of the Joint Combined Exchange Training (JCET) between the US and Mozambican forces. In addition, the US will provide advice and support in intelligence as well as some medical and communications equipment.

Portugal SOF to Assist. Portugal may be providing up to 60 members of its special forces to provide some military assistance. Arrival of the trainers could be as soon as April 2021. Mozambique is a former colony of Portugal. It gained its independence from Portugal in 1975 after a long struggle between the guerrilla forces of the Mozambique Liberation Front (FRELIMO) and Portugal. For many years during the Cold War Mozambique fell into orbit of the ‘eastern’ block of communist ruled nations. Lisbon will be encouraging the European Union to consider offering assistance to Mozambique at an informal gathering of EU defense ministers in late May 2021.

Country Profile. Mozambique is a country nearly twice the size of California with a population of almost 28 million people. It currently faces a range of political, economic, and security challenges. Mozambique is represented by people of diverse religions. Christians number about 60%, Muslims about 19%, and another 21 % are other or unknown.

Cabo Delgado Province. The northernmost province of Mozambique has seen the insurgency increase in strength since 2017. The ranks of the insurgents come from local fighters of the province. The province is located along the southern border of Tanzania and has a coastline on the Indian Ocean. The Cabo Delgado Province has about 2.3 million people – most of them Muslim. The region is rich in off-shore natural gas reserves and minerals. The conflict has resulted in a severe humanitarian crisis in northern Mozambique with many people in search of food. Hundreds of thousands of people have been displaced in the conflict area.

Insurgent Grievances. The province has a high illiteracy and unemployment rate – which breeds discontent and encourages recruits to join the insurgent group. Grievances include lack of jobs, poverty, and access to land. In addition, the rich off-shore natural gas reserves are currently being explored by multinational energy companies with little chance that the local population will benefit. There is a belief that the rich natural resources of the northern province is being exploited by central government officials and foreign corporations.

Insurgency. The insurgent group formed up in 2017. Members include poor fishermen and local workers who split off from the established religious leaders. In time more people joined and the group began conducting small-scale violent attacks against police and local officials. Over the past few years the group has become more dangerous with its attacks against security forces and civilians. The insurgent group has between 800 to 3,500 fighters – depending on the source of the information. The assistance from IS appears to be minimal. IS has provided a minimal level of media support. A United Nations report has information that trainers and explosive experts traveled to Mozambique to provide training and advise. There is a foreign fighter presence within the insurgency – most from neighboring Tanzania.

Atrocities. The Islamic State affiliated group has been conducting a number of atrocities to include the beheading of children as young as eleven years old. The US State Department estimates that ISIS-Mozambique has killed thousands of civilians. Beheadings by the jihadist group are a common occurrence.

Types of Attacks. The group is responsible for orchestrating a series of large scale and sophisticated attacks in the region. They briefly held the strategic port of Mocimboa da Praia in Cabo Delgado Province. The insurgent group targets police stations, government facilities and personnel, and local civilians. Farms have been destroyed and villages burned down. Contractors working for the U.S.-based energy firm Anadarko have been targeted as well. The weapons used include small arms and explosives. Many of its weapons have come from the government security forces during raids and ambushes conducted by the insurgents.

FADM. The Armed Defense Forces of Mozambique (FADM) are comprised of approximately 11,000 personnel. There are 10,000 Army, 200 Navy, and 1,000 Air Force personnel (CIA figure from 2019). The military’s equipment is primarily Soviet-era although India has been providing some equipment in recent years.

PMCs. Mozambique has been engaging in the services of private military corporations (PMCs) from foreign nations. Some reports indicate that there has been limited success by the security forces with the assistance of the PMCs.

At least one PMC is of Russian origin – numbering between 160 and 200. They arrived in 2019 on An-124 transport aircraft. Mozambique – despite being a poor country – has natural resources that make it attractive for outside investment. These include precious minerals and natural gas. So there is a strong incentive for the Russians to become involved in the affairs of Mozambique. Recent reports indicate that the Russians have withdrawn from the conflict area after suffering several casualties.

A more recent PMC is from South Africa – the Dyck Advisory Group (DAG). Human rights organizations have accused the South Africa mercenaries of human rights abuses. DAG provided training, advice, armored vehicles, and aviation services (helicopters and attack aircraft). The effectiveness of the South African contractors is still being determined.

Future Outlook? The Mozambique security forces are not highly skilled in counterinsurgency and lack the capability to use intelligence to target the insurgents. There is friction between the police and military which hampers the joint effort to confront the insurgency. It is hoped that the introduction of US Special Forces will improve the professionalism of the some of the Mozambique security forces to the extent that they can successfully combat and degrade the insurgent group. The advisory program will likely need to be longer than two months and scaled up in size for any real long-term benefit to occur.

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Graphic. Derived from CIA maps.